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Abstract
In this thesis, we discuss air cargo capacity control problems. We model these problems as
Markov decision processes because they require dynamic decisions under uncertain conditions.
Our focus is on analyzing decision models featuring structured optimal decisions on the one hand
and on developing efficient heuristics as well as bounds on the other hand. We analyze three
different decision problems:
First, we study a basic single-leg air cargo capacity control problem. The structural properties
of optimal actions have not yet been discussed in the currently available literature. We argue
that optimal decisions are not simply structured, and thus propose further decision models,
which feature an optimal control limit policy. Further, we determine feasible solutions to the
basic model by means of heuristics that are based on decomposition and approximate dynamic
programming. We also propose upper bounds on the optimal objective value.
The second problem optimizes the availability of both seats and cargo capacity on a single leg.
Controlling the availability of these resources is traditionally split up into two independent tasks
in both practice and research. We propose an integrated model that simultaneously controls the
availability of both resources. Since optimal decisions are not simply structured, we propose an
additional model, which features an optimal monotone switching curve policy. Furthermore, we
suggest a decomposition and a bid price heuristic for solving the basic integrated model. The
bid prices are obtained via a deterministic linear program, which provides an upper bound on
the optimal objective value.
In the third decision problem, the availability of cargo capacity for an entire network of flights
is optimized. Current research on network air cargo revenue management either significantly
simplifies the underlying decision problem or focuses on developing new solution techniques. We
pursue the question of how well-researched passenger network revenue management methods can
be adopted to a cargo context when capacity and capacity requirement uncertainties are ac-
counted for. Since the capacity control problem is very complex, we suggest several upper bound
problems and heuristics based on linear programming, approximate dynamic programming, and
decomposition approaches.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the US government passed the law to deregulate the airline market in 1978, cost efficiency,
operating profitability, and competitive behavior have become crucial management issues (Be-
lobaba, 2009, pp. 1-2). Even though airlines have been free to set ticket prices, increasing
competition has forced them to offer low fares. In recent years, being profitable has become
difficult for airlines since operating costs, which are largely driven by the oil price and labor
costs, have increased. Furthermore, ticket prices have been low since customers have become in-
creasingly price-sensitive, and many low cost carriers have entered the market. Numerous major
carrier bankruptcies, such as United, US Airways, Delta, or Air Canada, have demonstrated that
profitably operating an airline is challenging. Pilarski (2007, p. 3) even describes the financial
situation of the airline industry to be ”between disaster and catastrophe”. Consequently, airline
management actively seeks sources for cost minimization or revenue maximization. For example,
in 2012, in order to improve annual profits by over 2 billion dollars, Lufthansa German Airlines
introduced a three-year cost cutting program (Lufthansa, 2012).
Traditionally, an airline’s strategic focus has been on carrying passengers. Transporting cargo
on combination carriers was considered rather as a byproduct. According to Rathert (2006),
”cargo has always been the misunderstood and unglamorous step-child of the airline industry”.
However, due to the described pressure on profitability, airlines have started paying increasingly
attention to potential contributions from cargo operations (see e.g. Shaw, 2004, p. 39; Sandhu &
Klabjan, 2006; Rathert, 2006; Graff, 2008; Parthasarathy, 2010). In order to improve efficiency
and customer service, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) has even funded a
non-profit industry group that defines quality standards for cargo supply chains (IATA, 2012).
Today, for many airlines, cargo has become an important source of revenue and on average
contributes 15% of total air traffic revenue (Boeing, 2013). While all airlines at least sell cargo
space on their passenger aircraft to generate additional revenue, many carriers operate an extra
fleet of pure freighters to take advantage of demand for air freight. For instance, LAN Airlines
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generates 39.3% of its total revenue from transporting cargo (LAN, 2012), and for Korean Air,
cargo accounts for 29.7% of total revenue (Korean Air, 2012).
While air freight may be up to ten times as expensive as surface transport, it offers the
advantage of speed and reliability (Shaw, 2004, pp. 40-47). Typical goods, for which air transport
is chosen, are high tech products or perishable goods like fresh fruits (MergeGlobal, 2008). In
general, the benefits of speed and reliability are crucial for companies operating global supply
chains. Production strategies such as just-in-time and just-in-sequence, which avoid any stock
building, increase the importance of a quick and highly reliable transport even further. The
increasing importance of air cargo is also reflected in past and forecasted traffic data (see Figure
1.1): Global air cargo traffic grew on average 3.7% per year between 2001 and 2011, with a drop
in demand in 2009. Annual growth is predicted as on average 5.2% until 2031, which implies that
total air traffic will triple between 2011 and 2031. According to Airbus (2011), the main growth
drivers are international trade expansion, especially to and from China, and the development
of domestic express freight in China, India, and Brazil. While demand is expected to increase
3Copyright © 2012 Boeing. All rights reserved.
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Figure 1.1: World air cargo traffic (Boeing, 2013)
significantly, air freight yields have on average declined at 4.2% per year between 1991 and 2011
(see Figure 1.2), which is owed to, among others, overcapacity and intense competition (Vinod
& Narayan, 2008).
In summary, on the supply side, in order to compensate for profit challenges in the passenger
business, airlines have started focusing on revenue opportunities from cargo. On the demand
side, air freight traffic is expected to increase significantly, but yields are low. Thus, selling the
right product to the right customer at the right time is highly important in order to capture
market demand and increase yields. This brings along the question of which decision rules to
2
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Figure 1.2: Cargo yields (Boeing, 2013)
follow when selling cargo capacity to customers. Below, we provide a description of the associated
decision problem.
The Decision Problem
Consider a cargo revenue manager who receives short-term booking requests over a finite booking
horizon. A request for a shipment type is characterized by the shipment’s weight and volume
requirement, origin and destination of the fr igh , and its contribution margin per unit. The
aircraft (or multiple aircraft), which connects the specific origin and destination, have a limited
weight and volume capacity. When the revenue manager receives a booking request, a decision
has to be made whether the incoming request is accepted or rejected. Accepting the request
gives the airline the particular contribution margin times the shipment’s capacity requirement.
Rejecting the request implies that demand is lost, but capacity is saved for later requests. The
objective in this decision problem is to determine an acceptance policy that maximizes the overall
contribution margin. Since the cargo capacity control problem is one component of the revenue
management process, the term ’revenue’ rather than ’contribution margin’ is usually used despite
abusing the terminology.
1.1 Research Questions and Contributions
This work focuses on modeling cargo capacity control problems of airlines and determining
decision rules which maximize the revenue from selling available capacity. In general, air cargo
space can be sold based on either long-term contracts (allotments) or on a short term basis.
3
1 Introduction
We focus our research on managing short term capacity on what is known as ”spot market”.
Accordingly, we attempt to provide revenue-maximizing decision rules for decision makers who
have to decide whether an incoming short-term request, for a particular shipment, should be
accepted or rejected.
Cargo is 20 years behind the passenger business when it comes to implementing revenue man-
agement solutions (Rathert, 2006). According to Kasilingam (2011, p. 179), only a few airlines
have actually implemented revenue management systems. Thus, advanced and comprehensible
decision support tools, which are easy to implement, are required. However, translating the
capacity control problem into a mathematical model and solving it is not straightforward. In
comparison to seat inventory control, cargo capacity control is more complex, therefore making
most models computationally expensive. This is why, in cargo revenue management, research
focuses on solving the decision problem heuristically (see for instance Amaruchkul et al., 2007;
Levina et al., 2011). For a system state comprising two capacity dimensions, Xiao & Yang (2010)
provide the only study on the exact and analytical-form solution. However, the authors present
a capacity control model which is applicable in maritime rather than air cargo revenue manage-
ment. A similar study for air cargo has not yet been carried out. Given this research gap, the
first part of our work analyzes structural properties of optimal solutions for the single-leg air
cargo capacity control problem. In particular, our contributions are the following:
• We argue that the basic single-leg capacity control problem, modeled as a Markov decision
process, does not feature an optimal monotone control policy, and we provide reasons for
this finding.
• Further decision problems are modeled, using Markov decision processes, which make as-
sumptions regarding admissible actions and demand. This yields optimal monotone control
limit policies, which first, due to their comprehensible structure, are easy to understand
for revenue managers, and second, due to a reduced computational complexity, are easy to
implement.
• We propose a decomposition heuristic that provides a feasible solution to the basic capacity
control problem and offers structured decisions based on switching curves.
• In order to obtain bid prices for weight and volume, a piecewise linear approximation of
the value function is proposed. These bid prices are then used to construct a price-directed
heuristic. Furthermore, the linear program determining these bid prices provides an upper
bound on the maximum expected revenue of the basic capacity control problem.
Controlling the availability of seats and cargo capacity are traditionally two independent tasks.
Airlines justify this approach by simply assuming that passenger profitability is higher than
the equivalent cargo profitability (Kasilingam, 2011, p. 167). Independently performing the
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two optimization steps certainly keeps computational complexity manageable; however, it does
clearly not maximize an airline’s overall revenue. Ideally, according to Kasilingam (2011, p.
167), airlines should control an aircraft’s overall capacity based on profitability of passengers
versus cargo and thereby set up competition between the two sources of profit. Pilon (2007) even
describes an integrated optimization as ”the ultimate prospect for revenue management”. Graff
(2008) remarks that in future, airlines need to be willing to reject passengers in favor of cargo in
order to make money even though this contradicts today’s business practices. Although the need
for an integrated optimization clearly exists, no attempt has yet been made to model the decision
problem. Due to the lack of quantitative approaches, the second part of our study proposes and
analyzes a model for integrated capacity control both of cargo capacity and passenger seats. In
detail, our contributions are:
• We formulate a basic integrated single-leg capacity control problem for cargo space and pas-
senger seats as a finite-horizon Markov decision process and analyze the optimal solutions’
structural properties.
• We propose a further decision model that makes specific assumptions regarding admissible
actions and demand. This gives us an optimal, simply structured, and comprehensible
policy.
• A decomposition heuristic is proposed which gives a feasible solution to the basic integrated
capacity control problem and offers a control policy based upon decision rules that are
monotone in capacity.
• We propose a further heuristic, which is based on bid prices obtained through a linear
program. The solution of the linear program produces an upper bound on the maximum
expected revenue of the basic capacity control problem.
Most currently available research regarding cargo revenue management focuses on single-leg
problems. There are only four studies about the network problem: These are Pak & Dekker
(2004), Luo & Shi (2006), Popescu (2006), and Levina et al. (2011). Only the latter accounts for
real-world challenges such as uncertainty in available capacity and shipments’ capacity require-
ment. Furthermore, these authors model an infinite-horizon problem and focus on developing
a new value function approximation. However, in a network context, there has not been any
attempt to adopt methods, which are thoroughly studied as well as commonly accepted in pas-
senger revenue management, while accounting for uncertainty in both capacity and capacity
requirement. Given this research deficit, in the third part of this work, we pursue the question of
how methods from passenger network revenue management can be adopted in a cargo network
context, where real-world challenges are taken into account. Specifically, our contributions can
be summarized as follows:
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• We model the capacity control problem of a carrier operating flights on a network based
on a finite-horizon Markov decision process. Three sources of uncertainty are accounted
for: First, uncertain booking request arrival; second, uncertain aircraft capacity; and third,
uncertain shipment capacity requirement.
• We extend a linear programming upper bound of Amaruchkul et al. (2007) into our network
setting and account for uncertain capacity. We further suggest a randomized as well as a
partially randomized linear programming upper bound problem.
• An affine value function approximation is proposed to obtain a method which determines
bid prices for both weight and volume units on each leg of an air cargo network; we further
discuss the structural properties of the resulting bid prices.
• We propose a decomposition approach that builds on those bid prices and show that this
method also provides an upper bound on the maximum expected revenue.
• We suggest a piecewise linear approximation of the value function, which accounts for the
state of overbooking on each leg.
1.2 Outline
All the decision models analyzed in this work cover problems that are relevant in the field of
air cargo revenue management. Hence, in Chapter 2, we provide a comprehensive introduction
to this topic. In particular, we describe major characteristics and complexities of the cargo
business and provide an introduction to the fundamentals of revenue management. Furthermore,
a comparison between passenger and cargo revenue management is provided, and a literature
review on air cargo capacity control models is presented.
The theoretical foundations for modeling, analyzing, and approximating the decision problems
are outlined in Chapter 3. We introduce Markov decision processes as special types of stochastic
dynamic decision processes. In addition, since we analyze optimal monotone control policies of
two-dimensional decision problems, the required theoretical concepts like multimodularity are
provided. Also included in this chapter is the outline of the linear programming approach to
approximate dynamic programming. We use this method to approximate the value function of
the Markov decision processes.
In Chapter 4, we analyze optimal decisions of the single-leg air cargo capacity control prob-
lem. Additionally, we propose decision models that feature an optimal monotone control policy.
Furthermore, heuristics that determine feasible solutions of the basic capacity control problem
are developed and tested using numerical experiments. We also propose upper bounds on the
maximum expected revenue of the capacity control problem and test their quality using the same
experiments.
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1.2 Outline
Chapter 5 discusses a model which simultaneously controls both cargo capacity and passenger
seats on combination carriers. We propose a further decision model that features an optimal
monotone control policy. Heuristics for solving the original decision problem and an upper
bound on the maximum expected revenue are provided. Furthermore, the bound’s quality as
well as the heuristics’ performance are assessed using numerical experiments.
In Chapter 6, we propose a model for the air cargo network capacity control problem that
accounts for uncertain capacity and capacity requirement. Since this model suffers from the curse
of dimensionality much more than the single-leg model, our focus is on developing heuristics and
upper bounds. In particular, we propose a bound and a heuristic based upon bid prices obtained
through an affine value function approximation. In order to improve the heuristic and bound,
we develop a dynamic programming decomposition approach that uses these bid prices. All
heuristics and bounds are tested using extensive numerical experiments.
Chapter 7 summarizes the studies we carried out and proposes some potential directions for
future research.
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Chapter 2
Air Cargo Revenue Management
In this chapter, we provide an overview of air cargo revenue management. In order to get an
adequate understanding of how the cargo business works, we describe the basics of air cargo
transportation in Section 2.1. An overview of the fundamentals of revenue management is pro-
vided in Section 2.2. In particular, we outline the motivation for applying revenue management
techniques and a general definition. Additionally, we present an appropriate environment for ef-
fective application and describe major components of revenue management. Section 2.3 explores
the differences between air cargo and passenger revenue management. The results highlight the
need for specific solutions for cargo revenue management. In Section 2.4, we provide an overview
of the literature covering topics concerning air cargo capacity control.
2.1 Basics of Air Cargo Transportation
In order to understand the air cargo business, it is helpful to study its supply chain. According
to Mentzer et al. (2001, p. 4), a supply chain is defined as ”a set of three or more entities (or-
ganizations or individuals) directly involved in the upstream and downstream flows of products,
services, finances, and/or information from a source to a customer”. In the air cargo business, the
source of a product is referred to as the shipper, and the customer is denoted as the consignee.
The set of entities acting between a shipper and a consignee depends on the particular supply
chain concept. There exist two basic supply chain concepts which are depicted in Figure 2.1. In
the upper concept, freight forwarders consolidate single shipments from shippers and purchase
aircraft capacity for the accumulated freight. Then, an airline hauls cargo from one airport
to another, using either a combination carrier or a pure freighter. Afterwards, forwarders are
responsible for transporting the shipments to the designated consignee. Beyond these pick-up
and delivery services, forwarders may provide inventory-related activities such as warehousing,
commissioning, or handling (Hellermann, 2006, pp. 5-6). For 2011, in terms of revenue, the
9
2 Air Cargo Revenue Management
S
H
I
P
P
E
R
 
C
O
N
S
I
G
N
E
E
 
Forwarder Airline Forwarder 
Integrated 
carrier 
Integrated 
carrier 
Integrated 
carrier 
Origin Destination 
Customer-airport 
interface Airport-to-airport 
Airport-customer 
interface 
Figure 2.1: Air cargo supply chain concepts (MergeGlobal, 2008)
world’s largest forwarders were DHL Supply Chain and Global Forwarding, Kuehne + Nagel,
and DB Schenker Logistics (Air Cargo World, 2012). According to MergeGlobal (2008), in 2007,
the top 20 forwarders consolidated almost two thirds of total carried freight. This highlights the
significant buying power of freight forwarders.
The supply chain concept that is displayed as the lower one in Figure 2.1 is comprised of only
one integrated carrier that vertically integrates the business of forwarders and (cargo) airlines.
An integrated carrier owns or exclusively controls the assets, employees, and information systems
that are necessary to provide a door-to-door service (MergeGlobal, 2008). Most integrators are
focused on air mail and package service. Thus, it is not surprising that, worldwide, the biggest
four integrators, DHL, FedEx, TNT, and UPS, control more than 80% of the global air package
market (MergeGlobal, 2008).
Since we study capacity control problems for all kinds of shipments, the supply chain concept
comprising forwarders and airlines is more relevant for us. Note that this supply chain comprises
further stakeholders such as ground handling agencies, airport operators, and trucking companies,
which we do not consider.
As already mentioned earlier, airlines usually sell their capacity in two sequential steps. First,
they sell capacity based on long-term contracts. Second, they decide how much capacity should
be available for short-term requests and sell this capacity on the spot market. While long-
term allotments are negotiated up to 12 months in advance, short term capacity is available
on the spot market from approximately 30 days prior to departure (Hellermann, 2006, p. 15).
These two types of capacity allocation reflect the nature of cargo demand: On the one hand,
there are customers who can already determine a long time in advance how much capacity
they require for transporting perishable and/or valuable goods; on the other hand, another
customer group requests express capacity if products need to be hauled in an emergency situation
(MergeGlobal, 2008). For instance, in the unforeseen event that some technical spare parts need
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to be transported from Europe to Asia within one week, air freight is the only option. According
to Billings et al. (2003), airlines sell 30 to 75% of their capacity on the spot market. For example,
Hellermann (2006, p. 15) reports for Lufthansa Cargo that on average one third of total capacity
is sold through long-term contracts. Considering Lufthansa Cargo’s 2011 load factor of 69.1%
(Lufthansa Cargo, 2012), short term bookings accounted on average for more than 50% of total
sold capacity. Thus, the spot market capacity control problem, which we consider in this work,
is highly relevant in air cargo revenue management.
When shippers or freight forwarders request capacity, depending on the particular airline,
several distribution channels may be available. First, booking requests may be submitted via an
airline’s own self-service booking portal. Second, capacity bookings may also be conducted via
cross-airline online platforms like Global Freight Exchange (Descartes, 2012).
After having provided a short introduction to the air transport business, we now turn to the
revenue management fundamentals.
2.2 Fundamentals of Revenue Management
Motivation and Definition
When service firms are constrained by capacity, financial success often depends on the manage-
ment’s ability to efficiently use capacity (Kimes, 1989). The first industry that systematically
addressed this challenge was the airline industry. This occurred after the US market had been
deregulated in the late 1970s (Kimes, 2005b). A method called revenue (yield) management was
used to profitably control capacity, which led to a great increase in revenues (see for instance
Belobaba, 1989; Smith et al., 1992). More specifically, Boyd (1998) reports that implementing a
revenue management system can improve revenues between 2 and 8 percent or even more.
In order to get an understanding of the underlying concepts of revenue management, we outline
a simple example from the airline passenger business: Consider an airline that offers two fare
classes. The low-fare ticket is associated with a 14-days advance purchase requirement, while the
high-fare ticket does not have any restrictions. The airline can achieve the maximum revenue
by selling only high-fare tickets to all customers. Since some customers are not willing to pay
the high prices, offering only high-fare tickets would yield empty seats which, due to the seats’
perishability, represent an opportunity cost. In order to sell these empty seats, the airline offers
low-fare tickets to more price-sensitive customers. Further, to avoid price-insensitive customers
to book low-fare tickets, the tickets must be associated with an advance purchase requirement.
Then, late booking, price-insensitive customers have only the one choice of ticket, which is the
high-fare ticket. Early booking, price-sensitive customers can choose between low-fare and high-
fare tickets. The airline’s objective is to determine the mix of low-fare and high-fare tickets that
maximizes total revenue.
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So far, we know that revenue management comprises methods and tools for profitably control-
ling capacity. There are many definitions available in literature, which usually take into account
a particular application. Pfeifer (1989) defines yield management in the context of airlines as
”the process by which the discount fares are allocated to scheduled flights for the purpose of bal-
ancing demand and increasing revenues”. A general definition is given by Kimes (1989): ”Yield
management is a method which can help a firm sell the right inventory unit to the right type
of customer, at the right time, and for the right price. Yield management guides the decision
of how to allocate undifferentiated units of capacity to available demand in such a way as to
maximize profit or revenue”. Note that today the term revenue management rather than yield
management is used. The reason for this terminology choice is that revenue management tech-
niques are usually applied in capital-intensive industries, and thus additional variable costs for
selling capacity are relatively small compared to the opportunity cost of unused capacity (Kimes,
1989). Using the term yield in the airline context may even be misleading. For example, if an
airline’s objective was yield (profit per seat) maximization, accepting only one single full-fare
customer would achieve this objective (Weatherford & Bodily, 1992).
For detailed introductions to revenue management, the reader is referred to Cross (1997),
Yeoman et al. (2001), Phillips (2005), as well as Talluri & van Ryzin (2004). Numerous revenue
management applications can be found in Yeoman & McMahon-Beattie (2004), Chiang et al.
(2007), and Yeoman & McMahon-Beattie (2011). The traditional areas of application are airlines,
hotels (see for instance Bitran & Mondschein, 1995; Badinelli, 2000), and the car rental industry
(e.g. Geraghty & Johnson, 1997; Haensel et al., 2012). In recent years, many new fields of
application have arisen. This includes (examples in parentheses) casino table games (Chen et
al., 2012), Internet advertising (Karmarkar & Dutta, 2012), cruise lines (Lu & Mazzarella, 2007),
golf courses (Rasekh & Yihua, 2011), car parks (Guadix et al., 2011), retail electricity (Faruqui
et al., 2009), restaurants (Kimes, 2005a), and cargo flights (Amaruchkul et al., 2007).
An Appropriate Environment for Effective Application
In order to ensure the success of implementing a revenue management system, the following
characteristics are essential (cf. Kimes, 1989). We provide examples for these conditions from
the air cargo industry and thereby show that this industry is appropriate for application.
• Relatively fixed capacity. If demand changes, it is impossible, at least in the short run,
to provide less or more capacity. For example, an airplane’s cargo capacity is restricted.
Additional capacity can only be gained by operating more aircraft.
• Perishability. Products or services which cannot be stored are perishable. This distin-
guishes the service business from manufacturing firms. In the case of cargo flights, once
the plane has departed, unused capacity is irrecoverably lost.
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• Ability to segment markets. If customers are heterogeneous, a company can segment the
market into different customer groups, each with a particular willingness to pay. On cargo
flights, the same capacity can be assigned, for instance, to a same-day express shipment or to
a standard shipment. According to Sabre (2010), based on different customer requirements,
different products are already offered at different prices.
• Sale/Booking in advance. Typically, service firms operate reservation systems that offer
customers the option to purchase products/services in advance, before actual consumption.
This offers the company some security on future revenue, but some uncertainty remains as
well, as to whether capacity could be sold more profitably in the future. Cargo capacity
can be booked in advance, which holds the challenge of accepting early booking requests
or waiting for a more profitable request, which may or may not occur in the future.
• Stochastic demand. Capacity providers are confronted with a highly fluctuating demand.
If demand was deterministic, capacity would be simply assigned to the customers with the
highest willingness to pay. Volatility in demand patterns is named as one of the major
challenges in the air cargo industry (Mardan, 2010).
• Low marginal sales cost and high marginal capacity change cost. For capacity-constrained
firms, adjusting capacity to the demand is associated with significant cost, while selling one
more capacity unit creates relatively low cost. Cargo airlines can only increase capacity
by changing their fleet which implicates large investments. On the other hand, selling one
more unit of capacity generates only marginal handling and fuel costs, which are relatively
low when compared to the aircraft’s fixed operating cost.
Klein & Steinhardt (2008, pp. 10-12) mention a further necessary condition which they describe
as integration of an external factor. This condition means that an external factor is necessary
to receive the product or service. The external factor may be the customer, some object, or
information. For example, the service of transporting air cargo can only be provided if freight
(which is the external factor) is delivered to the airport. It means, this service cannot be provided
before the freight has been delivered. This again distinguishes the service industry from the
manufacturing industry, whose products can be produced and stored some time before they are
needed.
Components of Revenue Management
Revenue management comprises several problems, all of which have been widely studied. We
give a short overview of the ones that are most important in research:
• Forecasting : The task of forecasting is to predict demand, cancellations, and no-shows
(McGill & van Ryzin, 1999; Chiang et al., 2007). The forecasts’ quality is very important
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since it directly affects the success of overbooking, capacity control, and pricing decisions.
According to Po¨lt (1998), a reduction of 20% in forecast errors can yield a 1% increase in
incremental revenue.
• Overbooking : This component attempts to avoid unused capacity due to cancellations and
no-shows by selling more capacity than is physically available (McGill & van Ryzin, 1999).
Thus, overbooking’s major task is to determine an appropriate level of capacity that should
be sold (in addition to the real capacity). Overbooking has the longest history and most
successful practical application of all the revenue management components (Chiang et al.,
2007).
• Pricing : Differential pricing constructs various products with associated restrictions and
prices (Belobaba, 2009, p. 78). Thus, each customer can choose a product according to
his or her willingness to pay and corresponding to his or her willingness to accept the
restrictions.
• Capacity Control : The objective of capacity control is to allocate capacity to the different
products so that the expected revenue is maximized (Chiang et al., 2007). This allocation
may be constant, or it may change over time.
In the above outlined problems, the availability of products is the strategic variable that
helps to control capacity. Further, it is implicitly assumed that if the price for a particular
product changes, the demand forecast will also change. A different approach focuses directly on
the relationship between price and demand and treats price as the strategic variable (Boyd &
Bilegan, 2003). This approach is called dynamic pricing and is used in newer revenue management
applications such as low cost airlines ticket pricing. Dynamic pricing omits the optimization step
of differential pricing and varies the resource’s price over the booking horizon (Klein & Steinhardt,
2008, p. 178). By adjusting the price, the availability of capacity is controlled. We do not
consider this approach in our work because prices of cargo products are traditionally constant.
Nevertheless, as the cargo business is continuously developing, in the future, the industry might
offer dynamic pricing opportunities. Pilon (2007) even describes it as one of the future challenges
in cargo revenue management. For more information on dynamic pricing, the reader is referred
to Rajan et al. (1992), Gallego & van Ryzin (1994), Bitran & Mondschein (1997), Bitran &
Caldentey (2003), as well as Elmaghraby & Keskinocak (2003).
The focus of our work is on capacity control, and therefore, we will not discuss the other
components any further. However, for the latest forecasting research, the interested reader is
referred to e.g. Haensel & Koole (2011), Karmarkar et al. (2011), and Fiig et al. (2012); in case
of overbooking, up to date topics can be found for instance in Erdelyi & Topaloglu (2010), Xiong
et al. (2011), and Lan et al. (2011); and for pricing, the reader is referred to e.g. Zhang et al.
(2010), Westermann & Lancaster (2011), and Zhang & Bell (2012).
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2.3 Air Cargo Revenue Management vs. Passenger Revenue
Management
The air cargo business may seem very similar to the airline passenger business. Below, we
explore the numerous fundamental differences between these two businesses, which all affect
the requirements for a revenue management system. This highlights the need for specific cargo
revenue management systems since existing solutions from the passenger business cannot be
simply transferred.
• Capacity uncertainty. While the number of passenger seats is known at every point of
the booking process, cargo capacity depends on numerous factors such as the number of
passengers, runways, weather, and fuel weight (Kasilingam, 1996). Since some of these
factors are random, cargo capacity is random as well.
• Dimensionality of capacity. Passenger seats are one-dimensional, whereas cargo capacity
is multi-dimensional, i.e. weight, volume, and container positions need to be considered
(Billings et al., 2003).
• Routing options. Passengers follow their itinerary exactly as they booked it (unless a
schedule disruption occurs). On the other hand, cargo can be shipped along any route as
long as it arrives at its destination on time (Kasilingam, 2011). Thus, multiple routing
options are available. Furthermore, other modes of transportation can be even chosen,
such as trucks (LaDue, 2004). For instance, Slager & Kapteijns (2004) reports that KLM
transports the major part of its cargo within Europe by truck.
• Long-term demand. Passengers rarely book a seat on a weekly flight half a year in advance.
On the other hand, cargo customers reserve allotments on particular flights, based on long-
term contracts (Kasilingam, 1996). This space is not available for sale on the spot market,
and the carrier has to decide how much space to sell as long-term allotments.
• Number of customers. A large number of individuals purchase passenger seats. But since
forwarders consolidate the shippers’ freight, the number of cargo customers is much smaller
(Kasilingam, 2011). Further, cargo is a business-to-business market, and carrying passen-
gers is largely a business-to-customer market (Slager & Kapteijns, 2004).
• Volatility of demand. While seasonality patterns in passenger demand occur in roughly
the same form each year, cargo demand is much more difficult to anticipate (Billings et
al., 2003). Many sources of uncertainty affect the demand for air cargo, e.g. the weather
influencing harvest times or production disruptions, which decrease a customer’s output
(Billings et al., 2003; Becker & Dill, 2007).
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• Show-up behavior. According to Becker & Dill (2007), air freight deviating from booked
capacity is more likely than passengers not showing up at departure. Further, cargo show-
up rates can be somewhere between zero and one (or even greater than one), whereas
passengers either arrive at the gate or they do not.
• Priority usage of capacity. On combination carriers, passengers have the highest priority
for using capacity, whereas cargo has the lowest priority behind fuel, crew, and passenger
bags (Slager & Kapteijns, 2004; LaDue, 2004).
• Network Utilization. Passengers usually book a return trip that brings them back to their
originating location. On the other hand, air freight is always carried one way which yields
an inhomogeneous network utilization (Becker & Dill, 2007).
• Booking period. The booking period of the spot market is very short compared to the one
of a passenger flight (Becker & Dill, 2007). According to Mardan (2010), most bookings
take place within one week to departure.
Further challenges and complexities in air cargo revenue management are described in Pilon
(2007) as well as in Becker & Wald (2010). We now turn to an overview of available literature
in the field of cargo revenue management.
2.4 Literature Review on Air Cargo Revenue Management
In order to categorize the literature on cargo revenue management, we define the following four
major components of the cargo revenue management process (partly based on Kasilingam, 2011):
(i) Forecasting. In this step, capacity available for sale, demand, and show-up rates are pre-
dicted.
(ii) Allotment allocation. The airline determines how much space should be sold based on
long-term contracts and decides which allotment requests are accepted.
(iii) Overbooking. The forecasted capacity minus the capacity sold through long-term contracts
is overbooked in order to compensate for cancellations and under-tendering.
(iv) Spot market capacity control. In this last step, the availability of capacity on the spot
market, which is the capacity determined in step (iii), is controlled so that overall revenue
is maximized. Here, decision rules for accepting and denying cargo booking requests for
particular shipment types are required.
The models we propose in this work focus on the spot market capacity control problem.
Thus, we provide a comprehensive overview of literature in this field. For literature on allot-
ment management, the reader is referred to Hellermann (2006), Gupta (2008), Amaruchkul &
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Lorchirachoonkul (2011), and Levin et al. (2012). Overbooking models for air cargo can be found
in Kasilingam (1997), Popescu et al. (2006), Wang & Kao (2008), Becker & Wald (2008), Luo et
al. (2009), and Moussawi & Cakandyildirim (2012). To our knowledge, so far, no research paper
on forecasting in the cargo context has been published in a scholarly journal.
Early studies on cargo revenue management were mainly qualitative reports on successful im-
plementations by airlines (e.g. Hendricks & Kasilingam, 1993; Slager & Kapteijns, 2004; Nielsen,
2004). Even today, the number of publications on quantitative models is low. While capacity
control problems have been widely researched in passenger revenue management, the cargo spot
market capacity control problem has not yet gained comparable attention.
The first single-leg model was proposed by Karaesmen (2001) who discusses a static model,
which is very similar to a deterministic linear program used to determine bid prices in net-
work passenger revenue management (cf. Williamson, 1992). The author considers requests for
shipments that are characterized by continuous weight and volume requirements.
The first network cargo capacity control model was proposed by Pak & Dekker (2004). The
authors assume that each request is uniquely defined by weight, volume, revenue, and flights it
uses. The problem is modeled as a static multidimensional online knapsack problem and is solved
by means of a greedy algorithm (cf. Rinnooy Kan et al., 1993). A simulation study demonstrates
that their static bid price policies outperform policies based on bid prices obtained through a
deterministic linear program.
Huang & Hsu (2005) present the first dynamic model for solving the single-leg capacity control
problem. Their underlying idea is to adapt the model of Lee & Hersh (1993) for air cargo use.
In their analysis, they view cargo capacity as one-dimensional. Further, the effect of supply
uncertainty on expected revenue is analyzed.
Luo & Shi (2006) study a static stochastic programming approach for modeling the multi-leg
capacity allocation problem under normally-distributed demand. Each shipment class is defined
by its weight, volume, profit, and legs it uses. The stochastic programming model is transferred
to a linear program by means of chance constrained programming (cf. Charnes & Cooper, 1959).
Popescu (2006) models the spot market capacity control problem for multi-leg flights. The
unique idea of the author’s approach is to decompose the problem into a large and a small cargo
capacity control subproblem which both consider weight as the only dimension. While the small
cargo subproblem is handled by a probabilistic nonlinear program, the control of large cargo
requests is formulated as a Markov decision process.
Amaruchkul et al. (2007) propose a single-leg dynamic capacity control model that uses the
number of accepted shipments of each class as the state space. Each class defines the weight
and volume distribution of its uncertain capacity requirement as well as a particular fare rate.
The authors focus on developing several heuristics and bounds: First, they propose heuristics
and bounds based on decomposing the capacity control problem into subproblems of weight and
volume. And second, bounds and heuristics based on deterministic linear programs are provided.
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Our model formulation in Chapter 6 is very close to this single-leg model. We extend the state
space to the network setting and allow for stochastic capacity, while in Amaruchkul et al. (2007)
capacity is deterministic.
Huang & Chang (2010) present a heuristic that jointly estimates the expected revenue from
both weight and volume. In order to reduce computational load, only a limited number of sample
points in the state space is evaluated. Thereby, the authors attempt to avoid inaccurate estimates
produced by decoupling weight and volume. Only in a few scenarios, this heuristic outperforms
the decomposition heuristic proposed by Amaruchkul et al. (2007).
Zhuang et al. (2011) propose a general model considering a random resource requirement
which, if only a single resource is considered, can be applied in the field of cargo capacity control.
The authors focus on exploring structural properties of a multi-class problem, where the resource
requirement of each class is uncertain. Further, the authors describe two heuristics and show in
experiments that they outperform other heuristics that ignore random capacity requirement.
Xiao & Yang (2010) analyze structural properties of a continuous-time control model with
two capacity dimensions, which they claim is applicable in cargo revenue management. The
authors prove the existence of a threshold policy; however, this only applies to a situation with
two products consuming the same capacity on one dimension but unequal capacity on the other.
Thus, this model is rather applicable in maritime cargo revenue management, where volume is
largely fixed by standard containers.
Han et al. (2010) model the booking process as a Markov chain in order to reduce the possible
number of scenarios of sold weight and volume. Revenue-maximizing bid prices are then obtained
by means of a linear mixed-integer program. The authors show that their approach outperforms
the static bid-price policy proposed by Pak & Dekker (2004).
Levina et al. (2011) present a network dynamic capacity control model which accounts for un-
certainty in both available capacity and capacity requirement. They formulate an infinite-horizon
Markov decision process, which determines capacity control decisions, while an appropriate route
for a request is found in a separate subproblem. For learning approximate control policies, a lin-
ear programming and stochastic simulation-based computational method are discussed. The
model we propose in Chapter 6 is related to this model. While Levina et al. (2011) focus on
developing a new approximation of the value function and on the complexities caused by the
routing decisions, we assume that a request clearly defines its itinerary. This view is true for
small carriers and allows us to use methods that are closer to traditional revenue management
methods.
In Chapter 5, we discuss decision models that follow an integrated approach for controlling the
availability of passenger seats and cargo capacity. With the exception of some qualitative analyses
(e.g. Graff, 2008; Pilon, 2007), there is hardly any work available dealing with this problem. In
the field of fleet assignment, Sandhu & Klabjan (2006) propose a model that takes into account
both passenger and freight demand. The authors claim that such an integrated optimization
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efficiently utilizes the overall aircraft space and generates higher overall profit. Further, Blake
(2010) reports that increasing cargo demand causes passenger ticket prices to increase. This
means, that airlines are aware of the trade-off between passengers versus cargo and obviously, in
some way, take advantage of it. However, in the field of revenue management, no quantitative
approach for an integrated control of cargo capacity and passenger seats has yet been proposed.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical Foundations
This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical concepts that we use to analyze and to solve
cargo capacity control problems. General challenges of such decision problems are, first, that
they require making time-dependent decisions under uncertainty, second, that cargo capacity
is two-dimensional, and third, that models are computationally intractable for large problem
instances. In the following three sections, we outline the methodology that we use to manage
these challenges. In Section 3.1, we introduce stochastic dynamic decision processes. As a special
type of decision processes, we consider Markov decision processes, which are used in this work to
model cargo capacity control problems. Section 3.2 provides an overview of structural properties
that are necessary to ensure optimality of monotone control in two-dimensional problems. In the
same section, we also show that two particular problems, which are relevant in cargo capacity
control, feature some of these properties. Section 3.3 outlines the linear programming approach
to approximate dynamic programming. We use this technique to determine a heuristic solution
to large-scale air cargo capacity control problems.
3.1 Stochastic Dynamic Decision Processes
Many decisions in today’s business environment do not only require one single action but rather
a sequence of actions over time. For instance, a company does not decide on the production
output of a machine once and keeps it constant thereafter; it rather has to adjust the output
in order to react to changes in the environment such as market demand. Accordingly, decision
makers face various complex sequential decision processes. Dynamic programming, as a collection
of mathematical tools to analyze such processes, evolved from the insight that sequential decision
processes share several recurring mathematical features (Denardo, 1982, p. 3).
If a system reaches a state with a particular probability which might depend on previous
states and actions, it is modeled as a stochastic dynamic decision process. A special type of such
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processes is a Markov decision process (MDP) which was first introduced by Bellman (1957).
The term ’Markov’ is used since this type of process features the Markov property, i.e. only the
present state has an impact on the future behavior of the process; if the present state is known,
the entire history of the process can be neglected (Puterman, 1994, p. 2). Since the decision
maker is able to influence a probabilistic system’s behavior by undertaking actions, her or his
goal is to determine a sequence of decisions that causes the system to perform optimally with
regard to a predefined target criterion (Puterman, 1994, p. 17).
A comprehensive overview of MDPs is provided in White (1993), Puterman (1994), Sennott
(1999), or Waldmann & Stocker (2012). An overview of real world applications of MDPs is given,
for instance, in White (1985), White (1988), and Feinberg & Shwartz (2002).
Various types of MDPs can be used depending on the specific application. In Section 3.1.1, we
introduce a framework for discrete-time models with finite planning horizon, which is adequate
for modeling (cargo) revenue management problems. Note that this decision model could be
embedded into the general framework set out by Hinderer (1970) and Scha¨l (1975). As an en-
hancement of finite-horizon MDPs, Section 3.1.2 outlines MDPs explicitly considering a random
environment. In revenue management, such a random environment could be uncertain demand
for booking classes.
3.1.1 Finite-Horizon Markov Decision Processes
Consider a decision maker who seeks to control a probabilistic system by undertaking actions.
The system evolves through time, where the entire time horizon T is finite. Note that we consider
T as the beginning of the planning horizon and 0 as its end. Further, the horizon is divided into
discrete decision periods with decision epochs t = T, ..., 1 representing the beginning of each
period (despite slight abuse of terminology, we will hereafter refer to the point of time where the
action is taken also as decision period or just time). Note that in t = 0 no action is taken. At
each time t, a system state s is observed, and the decision maker selects an admissible action
a ∈ A(s). An action results immediately in a one-stage reward rt(s, a) which also depends on the
current state s. Further, the system occupies a state s′ at time t− 1 with transition probability
pt(s, a, s
′). When the end of the planning horizon is reached, the decision maker receives a
terminal reward V0(s) depending on the system’s terminal state.
Accordingly, a discrete-time finite-horizon MDP is a tuple (T, S,A, pt, rt, V0) with
(i) a finite planning horizon T ∈ N0;
(ii) a finite state space S;
(iii) a finite action space A, where A(s) is the non-empty finite set of admissible actions in state
s ∈ S, with A = ⋃s∈S A(s); further, we define the set J = {(s, a) : s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s)} ⊆ S×A;
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(iv) transition law pt : J × S → [0, 1], which specifies the probability pt(s, a, s′) for a transition
from state s ∈ S to state s′ ∈ S at time t = T, ..., 1 if action a ∈ A(s) is chosen; note that
for s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s) and t = T, ..., 1, pt(s, a, s′) is a discrete density function on S;
(v) a one-stage reward function rt : J → R which represents a reward rt(s, a) if at time
t = T, ..., 1 and state s ∈ S action a ∈ A(s) is chosen;
(vi) a terminal reward function V0 : S → R which corresponds to the reward V0(s) that is earned
if at time t = 0 the system is in state s ∈ S.
Note that the state space and the action space may also depend on t. For instance, a state space
might be time-dependent if the decision process starts in a particular initial state, and if in each
decision period the state space can only increase by one.
The decision maker’s objective is to choose a sequence of actions over the entire planning
horizon so that the system performs optimally with respect to a particular target criterion. The
action the decision maker should choose is specified by a decision rule. Formally, a decision rule
is a function f : S → A, which specifies the action f(s) ∈ A(s) to be taken in state s ∈ S. Let F
denote the set of decision rules. From the formulation given above, it is obvious that this kind
of decision rule requires only information about the current state rather than about the entire
history of the process, and the action to be taken is unambiguous. Note that decision rules can
also be randomized and/or history dependent, which, however, does not lead to any improvement
in the context of processes featuring the Markov property.
A policy pi = (fT , ..., f1) is a sequence of decision rules ft ∈ F for each time t = T, ..., 1
specifying actions a = ft(s) to be taken at time t and in state s. We let F
T denote the set of all
policies. Further, if a policy comprises only deterministic (Markovian) decision rules, it is called
a deterministic (Markovian) policy (hereafter abbreviated to ’policy’).
Since the reward of the system in each state is uncertain, sequences of random variables have
to be compared in order to evaluate the performance of different policies. Below, we introduce
an optimality criterion which allows us to compare policies based on the expected value of the
sum of one-stage rewards (cf. Waldmann & Stocker, 2012, pp. 149-150).
The Total Reward Criterion
We assume that a decision maker seeks to maximize the total reward over the entire planning
horizon. Since the system evolves stochastically, the total reward itself is random. Therefore, we
consider sT , sT−1, ..., s0 as realizations of the random variables S˜T , S˜T−1, ..., S˜0 which describe
the state process. The total reward under policy pi ∈ F T is also random and can be computed as
Rpi :=
T∑
t=1
rt(S˜t, ft(S˜t)) + V0(S˜0).
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In order to find an optimal policy, expected values of Rpi, i.e. Epi [Rpi], may be compared for
all different policies pi ∈ F T . Since Rpi is a function of S˜T , ..., S˜0, we can define a probability
measure Ppi on (S˜
T+1) with
Ppi(S˜T = sT , ..., S˜0 = s0) = P (S˜T = sT ) · pT (sT , fT (sT ), sT−1) · ... · p1(s1, f1(s1), s0).
Accordingly, Epi is the expectation of Rpi with respect to Ppi.
Now consider a decision maker who seeks to maximize the total reward of a system that is in
a particular initial state sˆ ∈ S. Then, if policy pi ∈ F T is followed starting from state sˆ ∈ S,
Epi [Rpi] is replaced by the conditional expected total reward Epi
[
Rpi|S˜T = sˆ
]
=: VT,pi(sˆ).
Now the target is to find a policy pi∗ that maximizes the expected total reward starting in
state sˆ. That is
VT,pi∗(sˆ) = sup
pi∈FT
VT,pi(sˆ) =: VT (sˆ). (3.1)
If a policy pi∗ fulfills the property in (3.1), it is called optimal. Further, we call the expected total
reward at time t and state s ∈ S the value function of the MDP which is defined as
Vt(s) := sup
pi∈FT
Vt,pi(s) ∀s ∈ S, t = T, ..., 1.
Note that the existence of an optimal policy is ensured since we consider an MDP with a finite
state space and a finite set of admissible actions (Puterman, 1994, p. 90).
The maximum expected reward and optimal policies at each time t and state s can be deter-
mined by means of an optimality equation. A proof of the following theorem can be found in
Puterman (1994, p. 92).
Theorem 3.1. VT is the unique solution to the optimality equation
Vt(s) = max
a∈A(s)
{
rt(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
pt(s, a, s
′)Vt−1(s′)
}
∀s ∈ S, (3.2)
which can be obtained for t = T, ..., 1 recursively when the terminal value is V0. Furthermore,
each policy pi = (fT , fT−1, ..., f1) formed by actions a = ft(s) ∈ F maximizing the right hand side
of (3.2) is optimal.
The optimality equation finds for each time t and state s the action that maximizes the right
hand side. Since the set of admissible actions is assumed to be finite, we can determine the
maximum rather than the supremum. Further, note that there may be several optimal policies.
We now turn to a technique that determines an optimal solution of the optimality equation
efficiently.
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Backward Induction
An intuitive way to find an optimal policy is to enumerate and compare all policies pi ∈ F T , which
would be very time-consuming. A more efficient solution technique for discrete-time finite-horizon
MDPs is backward induction. The algorithm, which we present below, starts with the terminal
reward function and determines backwards for t = 1, ..., T an action that maximizes the right
hand side of the optimality equation (cf. Puterman, 1994, p. 92).
Step 1 Set t = 0 and V ′(s) = V0(s) for all s ∈ S.
Step 2 Set t = t+ 1, V (s) = V ′(s), and determine V ′(s) for every s ∈ S by solving
V ′(s) = max
a∈A(s)
{
rt(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
pt(s, a, s
′)V (s′)
}
. (3.3)
Set f∗t (s) as an action maximizing the right hand side of (3.3).
Step 3 If t = T , set VT (s) = V
′(s) for all s ∈ S, and then stop. Otherwise return to step 2.
This algorithm determines the maximum expected reward and optimal actions for all s ∈ S at
each time t = T, ..., 1. Optimal policies are obtained by building a sequence of decision rules
f∗t (s). Note that the algorithm given above stores only one optimal action per system state at
a particular time. Thus, it does not provide multiple policies generating the same maximum
expected reward.
The optimal policy that is determined through this procedure will give decision support to
a decision maker. Depending on the specific decision problem, optimal actions may follow a
particular pattern. Below, we discuss policies that feature such specific structures.
Structured Policies
The previous results show that only optimal decision rules f∗t (s) need to be considered when
controlling a system. We are now interested in optimal policies that do not have to be determined
for all possible values of s ∈ S and t = T, ..., 1 since they feature a simply structured form. A
class of policies fulfilling this condition is what we call structured policies.
A well-known example of a structured policy is the (s,S) policy in dynamic inventory problems
(cf. Axsa¨ter, 2006, pp. 49-50). Its decision rule is: If inventory is above the level s, do not order;
and if inventory is below the level s, order a quantity so that the inventory level becomes S. In
this example, only two values are necessary in order to determine actions.
A decision problem featuring an optimal structured policy is generally desirable. According to
Glasserman & Yao (1994, p. 449), identifying optimal controls for MDPs is even computationally
infeasible in general if no particular structure can be determined. Furthermore, Powell (2007,
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p. 64) describes the identification of structured policies as ”[o]ne of the most dramatic success
stories from the study of Markov decision processes”. In summary, optimal structured policies
are very important since they yield (Puterman, 1994, p. 103)
(i) a decreased storage requirement,
(ii) a reduction of computational effort since specialized algorithms can be applied to determine
optimal policies,
(iii) a high acceptance by decision makers due to the policy’s comprehensibility, and
(iv) an ease of implementation due to less complex decision rules.
Monotone policies are a special kind of structured policies. They comprise decision rules that
have a monotone relation to the current state. That is, for example, an optimal action changes
from a to a+ 1 if the state increases. In our work, we are focused on a special type of monotone
policies which is defined below.
Definition 3.1. Suppose in each state s ∈ S the set of admissible actions is A(s) = {a1, a2}.
A Markov policy is called control limit policy if one action is optimal when the current state is
below a particular threshold, and the other action is optimal when the current state is equal to
or greater than this threshold. We call such a threshold control limit.
Accordingly, such a policy comprises a sequence of decision rules fT , fT−1, ..., f1 with
ft(s) =
a1 s < s∗ta2 s ≥ s∗t ,
and s∗t as the control limit. The term ’control limit rule’ was first introduced by Ignall & Kolesar
(1974), whereas Yadin & Naor (1963) reported the first control limit policy already earlier.
Further, this special form of policy plays an important role in revenue management and is quite
easy to obtain in passenger capacity control models (see for instance Lautenbacher & Stidham,
1999).
The concept of control limit policies does only apply to systems with a one-dimensional sys-
tem state. In Section 3.2, we provide the theoretical concepts that are necessary to prove the
optimality of monotone policies if the system state is two-dimensional.
3.1.2 Finite-Horizon Markov Decision Processes in a Random Environment
An MDP in a random environment is an enhancement of a standard MDP. It is assumed that the
sequential decision process is exposed to a randomly evolving environment. A general overview
of MDPs in a random environment is provided in Waldmann (1981). Applications of this type
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of decision process can be found, for instance, in Waldmann (1983), Waldmann (1984), Helm &
Waldmann (1984), Waldmann (1998), and Hinderer & Waldmann (2001).
We consider a special type of MDPs in a random environment, where the environment is
represented by a Markov chain. Such an MDP’s peculiarity is that an exogenous process is
observed, which can be described by a Markov chain with state space E and transition probability
p˜t(, 
′) with , ′ ∈ E. We assume that the external process may affect the behavior of the system;
however, the decision maker is not able to influence the external process by undertaking actions.
The MDP has a two-dimensional state space which comprises a system state on the one hand
and an environmental state on the other hand. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
environment has an impact on one-stage rewards and on transition probabilities.
The capacity control process in cargo revenue management can be modeled as an MDP with
an external Markov chain: The remaining space represents the system state, and the requested
shipment class (which is a Markovian demand) is an exogenous stochastic process which is not
influenced by the accept/reject decision. Further, if a request is accepted, its size determines the
gained revenue. The transition probability of the Markov chain is the probability of a request
for a particular shipment class in the next period.
The general decision problem is as follows: A decision maker observes a system state s and an
environmental state  at a particular time t. Based on this information, action a from the set of
admissible actions A(s, ) is chosen. This results in a reward rt(s, , a) which depends on both
the current system and environmental state. Further, the system takes a value s′ at t − 1 with
probability pt(s, , a, s
′) if the current state is (s, ) and action a is taken. The environmental
process evolves independently of the system and is at time t − 1 in state ′ with transition
probability p˜t(, 
′).
In our setting, a finite-horizon MDP in a random environment is a tuple (T, S,E,A, pt, p˜t, rt, V0)
with
(i) a finite planning horizon T ∈ N0;
(ii) an extended finite state space S × E;
(iii) a finite action space A; A(s, ) is the non-empty finite set of admissible actions in state s ∈ S
and  ∈ E with A = ⋃s∈S,∈E A(s, ); J˜ = {(s, , a) : s ∈ S,  ∈ E, a ∈ A(s, )} ⊆ S×E×A;
(iv) a transition law pt : J˜ × S → [0, 1], which specifies the probability pt(s, , a, s′) for a
transition from system state s ∈ S and environmental state  ∈ E to state s′ ∈ S at time
t = T, ..., 1 if action a ∈ A(s, ) is chosen; for s ∈ S,  ∈ E, a ∈ A(s, ) and t = T, ..., 1,
pt(s, , a, s
′) is a discrete density function on S;
(v) a transition law p˜t : E×E → [0, 1], which represents the probability p˜t(, ′) for a transition
from environmental state  ∈ E to ′ ∈ E; for a fixed  ∈ E, p˜t(, ′) is a discrete density
function on E;
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(vi) a one-stage reward function rt : J˜ → R, which represents the reward rt(s, , a) if at time
t = T, ..., 1, in system state s ∈ S and in environmental state  ∈ E action a ∈ A(s, ) is
chosen;
(vii) a terminal reward function V0 : S × E → R which corresponds to the reward V0(s, ) that
is earned if at time t = 0 the system is in state s and .
As in the model without an external process, the maximum total expected reward, if the system
is in state (s, ) and t decision periods are remaining, is the unique solution to the optimality
equation
Vt(s, ) = max
a∈A(s,)
{
rt(s, , a) +
∑
s′∈S
∑
′∈E
pt(s, , a, s
′)p˜t(, ′)Vt−1(s′, ′)
}
. (3.4)
We now outline a very popular application of MDPs exposed to an external Markov chain,
which can be found in the field of revenue management. The optimality equation, in its standard
form as stated in (3.4), is given in Talluri & van Ryzin (2004, p. 654). In their model, the
requested booking class (here state ) as well as the number of remaining seats (here state s)
are observed at the same time, and a decision is made based on this information. Moreover,
the authors propose a different form of the optimality equation which determines the maximum
expected reward before the environmental state is observed. This alternative formulation is called
the observable-disturbance form, which we outline below.
In a revenue management context, the probability that a request for a particular booking class
arrives at time t is assumed to be independent of the requested booking class at time t + 1.
Therefore, we define pˆt−1(′) := p˜t(, ′) for all  ∈ E and t = T, ..., 1. We further define the
operator
Hˆtu(s) :=
∑
e∈E
pˆt()u(s, )
for an arbitrary real-valued function u on S × E. Then, we can rewrite the optimality equation
(3.4) as
Vt(s, ) = max
a∈A(s,)
{
rt(s, , a) +
∑
s′∈S
pt(s, , a, s
′)Hˆt−1Vt−1(s′)
}
. (3.5)
Rewriting this in observable-disturbance form, which is simply taking expectations on both sides
of the optimality equation, yields
HˆtVt(s) =
∑
e∈E
pˆt() max
a∈A(s,)
{
rt(s, , a) +
∑
s′∈S
pt(s, , a, s
′)Hˆt−1Vt−1(s′)
}
. (3.6)
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According to Talluri & van Ryzin (2004), the underlying decision process of this optimality
equation can be described as follows: First, a state s is observed but  is unknown. At this point,
one determines the maximum expected reward. Afterwards, a booking class  is observed, the
optimal decision is made, and the system moves to state s′.
The form (3.6) is usually presented for revenue management models in literature. The benefit
of the observable-disturbance form is that it decreases the MDP’s state space since the number
of booking classes does not have to be considered. Note, however, that this does not decrease
the number of optimal actions because they depend on time, system state, and environmental
state. Note further that (3.5) and (3.6) determine identical optimal actions since the maximum
functions in both optimality equations are identical.
We now turn to the concepts that are necessary to show that a two-dimensional decision
problem features an optimal monotone policy.
3.2 Optimal Monotone Control in Two-Dimensional Problems
The importance of structured policies was already highlighted in Section 3.1.1. In case of a one-
dimensional state space, well-known concepts like concavity or convexity ensure the optimality of
monotone policies (see for example Helm & Waldmann, 1984). On the other hand, the sufficient
conditions for the existence of two-dimensional optimal monotone policies are more complex.
Optimal monotone control in two-dimensional problems has been studied in numerous fields
of application. It first appeared in the context of queuing systems, see e.g. Hajek (1984),
Ghoneim & Stidham (1985), Weber & Stidham (1987), Veatch & Wein (1992), and Stidham &
Weber (1993). Two-dimensional monotone control has also been researched in production and
manufacturing, for instance by Veatch & Wein (1994), Ha (1997a), Ha (1997b), Ha (2000), Carr
& Duenyas (2000), and Benjaafar et al. (2010). Further studies have been conducted in health
care management, e.g. by Green et al. (2006), and in revenue management, see You (1999),
Savin et al. (2005), Morton (2006), and Chen et al. (2010).
Section 3.2.1 provides an overview of the conditions that yield optimal monotone policies in
two-dimensional problems. Furthermore, we show in Section 3.2.2 that two particular problems,
which are relevant in cargo capacity control, feature some of these properties which ensure the
existence of optimal monotone control policies.
3.2.1 Two-Dimensional Structural Concepts
We already introduced a control limit policy in case of a one-dimensional system state. Now
consider a state space comprising two dimensions (say S1 × S2). Then a control limit is not
a particular state s∗ any more but rather a function of the other dimension, which we call a
switching curve.
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Definition 3.2. (cf. Lewis, 2001). Suppose in each state (s1, s2) ∈ S1×S2 the set of admissible
actions is A(s) = {a1, a2}. A deterministic Markov policy is called switching curve policy if some
curve (i.e. a function) separates S1 × S2 into two adjacent regions. Then one action is optimal
for states below the curve, and the other action is optimal for states above the curve. If the
curve is monotone, a policy is called monotone switching curve policy.
An example of a monotone switching curve policy is shown in Figure 3.1.
1s
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Figure 3.1: A switching curve
We now turn to the necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of monotone switching
curve policies. These conditions are given by the concept of multimodularity, which comprises
two individual structural properties. All properties that may be related to multimodularity are
outlined below.
Definition 3.3. (Zhuang & Li, 2010). Let l : Z2 → R be a real-valued function and e1 := (1, 0)
as well as e2 := (0, 1). Let further x ∈ Z2 and j, k ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= k.
(i) l(x) is supermodular (submodular) in j and k if
l(x)− l(x− ej) ≤ (≥)l(x+ ek)− l(x− ej + ek).
(ii) l(x) is superconcave (subconvex ) in j and k if both
l(x)− l(x− ej) ≤ (≥)l(x− ej − ek)− l(x− 2ej − ek) and
l(x)− l(x− ek) ≤ (≥)l(x− ej − ek)− l(x− ej − 2ek).
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(iii) l(x) is subconcave (superconvex ) in j and k if both
l(x+ ej)− l(x) ≤ (≥)l(x+ ek)− l(x− ej + ek) and
l(x+ ek)− l(x) ≤ (≥)l(x+ ej)− l(x+ ej − ek).
(iv) l(x) is componentwise concave (convex ) in j if
l(x)− l(x− ej) ≤ (≥)l(x− ej)− l(x− 2ej).
Before we outline the relationship between multimodularity and these concepts in the two-
dimensional case, we derive multimodularity for n dimensions by means of the following defini-
tions. Note that we assume the decision maker seeks to maximize total expected reward. Thus,
we consider multimodularity in the context of concavity.
Definition 3.4. (Altman et al., 2003). A matrix D of size (n + 1) × n and of rank n is called
multimodular if the rows of the matrix define n + 1 vectors (g0, g1, ..., gn) satisfying g0 + g1 +
...+ gn = 0.
Definition 3.5. (Altman et al., 2003, Definition 17). The mesh MD associated with the multi-
modular matrix D is the set of all points {∑ni=0 θigi, θi ∈ Z}.
Definition 3.6. (cf. Altman et al., 2003, Definition 20). A function l : MD → R is D-
multimodular in the context of concavity if and only if for all x ∈MD and 0 ≤ j, k ≤ n,
l(x+ gj) + l(x+ gk) ≤ l(x) + l(x+ gj + gk). (3.7)
This definition implies that the vectors g determine how a state x may change. Thus, each
row vector in D represents a particular transition. Further, note that D-multimodularity can be
defined in the context of convexity which would require to reverse the inequality in (3.7).
From now on, we limit this general definition of D-multimodularity to two dimensions and
to row vectors with entries -1, 0, or 1 (thus, MD is Z2). We consider this specified definition
since we require multimodularity of MDPs having only a two-dimensional system state and with
transitions that are bounded by the unity vector. That means, we only need to consider the
following two multimodular matrices (Zhuang & Li, 2012, cf. ).
Ds =
 1 0−1 1
0 −1
 , Dc =
 1 0−1 −1
0 1

Note that we might as well consider −Ds and −Dc, which would yield the same result that is
derived next.
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The difference between these multimodular bases allows us to characterize two-dimensional
decision problems (cf. Zhuang & Li, 2012). Each row vector in Ds and Dc represents a specific
transition. In particular, the second row vector indicates the most important property of the
base: (−1, 1) in Ds corresponds to the event of transferring resources from one dimension to
the other. For instance, in case of two queues, a waiting customer can be transferred from one
queue to the other. This possible transition indicates substitutability of the two dimensions of
the state space. On the other hand, (−1,−1) in Dc corresponds to the event of decreasing both
dimensions of the state space to the same extent and at the same time. In case of two queues, this
would be to accept one customers from both queues at the same time. This transition indicates
complementarity of resources.
This insight allows us to characterize two-dimensional MDPs according to substitutability and
complementarity of system states. Below, we categorize multimodularity according to substi-
tutability and complementarity of resources. Hereafter, we will use this categorization rather
than referring to multimodularity with respect to a particular base D.
Multimodularity in the Context of Substitutability
In case of substitutable resources, only Ds needs to be considered as a multimodular base.
Then, it is easy to show that (3.7) reduces to three different inequalities that are equal to the
inequalities in the definition of submodularity and subconcavity. This result is outlined in the
following lemma (cf. Zhuang & Li, 2010).
Proposition 3.1. A real-valued function l : Z2 → R is multimodular in the context of substi-
tutability if and only if l is submodular and subconcave. Furthermore, any multimodular function
is componentwise concave.
This proposition applies to decision problems maximizing the objective value (i.e. in the
context of concavity). A parallel definition of multimodularity can be given for systems that
minimize the objective value. As an example, consider a server that admits only one request
from two different queues while seeking to minimize cost. In this case, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for multimodularity are supermodularity and superconvexity since (3.7) is reversed.
Multimodularity in the Context of Complementarity
In case of complementary resources, Dc is the only multimodular base that needs to be considered.
Then, it is easy to show that (3.7) reduces to supermodularity and superconcavity as outlined
below.
Proposition 3.2. A real-valued function l : Z2 → R is multimodular in the context of comple-
mentarity if and only if l is supermodular and superconcave. Furthermore, any multimodular
function is componentwise concave.
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Again, an analogue proposition exists in the context of convexity (minimization of objective
value). Then, the necessary and sufficient conditions for multimodularity are submodularity and
subconvexity.
In summary, multimodularity ensures that the differences in value over two states are horizon-
tally, vertically, and diagonally monotone over state variables (Zhuang & Li, 2010). An overview
of the introduced concepts is provided in Table 3.1.
Objective Resources’ relationship Structural properties Example
Maximization Substitutability Submodularity & Green et al. (2006)
subconcavity
Minimization Substitutability Supermodularity & Hajek (1984)
superconvexity
Maximization Complementarity Supermodularity & Morton (2006)
superconcavity
Minimization Complementarity Submodularity & Benjaafar et al. (2010)
subconvexity
Table 3.1: Overview of multimodularity in different contexts
3.2.2 Two-Dimensional Structural Properties of Particular Problems
In this section, we prove that multimodularity is preserved under two particular operators that
are relevant in the decision models we will analyze later. The following lemma will help us to
conduct the proofs efficiently.
Lemma 3.1. (Zhuang & Li, 2010) Let {νj , ηj , ν˜j , η˜j : j = 1, ..., n} be four arbitrary real sequences.
Assume that for any j and k, there exist z1, z2 ∈ {1, ..., n} so that
νj − ηz1 ≤ ν˜z2 − η˜k. (3.8)
Then the following inequality holds:
max{ν1, ..., νn} −max{η1, ..., ηn} ≤ max{ν˜1, ..., ν˜n} −max{η˜1, ..., η˜n}.
Proof. We denote νmax, ηmax, ν˜max, η˜max as the maximum element of each sequence. According
to the assumption, there exist z1, z2 ∈ {1, ..., n} so that
νmax − ηz1 ≤ ν˜z2 − η˜max.
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Further, we have for every z1 ∈ {1, ..., n} that νmax − ηmax ≤ νmax − ηz1 and for every z2 ∈
{1, ..., n} that ν˜z2 − η˜max ≤ ν˜max − η˜max. It follows that
νmax − ηmax ≤ ν˜max − η˜max.
Zhuang & Li (2010) describe this lemma as an alternative to the theory of ordered optimal
solutions developed by Topkis (1978) and Glasserman & Yao (1994), which can also be applied
to show the existence of optimal monotone policies.
We now show that multimodularity is preserved under a particular operator.
Proposition 3.3. If l(x) : Z2 → R is multimodular, and if x1 and x2 are complementary
resources, the operator Ul˜(x, ι) : Z2 → R is also multimodular where
Ul˜(x, ι) = max
a∈{0,1}
{arι + l(x− a)}
for x = (x1, x2), rι ∈ R+0 , ι ∈ N0, and a = (a, a).
Proof. Since we assume that l(x) is multimodular and resources are complements, l(x) is super-
modular and superconcave. We first show that Ul˜(x, ι) is supermodular. Thus, we need to proof
that for distinct j, k ∈ {1, 2} and some ι ∈ N0,
Ul˜(x, ι)− Ul˜(x− ej , ι) ≤ Ul˜(x+ ek, ι)− Ul˜(x− ej + ek, ι). (3.9)
(3.9) is equivalent to
max
a1∈{0,1}
{a1rι + l(x− a1)} − max
a2∈{0,1}
{a2rι + l(x− ej − a2)}
≤ max
a3∈{0,1}
{a3rι + l(x+ ek − a3)} − max
a4∈{0,1}
{a4rι + l(x− ej + ek − a4)} .
In order to prove supermodularity, we enumerate the combinations of optimal values for Ul˜(x, ι)
and Ul˜(x−ej+ek, ι) and find feasible values for Ul˜(x−ej , ι) and Ul˜(x+ek, ι) so that (3.8) holds.
For a1 = a4, the proof simply follows from supermodularity when setting a1 = a2 = a3 = a4. We
further have to consider the cases a1 < a4 and a1 > a4.
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(i) If a1 = 0 and a4 = 1, set a2 = 0 and a3 = 1, which yields
a1rι + l(x− a1)− a2rι − l(x− ej − a2)
=l(x)− l(x− ej)
=l(x+ ej + ek − a3)− l(x+ ek − a4)
≤l(x+ ek − a3)− l(x− ej + ek − a4)
=l(x+ ek − a3) + a3rι − l(x− ej + ek − a4)− a4rι,
where the inequality follows from componentwise concavity.
(ii) If a1 = 1 and a4 = 0, set a2 = 0 and a3 = 1, which yields
a1rι + l(x− a1)− a2rι − l(x− ej − a2)
=l(x− ej − ek) + rι − l(x− ej)
≤l(x) + rι − l(x+ ek)
=l(x+ ej + ek − a3) + rι − l(x+ ek − a4)
≤l(x+ ek − a3) + rι − l(x− ej + ek − a4)
=l(x+ ek − a3) + a3rι − l(x− ej + ek − a4)− a4rι,
where the first inequality follows from superconcavity. Note that we multiplied the in-
equality in the definition of superconcavity by -1. The second inequality follows from
componentwise concavity. According to Lemma 3.1, Ul˜(x, ι) is supermodular in x1 and x2
for ι ∈ N0.
We now prove that Ul˜(x, ι) is superconcave, i.e. for distinct j, k ∈ {1, 2} and ι ∈ N0,
Ul˜(x, ι)− Ul˜(x− ej , ι) ≤ Ul˜(x− ej − ek, ι)− Ul˜(x− 2ej − ek, ι) and (3.10)
Ul˜(x, ι)− Ul˜(x− ek, ι) ≤ Ul˜(x− ej − ek, ι)− Ul˜(x− ej − 2ek, ι). (3.11)
(3.10) is equivalent to
max
a1∈{0,1}
{a1rι + l(x− a1)} − max
a2∈{0,1}
{a2rι + l(x− ej − a2)}
≤ max
a3∈{0,1}
{a3rι + l(x− ej − ek − a3)} − max
a4∈{0,1}
{a4rι + l(x− 2ej − ek − a4)} .
We enumerate the combinations of optimal values for Ul˜(x, ι) and Ul˜(x − 2ej − ek, ι) and find
feasible values for Ul˜(x− ej , ι) and Ul˜(x− ej − ek, ι) so that (3.8) holds. In case of a1 = a4, the
proof follows from superconcavity with a1 = a2 = a3 = a4. Consider the remaining two cases:
35
3 Theoretical Foundations
(i) If a1 = 0 and a4 = 1, set a2 = 0 and a3 = 1, which yields
a1rι + l(x− a1)− a2rι − l(x− ej − a2)
=l(x)− l(x− ej)
≤l(x− ej − ek)− l(x− 2ej − ek)
≤l(x− 2ej − 2ek)− l(x− 3ej − 2ek)
=l(x− ej − ek − a3)− l(x− 2ej − ek − a4)
=l(x− ej − ek − a3) + a3rι − l(x− 2ej − ek − a4)− a4rι,
where both inequalities follow from superconcavity.
(ii) If a1 = 1 and a4 = 0, set a3 = 0 and a2 = 1. Then, we have
a1rι + l(x− a1)− a2rι − l(x− ej − a2)
=l(x− ej − ek)− l(x− 2ej − ek)
=a3rι + l(x− ej − ek − a3)− a4rι − l(x− 2ej − ek − a4).
The proof of the second case of superconcavity, (3.11), can be done analogously. Thus, ac-
cording to Lemma 3.1, Ul˜(x, ι) is superconcave in x1 and x2 for ι ∈ N0. In combination with
supermodularity Ul˜(x, ι) is multimodular in x1 and x2.
Now we prove that the following operator preserves multimodularity.
Proposition 3.4. If l(x) : Z2 → R is multimodular, and if x1 and x2 are complementary
resources, the operator Uj l˜(x, ι) : Z2 → R is also multimodular where
Uj l˜(x, ι) = max
a∈{0,...,nι}
{arι + l(x− aej)}, j ∈ {1, 2}
for x = (x1, x2), rι ∈ R+0 , ι ∈ N0, and nι ∈ N.
Proof. Since l(x) is multimodular and resources are complements, l(x) is supermodular and
superconcave. We start showing that supermodularity is preserved under the operator Uj . Thus,
we need to prove that for distinct j, k ∈ {1, 2} and ι ∈ N0
Uj l˜(x, ι)− Uj l˜(x− ej , ι) ≤ Uj l˜(x+ ek, ι)− Uj l˜(x− ej + ek, ι), (3.12)
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which is equivalent to
max
a1∈{0,...,nι}
{a1rι + l(x− a1ej)} − max
a2∈{0,...,nι}
{a2rι + l(x− ej − a2ej)}
≤ max
a3∈{0,...,nι}
{a3rι + l(x+ ek − a3ej)} − max
a4∈{0,...,nι}
{a4rι + l(x− ej + ek − a4ej)} .
Note that we also have to prove Uk l˜(x, ι)− Uk l˜(x− ej , ι) ≤ Uk l˜(x+ ek, ι)− Uk l˜(x− ej + ek, ι);
however, this inequality can be rearranged to (3.12) with transformed x. Thus, the proof works
analogously and is omitted. Below, we enumerate the combinations of optimal values for Uj l˜(x, ι)
and Uj l˜(x−ej+ek, ι) and find feasible values for Uj l˜(x−ej , ι) and Uj l˜(x+ek, ι) so that (3.8) holds.
The proof for a1 = a4 follows simply from supermodularity when setting a1 = a2 = a3 = a4.
Further, the following two cases have to be considered.
(i) If nι ≥ a1 > a4, set a2 = a1 − 1 and a3 = a4 + 1, which yields
a1rι + l(x− a1ej)− a2rι − l(x− ej − a2ej)
=l(x− a1ej)− l(x− a1ej) + rι
=rι
=l(x+ ek − a3ej)− l(x+ ek − a3ej) + rι
=l(x+ ek − a3ej) + a3rι − l(x− ej + ek − a4ej)− a4rι.
(ii) If a1 < a4 ≤ nι, set a2 = a1 and a3 = a4, which yields
a1rι + l(x− a1ej)− a2rι − l(x− ej − a2ej)
=l(x− a1ej)− l(x− ej − a1ej)
≤l(x+ ek − a1ej)− l(x− ej + ek − a1ej)
≤l(x− ej + ek − a1ej)− l(x− 2ej + ek − a1ej)
...
≤l(x+ ek − (a4 − a1)ej − a1ej)− l(x− ej + ek − (a4 − a1)ej − a1ej)
=l(x+ ek − a3ej) + a3rι − l(x− ej + ek − a4ej)− a4rι,
where the first inequality follows from supermodularity. All other inequalities follow from
componentwise concavity (which is applied (a4 − a1) times). According to Lemma 3.1,
Uj l˜(x, ι) is supermodular in x1 and x2 for j ∈ {1, 2} and ι ∈ N0.
We next prove that superconcavity is preserved under Uj l˜(x, ι), i.e. for distinct j, k ∈ {1, 2}
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and some ι ∈ N0,
Uj l˜(x, ι)− Uj l˜(x− ej , ι) ≤ Uj l˜(x− ej − ek, ι)− Uj l˜(x− 2ej − ek, ι) and (3.13)
Uj l˜(x, ι)− Uj l˜(x− ek, ι) ≤ Uj l˜(x− ej − ek, ι)− Uj l˜(x− ej − 2ek, ι). (3.14)
Note that we might as well prove superconcavity when using Uk instead of Uj in the above
inequalities, which would give the same result that is derived below. (3.13) is equivalent to
max
a1∈{0,...,nι}
{a1rι + l(x− a1ej)} − max
a2∈{0,...,nι}
{a2rι + l(x− ej − a2ej)}
≤ max
a3∈{0,...,nι}
{a3rι + l(x− ej − ek − a3ej)} − max
a4∈{0,...,n}
{a4rι + l(x− 2ej − ek − a4ej)} .
We enumerate the combinations of optimal values for Uj l˜(x, ι) and Uj l˜(x− 2ej − ek, ι) and find
feasible values for Uj l˜(x−ej , ι) and Uj l˜(x−ej−ek, ι) so that (3.8) holds. For a1 = a4, the proof
follows from superconcavity when setting a1 = a2 = a3 = a4. Now consider the remaining cases:
(i) If nι ≥ a1 > a4, set a2 = a1 − 1 and a3 = a4 + 1, which yields
a1rι + l(x− a1ej)− a2rι − l(x− ej − a2ej)
=l(x− a1ej)− l(x− a1ej) + rι
=rι
=l(x− 2ej − ek − a4ej)− l(x− 2ej − ek − a4ej) + rι
=l(x− ej − ek − a3ej) + a3rι − l(x− 2ej − ek − a4ej)− a4rι.
(ii) If a1 < a4 ≤ nι, set a2 = a1 and a3 = a4, which yields
a1rι + l(x− a1ej)− a2rι − l(x− ej − a2ej)
=l(x− a1ej)− l(x− ej − a1ej)
≤l(x− ej − ek − a1ej)− l(x− 2ej − ek − a1ej)
≤l(x− 2ej − ek − a1ej)− l(x− 3ej − ek − a1ej)
...
≤l(x− ej − ek − (a4 − a1)ej − a1ej)− l(x− 2ej − ek − (a4 − a1)ej − a1ej)
=l(x− ej − ek − a3ej) + a3rι − l(x− 2ej − ek − a4ej)− a4rι,
where the first inequality follows from superconcavity. All other inequalities follow from
componentwise concavity (which is applied (a4 − a1) times).
Unlike in the case of Ul˜(x, ι), here the second part of superconcavity cannot be simply proven
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analogously. (3.14) is equivalent to
max
a1∈{0,...,nι}
{a1rι + l(x− a1ej)} − max
a2∈{0,...,nι}
{a2rι + l(x− ek − a2ej)}
≤ max
a3∈{0,...,nι}
{a3rι + l(x− ej − ek − a3ej)} − max
a4∈{0,...,nι}
{a4rι + l(x− ej − 2ek − a4ej)} .
We enumerate the combinations of optimal values for Uj l˜(x, ι) and Uj l˜(x− ej − 2ek, ι) and find
feasible values for Uj l˜(x−ek, ι) and Uj l˜(x−ej−ek, ι) so that (3.8) holds. The proof for a1 = a4
follows from superconcavity when setting a1 = a2 = a3 = a4. The following two cases need to be
considered:
(i) If nι ≥ a1 > a4, set a2 = a1 and a3 = a4, which yields
a1rι + l(x− a1ej)− a2rι − l(x− ek − a2ej)
=l(x− a1ej)− l(x− ek − a1ej)
≤l(x+ ej − a1ej)− l(x+ ej − ek − a1ej)
...
≤l(x+ (a1 − a4)ej − a1ej)− l(x+ (a1 − a4)ej − ek − a1ej)
=l(x− a4ej)− l(x− ek − a4ej)
≤l(x− ej − ek − a4ej)− l(x− ej − 2ek − a4ej)
=l(x− ej − ek − a3ej) + a3rι − l(x− ej − 2ek − a4ej)− a4rι.
Note that the first two inequalities follow from supermodularity (which is applied (a1− a4)
times). The last inequality follows from superconcavity.
(ii) If a1 < a4 ≤ nι, set a2 = a1 + 1 and a3 = a4 − 1, which yields
a1rι + l(x− a1ej)− a2rι − l(x− ek − a2ej)
=l(x− a1ej)− l(x− ej − ek − a1ej)− rι
≤l(x− ej − a1ej)− l(x− 2ej − ek − a1ej)− rι
...
≤l(x− (a4 − a1)ej − a1ej)− l(x− ej − ek − (a4 − a1)ej − a1ej)− rι
=l(x− a4ej)− l(x− ej − ek − a4ej)− rι
≤l(x− ek − a4ej)− l(x− ej − 2ek − a4ej)− rι
=l(x− ej − ek − a3ej) + a3rι − l(x− ej − 2ek − a4ej)− a4rι.
The first inequalities follow from superconcavity (which is applied (a4 − a1) times). Here
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we rearranged the inequality in the original definition. The last inequality also follows from
superconcavity using the same rearranged definition.
According to Lemma 3.1, Uj l˜(x, ι) is superconcave in x1 and x2. In combination with supermod-
ularity, it follows that Uj l˜(x, ι) is multimodular in x1 and x2 for j ∈ {1, 2} and ι ∈ N0.
We now turn to a technique that approximates the value function in order to reduce the model’s
complexity. This makes the decision model tractable in case of large-scale problem instances.
3.3 The Linear Programming Approach to Approximate Dynamic
Programming
In order to solve multi-dimensional problems prevailing in cargo capacity control, we apply ap-
proximate dynamic programming. General introductions and overviews of approximate dynamic
programming are given by Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis (1996), Bertsekas (2005), and Powell (2007).
These authors focus on adaptively approximating the value function by means of simulations. We
propose solution approaches that do not require simulation but solve an optimization problem di-
rectly. This is related to the linear programming approach for dynamic programs (cf. Puterman,
1994, pp. 223-231). Schweitzer & Seidmann (1985) first considered the idea to approximate the
value function in the linear programming formulation by a linear combination of other functions.
De Farias & Van Roy (2003) discuss the quality of the performance of such approximations.
The linear programming approach to approximate dynamic programming has been applied in
various fields of research. In passenger revenue management, Adelman (2007) was the first to ap-
proximate the value function. He proposes an affine approximation to compute time-dependent
bid prices. Topaloglu & Tong (2011) further analyze the model of Adelman (2007) to make the
solution feasible even for large networks. When considering customer choice behavior in network
revenue management, value function approximations are used in Zhang & Adelman (2009) as
well as in Meissner & Strauss (2012). Kunnumkal & Talluri (2011) establish a connection be-
tween piecewise linear approximations and Lagrangian approximations, as discussed in Topaloglu
(2009).
Other fields where the linear programming approach to approximate dynamic programming
is applied are, among others, inventory routing (e.g. Adelman, 2003), health care management
(e.g. Patrick et al., 2008), and cargo capacity control (e.g. Levina et al., 2011).
In this section, we first introduce the linear programming approach for dynamic programs.
Building on that, the value function approximation is discussed.
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Linear Programming Approach for Dynamic Programs
In Section 3.1.1, we introduced backward induction as a technique for determining a solution of
a finite-horizon MDP. A further way is to compute the value function by a linear program (LP).
The underlying idea of this approach is as follows: If Vˆτ (s) is a feasible solution to (3.2) for some
s ∈ S and some τ = T, ..., 1, and if
Vˆτ (s) ≥ max
a∈A(s)
{
rτ (s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
pτ (s, a, s
′)Vˆτ−1(s′)
}
, (3.15)
then Vˆτ (s) is an upper bound on the optimal value function Vτ (s) (Puterman, 1994, p. 223).
Thus, the optimal value satisfying Vτ (s) = maxa∈A(s){rτ (s, a) +
∑
s′∈S pτ (s, a, s
′)Vτ−1(s′)} is the
smallest value Vˆτ (s) that satisfies (3.15). From this result, one can formulate the following LP
that determines the optimal value functions Vτ (s) at time τ for all s ∈ S (cf. Puterman, 1994,
p. 223):
(P0) min
Vˆτ ,...,Vˆ1
∑
s∈S
Vˆτ (s) (3.16)
s.t. Vˆt(s) ≥ rt(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
pt(s, a, s
′)Vˆt−1(s′) ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s), t = τ, ..., 1 (3.17)
Vˆt(s) ∈ R ∀s ∈ S, t = τ, ..., 1. (3.18)
Note that Vˆ0(s) = V0(s) is given for all s ∈ S and does not have to be determined in
the LP. Note further that for some s ∈ S and t = T, ..., 1, Vτ (s) = maxa∈A(s){rτ (s, a) +∑
s′∈S pτ (s, a, s
′)Vτ−1(s′)} implies that Vτ (s) ≥ rτ (s, a) +
∑
s′∈S pτ (s, a, s
′)Vτ−1(s′) for all a ∈
A(s). It follows that Vt(s) is a feasible solution of (P0).
Below, we provide a proof for the fact that any feasible solution to (P0) provides indeed an
upper bound on the optimal objective value in (3.2)(based on Adelman, 2007).
Proposition 3.5. Suppose Vt(s) solves the optimality equation in (3.2) for some t = T, ..., 1 and
s ∈ S. If Vˆt(s) is a feasible solution to (P0), it follows that Vˆt(s) ≥ Vt(s).
Proof. The proof follows by induction. For τ = 1, (3.17) reads for all s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s)
Vˆ1(s) ≥ r1(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
p1(s, a, s
′)Vˆ0(s′).
This implies that for all s ∈ S, we have
Vˆ1(s) ≥ max
a∈A(s)
{
r1(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
p1(s, a, s
′)Vˆ0(s′)
}
= V1(s).
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This is true since V0 ≡ Vˆ0. Now assume the assertion holds for all τ = 1, ..., t and consider (3.17)
for τ = t+ 1. Then, we have
Vˆt+1(s) ≥ rt+1(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
pt+1(s, a, s
′)Vˆt(s′) ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s)
≥ rt+1(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
pt+1(s, a, s
′)Vt(s′) ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s)
≥ max
a∈A(s)
{
rt+1(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
pt+1(s, a, s
′)Vt(s′)
}
∀s ∈ S
= Vt+1(s) ∀s ∈ S.
The inequality in the second line follows from the induction assumption. The next inequality
uses the fact that if the inequality in the second line holds for all a ∈ A(s), it holds in particular
for the a ∈ A(s) that maximizes the right hand side.
Linear programming is traditionally not considered as a solution technique for finite-horizon
MDPs because the problem features an excessive number of constraints and variables making it
very expensive to solve. We now introduce a technique that makes the LP tractable.
Value Function Approximation
The optimization problem (3.16)-(3.18) gives a solution to the optimality equation (3.2), however,
the problem becomes computationally intractable for large-scale problems due to the curse of
dimensionality (this term was introduced by Bellman, 1957). In order to reduce the problem’s
dimensionality, Schweitzer & Seidmann (1985) were the first to propose an approximation of the
value function by a linear combination of multiple basis functions. For the MDP introduced in
this chapter, an approximation of the value function by n basis functions would be
Vt(s) ≈
n∑
i=1
αt,ihi(s) ∀s ∈ S, t = T, ..., 0, (3.19)
with basis functions hi(s) and approximation parameters αt,i which weight the i-th basis function
at time t. Note that n is chosen so that n < Smax with Smax as the number of possible states.
If n was equal to Smax, the approximation would be as complex as the original value function.
Plugging approximation (3.19) into (P0) yields
(P) min
α
∑
s∈S
n∑
i=1
ατ,ihi(s) (3.20)
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s.t.
n∑
i=1
αt,ihi(s) ≥ rt(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
pt(s, a, s
′)
n∑
i=1
αt−1,ihi(s′) ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s), t = τ, ..., 1
(3.21)
αt,i ∈ R ∀t = τ, ..., 1, i = 1, ..., n, (3.22)
with given α0,i, for all i = 1, ..., n, which approximate the terminal reward function.
Note that (P) is feasible if one of the basis functions is a constant function (Schweitzer &
Seidmann, 1985). For example, if h1(s) = 1 for all s ∈ S, a feasible solution is
α1,1 = max
s∈S,a∈A(s)
{
r1(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
p1(s, a, s
′)
n∑
i=1
α0,ihi(s
′)
}
,
αt,1 = max
s∈S,a∈A(s)
{
rt(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
pt(s, a, s
′)αt−1,1
}
∀t = τ, ..., 2,
αt,i = 0 ∀i 6= 1, t = τ, ..., 1.
Further, the objective function in (3.20) is bounded below: In Proposition 3.5, we showed that
any feasible solution to (P0) is an upper bound on the optimal objective value in (3.2). Since
(P) provides a feasible solution to (P0), it follows that any feasible solution to (P) provides an
upper bound on the optimal objective, too.
Feasibility in combination with boundedness yields that (P) and its dual (which is outlined
below) have finite optima. Further, note that we reduced (P0), which features Smax× τ decision
variables, to a problem with n× τ decision variables. Depending on the size of n, this makes the
problem tractable.
The dual formulation is usually computationally preferable since it has fewer constraints than
the primal formulation (Schweitzer & Seidmann, 1985). The dual of (P) is
(D) max
X
∑
1≤t≤τ,s∈S,a∈A(s)
Xt,s,art(s, a) (3.23)
s.t.
∑
s∈S,a∈A(s)
Xt,s,ahi(s)
=

∑
s∈S
hi(s) t = τ, i = 1, ..., n∑
s∈S,a∈A(s)
Xt+1,s,a
∑
s′∈S
pt+1(s, a, s
′)hi(s′) 1 ≤ t < τ, i = 1, ..., n
(3.24)
Xt,s,a ≥ 0 t = τ, ..., 1, s ∈ S, a ∈ A(s). (3.25)
An important relation between primal and dual optimal solutions is given by the complemen-
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tary slackness conditions, which we will use later to prove structural properties. These conditions
are outlined next for the above introduced primal and dual formulation (for a proof, see Bertsimas
& Tsitsiklis, 1997, pp. 151-152).
Theorem 3.2. Let α and X be feasible solutions to the primal and the dual problem, respectively.
α and X are optimal solutions for the two respective problems if and only if
(i) Xt,s,a
[
n∑
i=1
αt,ihi(s)− rt(s, a)−
∑
s′∈S
pt(s, a, s
′)
n∑
i=1
αt−1,ihi(s′)
]
= 0 ∀1 ≤ t ≤ τ, s ∈ S, a ∈
A(s),
(ii) αt,i
[∑
s∈S
hi(s)−
∑
s∈S,a∈A(s)
Xt,s,ahi(s)
]
= 0 ∀t = τ, i = 1, ..., n,
(iii) αt,i
[ ∑
s∈S,a∈A(s)
Xt+1,s,a
∑
s′∈S
pt+1(s, a, s
′)hi(s′)−
∑
s∈S,a∈A(s)
Xt,s,ahi(s)
]
= 0 ∀1 ≤ t < τ, i =
1, ..., n.
The first condition ensures that the dual variable Xt,s,a is zero unless the corresponding con-
straint of the primal problem is active. We say that a constraint is active if its left hand side
equals its right hand side. Bertsimas & Tsitsiklis (1997) give an intuitive explanation of such a
condition: If a constraint is not active at an optimal solution, it can be removed from the prob-
lem without affecting the objective value. Thus, there is no point in associating a non-negative
shadow price with such a constraint, and hence the dual variable Xt,s,a will be zero. Note that
the second and the third condition are automatically satisfied by every feasible solution to (D).
In summary, the linear programming approach to approximate dynamic programming gives an
upper bound on the maximum expected reward on the one hand and parameters approximating
the value function on the other hand. These parameters can be used to construct heuristic
decision rules; for instance, a heuristic decision rule is obtained by substituting the value function
for the approximation in the original decision rule. We will follow this approach in the next
chapters.
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Single-Leg Cargo Capacity Control
In this chapter, we propose and analyze single-leg capacity control models by means of the
methodology that was introduced in the previous chapter. A basic capacity control model for
carriers operating flights on single legs is outlined in Section 4.1. The shortcoming of this model
is the fact that its optimal policy does not feature a monotone structure and is therefore not
comprehensible. A further consequence of the lack of structure is that, for large problems,
the model is computationally intractable. Therefore, we propose in Section 4.2 two particular
capacity control models which feature an optimal simply structured control policy. These models
make specific assumptions regarding the market demand and the options of dealing with requests.
In Section 4.3, we suggest several heuristics that can be applied even if these specific assumption
are not fulfilled. Our heuristics provide decision rules that are easy to obtain and can thus be
used, even for large problems, to determine a solution to the basic model. In the same section,
we provide two bounds on the maximum expected revenue. Section 4.4 demonstrates, by means
of numerical experiments, how well the heuristics perform. Most of the ideas in this chapter are
based on Hoffmann (2013).
4.1 Basic Capacity Control Model
We consider a carrier that operates flights on single legs and does not offer connecting flights.
Consequently, capacity on each leg is controlled independently of any other leg. An aircraft on
a particular leg has a remaining weight capacity cw ∈ Cw = {0, 1, ...,Cw} and volume capacity
cv ∈ Cv = {0, 1, ...,Cv}. We let Cw and Cv denote the aircraft’s deterministic total weight
and volume capacity, respectively. Note that the term ’capacity’ in this context means capacity
available on the spot market (i.e. total capacity minus capacity sold through long-term contracts).
Over a booking horizon of T time periods, the carrier may receive in each period a short-term
booking request for a particular shipment class i ∈ I = {0, ...,m}. A shipment class is a
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combination of a shipment category, which has a specific weight and volume requirement, and
a particular per unit contribution margin. Thus, each shipment class is characterized by its
weight and volume requirement wi ∈ N0 and vi ∈ N0, respectively, and its per unit contribution
margin ϕi ≥ 0 (which we hereafter refer to as revenue despite abusing the terminology). Note
that a difference in revenue may occur due to special treatment like express shipping, cooling, or
special care for hazardous goods. Class i = 0 represents the event of no arriving request, where
we define w0 = ∞, v0 = ∞, and ϕ0 = 0. As is common in a revenue management context, we
count time backwards with time period T denoting the beginning of the booking process and
t = 0 representing the departure of the aircraft. At each time t = T, ..., 0, the probability of an
arriving request for a shipment class i is denoted by qt,i ≥ 0. The probability that no request
arrives is given by qt,0 = 1−
∑m
i=1 qt,i ≥ 0. We further define q0,0 = 1 and q0,i = 0 for i = 1, ...,m.
This means, no request arrives at t = 0. We assume that the arrival process follows a Poisson
process, which we approximate by a Bernoulli experiment at each discrete time t. Thus, the
probability for an arriving request at time t is
∑m
i=1 qt,i. Choosing T sufficiently large ensures
that the probability of more than one arrival per time period can be neglected. We further
assume that the demand for a particular shipment class is independent of, first, the demand for
all other classes, and second, the availability of other classes. Another assumption is that neither
cancellations nor no-shows occur. Hence, overbooking is not necessary. Further, customers are
assumed to be myopic, and thus strategic behavior is not accounted for.
In each period, in which a request is observed, the decision maker has to decide if the incoming
request is accepted or rejected. We assume that at the time the decision is made, the weight
and volume requirement of the shipment class is known. Thus, acceptance of a request gives a
revenue ϕi max{wi, vi/ϑ}, where ϑ denotes a constant representing the ratio of volume to weight
of a standard shipment (usually 6000 cm3/kg). The expression max{wi, vi/ϑ} is referred to as
chargeable weight and vi/ϑ as dimensional weight. Rejected demand is lost.
The risk-neutral decision maker faces the problem of whether to generate revenue by accepting
a request or saving capacity for later requests that might generate higher revenue. The objective
is to identify an optimal control policy that maximizes the total expected revenue over the
entire booking horizon. This can be reduced to solving the optimality equation of the following
finite-horizon MDP (T, S,E,A, pt, rt, V0) with:
(i) Planning horizon T ∈ N0, indexed by t.
(ii) State space S × E = (Cw × Cv)× I.
The state space comprises remaining weight and volume as system states and the requested
shipment class as an environmental state.
(iii) Action space A ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether a request is denied or accepted. The set of
admissible actions is defined as
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A(cw, cv, i) :=
{0, 1} cw ≥ wi, cv ≥ vi, i ∈ I{0} otherwise.
(iv) Transition law pt(cw, cv, i, a, cw − awi, cv − avi, i′) = qt−1,i′
for all t = T, ..., 1, cw ∈ Cw, cv ∈ Cv, i, i′ ∈ I, and a ∈ A(cw, cv, i). Note that the transition
probability is independent of the current state and action. It only represents the probability
of a booking request for class i′ arriving at time t− 1.
(v) One-stage reward function rt(cw, cv, i, a) = aϕi max{wi, vi/ϑ} =: aρi
for all t = T, ..., 1, cw ∈ Cw, cv ∈ Cv, i ∈ I, and a ∈ A(cw, cv, i).
(vi) Terminal reward function V0 ≡ 0
We let the terminal reward be zero since we do not account for overbooking in this model.
The maximum expected revenue at time t = T, ..., 1 given remaining capacity cw ∈ Cw, cv ∈ Cv
and a request for shipment class i ∈ I is the unique solution to the optimality equation
Vt(cw, cv, i) = max
a∈A(cw,cv ,i)
{
aρi +
m∑
i′=0
qt−1,i′Vt−1(cw − awi, cv − avi, i′)
}
. (4.1)
For an arbitrary real-valued function u on Cw × Cv × I, we define the operator H as
Htu(cw, cv) :=
m∑
i=0
qt,iu(cw, cv, i) ∀t = T, ..., 0.
Accordingly, we can rewrite (4.1) as:
Vt(cw, cv, i) = max
a∈A(cw,cv ,i)
{aρi +Ht−1Vt−1(cw − awi, cv − avi)}. (4.2)
The observable-disturbance form (cf. Section 3.1.2) of (4.2) is
HtVt(cw, cv) =
m∑
i=0
qt,i max
a∈A(cw,cv ,i)
{aρi +Ht−1Vt−1(cw − awi, cv − avi)}. (4.3)
We will use the maximum expected revenue determined by the optimality equation in observable-
disturbance form later in our numerical experiments. For the following analysis of the decision
model, we consider the form given in (4.2).
Instead of considering non-negative capacities and restricting admissible actions, we can also
allow for negative capacities, define admissible actions A ≡ {0, 1}, and define Vt(cw, cv, i) =
−T maxi∈I{ρi} for all t = T, ..., 0 if min{cw, cv} < 0. Using this alternative formulation, we can
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write (4.2) for cw ≥ 0, cv ≥ 0, and i ∈ I as
Vt(cw, cv, i) = max{ρi +Ht−1Vt−1(cw − wi, cv − vi), Ht−1Vt−1(cw, cv)}.
If a booking request for shipment class i is accepted at time t, the expected revenue is ρi +
Ht−1Vt−1(cw − wi, cv − vi). If the request is rejected, the expected revenue is Ht−1Vt−1(cw, cv).
Accordingly, the optimal decision rule in t given a request for shipment class i ∈ I is
f∗t (cw, cv, i) =
1 ρi ≥ Ht−1Vt−1(cw, cv)−Ht−1Vt−1(cw − wi, cv − vi), cw ≥ 0, cv ≥ 00 otherwise. (4.4)
That means, a request is accepted if sufficient capacity is remaining and if revenue ρi is greater
than the opportunity cost of the amount of weight and volume that is required by the requested
shipment class (i.e. Ht−1Vt−1(cw, cv) −Ht−1Vt−1(cw − wi, cv − vi) =: δt−1(cw, cv, i)). Note that
if insufficient capacity is remaining or class i = 0 is requested, opportunity cost is larger than
revenue. Thus, such requests are rejected.
In order to determine optimal actions at time t, all values Ht−1Vt−1(cw, cv) for cw ≥ 0 and
cv ≥ 0 need to be computed. This is the major drawback of this model because determining
optimal actions for real world problems (e.g. a freighter having a capacity of 590 m3 and 92,000
kg) is computationally intractable. One way to reduce computational load is to identify monotone
policies (cf. Section 3.1.1). In passenger revenue management, a well-known approach is to
explore whether opportunity cost is monotone in capacity or time. If this is proven to be true,
the optimal control policy follows a control limit policy that indicates when to switch from
accepting to rejecting a request. However, as is shown next, opportunity cost in the basic cargo
capacity control model is neither monotone in capacity nor in time.
Non-Monotone Behavior
Proposition 4.1. δt(cw, cv, i) is not monotone in cw and neither in cv for (cw, cv, i) ∈ Cw×Cv×I
and t = T − 1, ..., 0.
The following counterexample for monotonicity of opportunity cost in weight shows that the
proposition holds. An analog example for non-monotone behavior in volume can be easily con-
structed.
Example 4.1. Consider an aircraft with a remaining capacity of 5 weight and 6 volume units
(cw = 5, cv = 6). In the last two decision periods, requests for two different shipment classes
may arrive: Shipment class 1 requires 5 weight and 3 volume units (w1 = 5, v1 = 3) and gives a
revenue ϕ1 = 1.0, whereas shipment class 2 requires 6 weight and 3 volume units (w2 = 6, v2 = 3)
and gives a revenue ϕ2 = 1.2. The probability of a request for class 1 and 2 is qt,1 = 0.1 and
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qt,2 = 0.9, respectively, for t ∈ {1, 2}. For the sake of simplicity, we let ϑ = 1. Now assume that
in period 2 a request for shipment class 1 arrives (with ρ1 = 5), and the decision maker has to
decide whether to accept or to reject the request. For a remaining capacity of cw = 5 and cv = 6,
the request should be accepted since ρ1 > δ1(5, 6, 1) = q1,1ρ1 = 0.5. If the remaining capacity
was cw = 8 and cv = 6, the request should be rejected since the opportunity cost for accepting
it (δ1(8, 6, 1) = q1,1ρ1 + q1,2ρ2=6.98) is greater than the revenue that could be generated at
t = 2. For a remaining capacity of cw = 11 and cv = 6, the request should be accepted because
ρ1 > δ1(11, 6, 1) = 0. This example demonstrates that as remaining weight increases, the optimal
action changes from accepting to rejecting and back to accepting the request. The reasons is
that opportunity cost first increases and then decreases. Figure 4.1 shows the non-monotone
behavior of opportunity cost in weight for this example.
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Figure 4.1: Non-monotone behavior of opportunity cost in weight
This phenomenon occurs because of two reasons: First, requests featuring different sizes com-
pete for multiple and scarce resources. And second, requests have to be entirely accepted or
denied. If resources are plentiful (cw = 11), competition between different requests does not ex-
ist since accepting a class-1 request would leave sufficient capacity for accommodating a request
for either class 1 or class 2 in period 1. Thus, a class-1 request should be accepted. As less weight
remains (cw = 8), competition is created, and a class-1 request should be denied because accept-
ing it would lower available capacity, so that a larger high-value request could not be accepted in
period 1. As even less capacity is available (cw = 5), competition vanishes. Rejecting a class-1
request is then pointless since it would not yield sufficient capacity for accepting a class-2 request
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during the remaining periods. Thus, the request should be accepted. Generally speaking, the
higher the probability of a large high-value request arriving at the end of a booking period (q1,2
in this example), the more likely is a situation with non-monotone opportunity cost.
Proposition 4.2. δt(cw, cv, i) is not monotone in time for (cw, cv, i) ∈ Cw × Cv × I.
The following example will demonstrate the proposition’s validity.
Example 4.2. Consider an aircraft with a remaining capacity of 10 weight and 6 volume units
(cw = 10, cv = 6). The same shipment classes as in the previous example may be requested, i.e.
(w1 = 5, v1 = 3) with ϕ1 = 1.0 and (w2 = 6, v2 = 3) with ϕ2 = 1.2. We again assume that
ϑ = 1. The arrival probabilities are now given by qt,1 = 0.3 and qt,2 = 0.7 for all t = T, ..., 1. We
consider an observed request for shipment class 1 with ρ1 = 5. In t = 1, the request is accepted
since ρ1 > δ0(10, 6, 1) = 0. In t = 2, the request is denied because the revenue which would
be generated through acceptance is lower than the opportunity cost associated with class 1, i.e.
δ1(10, 6, 1) = q1,2ρ2 = 5.04. The decision changes again in t = 3, where the request is accepted
since ρ1 > δ2(10, 6, 1) with δ2(10, 6, 1) = q2,1(q1,1ρ1 + q1,2ρ2) + q2,2ρ2− q2,1ρ1− q2,2q1,1ρ1 = 4.452.
Accordingly, the opportunity cost is not monotone in time in this example, and thus a monotone
policy based on time is not optimal. Figure 4.2 displays the opportunity cost’s non-monotone
behavior in time.
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Figure 4.2: Non-monotone behavior of opportunity cost in time
This example shows that a class-1 request should be accepted very close to departure (period
1) as this is the last opportunity to generate revenue. Further, the request should also be
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accepted earlier in the booking process (period 3) when it is likely that another class-1 request
might occur, and accepting two class-1 requests would generate a higher revenue than accepting
a single class-2 request. However, as departure comes closer (period 2), an arrival of another
class-1 request becomes less likely. Thus, the decision maker rejects the request in order to save
capacity for a more likely arriving class-2 request. This suggests that a non-monotone behavior
occurs if the probability and revenue of a class-1 request is neither too small nor too large. If the
arrival probability was too large, it would still be profitable to accept a class-1 request closer to
departure (period 2). If the probability was too small, it would be rejected in any period except
just before departure. Transferring the results of Maddah et al. (2010) to our example, a non-
monotone behavior in time is observed if the following relationship holds (assuming stationary
request probabilities qi):
1 + q1
1 + q1 + q1q2 − q21
q2ρ2 < ρ1 < q2ρ2.
The reason for the non-monotone behavior in time and remaining capacity is related to the
difficulties caused by accepting several units at once. Numerous authors remark that, if requests
comprising multiple units must be entirely accepted (usually referred to as batch arrivals), im-
portant monotonicity structures do not exist. This implies that a monotone policy may not be
optimal. Models considering requests with multiple units can be found in Deb & Serfozo (1973),
Weiss (1979), Lee & Hersh (1993), Kleywegt & Papastavrou (2001), Walczak (2001), Brumelle &
Walczak (2003), and Walczak (2006). Papastavrou et al. (1996) provide some properties of the
arrival probabilities of batches in the one-dimensional case so that opportunity cost is monotone
in time and capacity.
We now turn to capacity control models that feature monotone opportunity costs. In the
following section, we propose two models that are very similar to the basic control model but
make some assumptions which yield an optimal monotone policy.
4.2 Capacity Control Models featuring Structured Control Policies
On the one hand, we highlighted in Section 3.1.1 the importance of structured decision rules.
On the other hand, we have shown in the previous section that the optimal policy of the cargo
capacity control problem is neither monotone in capacity nor in time. Therefore, our motivation
in this section is to develop decision models that feature a simply structured optimal acceptance
policy.
We first present a model which we hereafter refer to as M1. One underlying idea of this
decision model is to consider cargo capacity as one-dimensional, i.e. decisions are made based on
either available volume or weight. This approach is reasonable if the expected ratio of capacity
to demand is much lower for one capacity dimension than for the other. For instance, if mainly
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flowers are carried on a leg, the aircraft is very likely to have sufficient weight capacity but too
little volume capacity. Thus, the volume capacity-demand ratio is much lower than the weight
capacity-demand ratio. In this situation, the remaining weight is not important for making
acceptance decisions and thus can be neglected. Based on past and forecasted demand data on
a leg, the decision maker can choose which cargo dimension to consider as the model’s state
space. Then, capacity requirement of all shipment classes is also considered as one-dimensional.
A further characteristic of M1 is that it allows for requests to be partially accepted. This
assumption may contradict some airlines’ business practices. However, there are two reasons
why such an approach might be still reasonable. First, a revenue manager generally has the
option to sell only a part of the actual requested capacity. Second, freight forwarders often use
only a part of the originally requested capacity without being penalized (Luo et al., 2009). By
accepting only a part of a request, the gap between requested and eventually used capacity might
be decreased, and thus more capacity would be available for other requests.
In M1, we again consider a carrier that operates flights on single legs. Now an aircraft on
a particular leg has a remaining cargo capacity c ∈ C = {0, ...,C}, and we let C denote the
aircraft’s total capacity. Further, each shipment class that may be requested is characterized by
its capacity requirement γi ∈ N0 and its per unit revenue ϕi ≥ 0. Similarly as in the basic model,
we define γ0 =∞ and ϕ0 = 0. All other notations are equal to the notation of the basic model.
Further, except allowing for partial acceptance, we make the same assumptions as in the basic
model.
Again, our objective is to identify an optimal control policy that maximizes the expected rev-
enue. This can be achieved by solving the optimality equations of an MDP (T, S,E,A, pt, rt, V
M1
0 )
with:
(i) Planning horizon T ∈ N0.
(ii) State space S × E = C × I.
(iii) Action space A ⊂ N0 with a ∈ A as the number of accepted capacity units. The set of
admissible actions is defined as A(c, i) := {0, ...,min{γi, c}} for all c ∈ C and i ∈ I.
If the capacity requirement γi of the requested shipment class i is lower than the remaining
capacity c, the entire request or any part of it can be accepted. However, if the inventory
level is lower than the capacity requirement, the number of accepted capacity units must
not exceed remaining capacity.
(iv) Transition law pt(c, i, a, c− a, i′) = qt−1,i′
for all t = T, ..., 1, c ∈ C, i, i′ ∈ I, and a ∈ A(c, i).
(v) One-stage reward function rt(c, i, a) = aϕi
for all t = T, ..., 1, c ∈ C, i ∈ I, and a ∈ A(c, i).
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(vi) Terminal reward function VM10 ≡ 0.
The maximum expected revenue at time t = T, ..., 1 given remaining capacity c ∈ C and a request
for shipment class i ∈ I is the unique solution to the optimality equation
VM1t (c, i) = max
a∈A(c,i)
{
aϕi +
m∑
i′=0
qt−1,i′VM1t−1 (c− a, i′)
}
. (4.5)
Using the operator Hˆtu(c) :=
∑m
i=0 qt,iu(c, i) for an arbitrary real-valued function u on C × I,
we can restate (4.5) as
VM1t (c, i) = max
a∈A(c,i)
{
aϕi + Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a)
}
.
Below, we explore the structural properties of M1. Before a statement on the characteristics
of the optimal policy can be given, some necessary properties need to be provided.
Lemma 4.1. VM1t (c, i) is non-decreasing in c for all i ∈ I and t = T, ..., 0.
Proof. The proof follows by induction on t. Since VM10 ≡ 0, the assertion holds for t = 0.
Now assume that VM1t (c, i) is non-decreasing in c for t ≥ 0 and for all i ∈ I. Further, let
a∗i = f
∗
t+1(c − 1, i) (with c > 0), i.e. a∗i is the optimal action at t + 1 if c − 1 capacity units are
remaining and class i is requested. Since a∗i ∈ A(c − 1, i), it follows that a∗i ∈ A(c, i). Now we
prove the supposition for t+ 1. For fixed c > 0 and i ∈ I, we have
VM1t+1 (c, i)− VM1t+1 (c− 1, i)
= max
a∈A(c,i)
{aϕi + HˆtVM1t (c− a)} − max
a∈A(c−1,i)
{aϕi + HˆtVM1t (c− 1− a)}
≥HˆtVM1t (c− a∗i )− HˆtVM1t (c− 1− a∗i )
≥0.
The last step follows from the induction assumption and from the fact that a convex combination
of non-decreasing functions is non-decreasing as well.
Lemma 4.2. Let h : N0 → R be defined by
h(s) := max
a∈A(s)
{r(a) + h˜(s− a)}, (4.6)
with
• h˜ : N0 → R is concave
• r : N0 → R is concave
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• A(s) = {a ∈ N0 | n1(s) ≤ a ≤ n2(s)}, s ∈ N0
• n1 is non-decreasing and convex
• n2 is non-decreasing and concave
• n2(s+ 1) ≤ n2(s) + 1, s ∈ N0.
Let further f(s), s ∈ N0, be the action maximizing the right hand side of (4.6). Then, we have
(i) f(s) ≤ f(s+ 1) ≤ f(s) + 1 and
(ii) h(s) is concave in s.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 4.3. VM1t (c, i) is non-decreasing and concave in c for all i ∈ I and t = T, ..., 0.
Proof. The proof follows by induction on t. Since VM10 ≡ 0, VM10 (c, i) is concave in c, and thus
the assertion holds for t = 0. Now assume VM1t (c, i) is concave in c for all i ∈ I and some t ≥ 0.
At t+ 1, we have
VM1t+1 (c, i) = max
a∈A(c,i)
{aϕi + HˆtVM1t (c− a)}. (4.7)
The induction assumption in combination with the fact that a convex combination of concave
functions is also concave yields that HˆtV
M1
t (c− a) is concave in c. Thus, we can apply Lemma
4.2 to (4.7), which yields concavity of VM1t+1 (c) in c. Monotonicity of V
M1
t (c, i) in c was already
shown in Lemma 4.1, which completes the proof.
We now have the necessary and sufficient conditions for ensuring that the optimal policy of
M1 follows a monotone policy.
Theorem 4.1. The optimal policy of M1 is a control limit policy pi∗ = (f∗T , f
∗
T−1, ..., f
∗
1 ) with
decision rules
f∗t (c, i) =
0 c ≤ c∗(t, i)min{γi, c− c∗(t, i)} c > c∗(t, i),
with control limits c∗(t, i) = max
{
c > 0 : ϕi < Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1)
}
and c∗(t, i) = 0
if the set is empty.
Proof. Since VM1t (c, i) is concave in c for all t = T, ..., 0, HˆtV
M1
t (c) is also concave in c as a
convex combination of concave functions. Concavity implies that
Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1) ≤ Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 2).
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That means, Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c) − Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c − 1) is non-increasing in c which ensures the existence
of the control limits
c∗(t, i) = max{c > 0 : ϕi < Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1)}. (4.8)
Now fix c ∈ C, i ∈ I, t > 0, and let d ∈ N0. Let a be the largest a ∈ A(c, i) that maximizes
the right hand side of (4.5) in t. Then, we have
aϕi + Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a) ≥ dϕi + Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− d) for a > d ≥ 0, and
aϕi + Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a) > dϕi + Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− d) for a < d ≤ min{γi, c}.
Since Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c) is concave in c, we can rewrite the above inequalities as
aϕi + Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a) ≥ (a− 1)ϕi + Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a+ 1),
aϕi + Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a) > (a+ 1)ϕi + Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a− 1),
where the expression reduces to the first (second) equation if a = min{γi, c} (a = 0). This can
be rearranged as
ϕi ≥ Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a+ 1)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a), (4.9)
ϕi < Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a− 1). (4.10)
Applying (4.8) to the above inequalities yields that c∗(t, i) = c − a. For c ≤ c∗(t, i), it follows
that the optimal action is a = 0. For all c > c∗(t, i), we have a = c− c∗(t, i). The optimal action
is only limited by the request size γi. Thus, we have a = min{γi, c− c∗(t, i)} if c > c∗(t, i).
The optimal policy of M1 reveals that smaller portions of requests should be accepted as
remaining capacity decreases (assuming constant time). This result is intuitive since a part of
the capacity should be saved for later requests that may have a higher value. Note that c∗(t, i) has
a similar interpretation as time-dependent protection levels, which are used as control instruments
in passenger revenue management: A control limit c∗(t, i) tells a revenue manager that given a
request in time period t for a shipment class i ∈ I, an amount of c∗(t, i) capacity units should be
protected for later bookings.
A further characteristic of M1 is that the control limits can be structured with respect to time.
Proposition 4.3. The control limits c∗(t, i) are non-decreasing in t for i ∈ I.
Proof. In order to prove this proposition, we have to show that opportunity cost HˆtV
M1
t (c) −
HˆtV
M1
t (c− 1) is non-decreasing in time (for c > 0). We fix c ∈ C with c > 0 as well as t > 0 and
define a∗i = f
∗
t (c− 1, i) as the optimal action depending on i ∈ I at time t if c− 1 capacity units
55
4 Single-Leg Cargo Capacity Control
are remaining. Note that for all i ∈ I we have a∗i ∈ A(c− 1, i) and a∗i ∈ A(c, i). Then, it follows
∆cHˆtV
M1
t (c) := HˆtV
M1
t (c)− HˆtVM1t (c− 1)
=
∑
i∈I
qt,i
[
max
a∈A(c,i)
{
aϕi + Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a)
}
− max
a∈A(c−1,i)
{
aϕi + Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1− a)
}]
≥
∑
i∈I
qt,i
[
Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a∗i )− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1− a∗i )
]
≥∆cHˆt−1VM1t−1 (c).
The last inequality follows from concavity of Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c) in c.
Since the control limits are non-increasing as departure approaches (assuming constant capac-
ity), this result reveals that greater portions of requests should be accepted close to departure.
This characteristic of M1 is reasonable since the less time is remaining until departure, the less
likely is the arrival of a request which may generate revenue. Thus, a revenue manager should
take advantage of remaining opportunities to sell capacity.
The following property of M1 gives further information on the control limits’ structure.
Proposition 4.4. For t = T, ..., 1, we have c∗(t, i1) ≤ c∗(t, i2) with ϕi1 ≥ ϕi2 and i1, i2 ∈ I.
Proof. Consider two shipment classes i1 and i2 with ϕi1 ≥ ϕi2 . From Lemma 4.3 we know that
Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c) is concave which implies that Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1) is non-increasing in c.
This means that the maximum capacity level c that satisfies ϕi1 < Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c−
1) cannot be greater than the maximum capacity level that satisfies ϕi2 < Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c) −
Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1). Therefore, it follows that c∗(t, i1) ≤ c∗(t, i2).
This result’s interpretation is that the higher the per unit revenue of a request, the greater is
the portion of the request that should be accepted. Note that the requests’ size does not affect
this result since M1 allows for partial acceptance.
Since it is only necessary to compute control limits c∗(t, i) in order to determine optimal
actions and because the state space is one-dimensional, the computational load of M1 is reduced
compared to the basic capacity control model. Furthermore, the intuitive structures offered by
M1 make the acceptance policy comprehensible for revenue managers. This might yield a higher
acceptance of decision support systems in practice.
Since M1 considers only one capacity dimension, a loss in accuracy occurs if neither loose cargo
nor dense cargo is exclusively requested. Below, we study a further decision model which does
not focus on a single resource. This model is applicable if requested shipments mainly feature
the weight-volume ratio of a standard shipment.
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A Decision Model for Standard Shipments
This decision model (which is hereafter referred to as M2 ) is similar to M1, which we described
in the previous section. The differences to M1 are the following: First, in M2, we consider
two capacity dimensions rather than one. Second, partially accepting requests is allowed, where
the set of admissible actions is defined so that it is only possible to accept an equal number
of capacity units of both resources. Third, we let the system state comprise remaining weight
cw ∈ Cw = {0, ...,Cw} as well as dimensional weight c˜v ∈ C˜v = {0, ..., bCv/ϑc}. Consequently, a
decision lowers the system state by the same amount of weight and dimensional weight units. If
largely standard shipments are requested, M2 will allow accepting any part of a request while
exactly accounting for both capacity dimensions.
Note that the state space can be chosen arbitrarily in the way that multiples or fractions of
weight and volume units can be considered. That means, if requested shipments are expected to
follow a particular pattern regarding the weight-volume ratio, the state space can be chosen to
represent this pattern, too.
We make the same assumptions in M2 as in the basic model except allowing for partial ac-
ceptance. The objective of M2 is to determine an optimal policy that maximizes total expected
revenue. This can be modeled by means of an MDP (T, S,E,A, pt, rt, V
M2
0 ) with:
(i) Planning horizon T ∈ N0.
(ii) State space S × E = (Cw × C˜v)× I.
(iii) Action space A ⊂ N0 with a ∈ A as the number of both accepted weight and dimensional
weight units. The set of admissible actions is defined as
Aˆ(cw, c˜v, i) := {0, ...,min {γ˜i, cw, c˜v}} for all cw ∈ Cw and c˜v ∈ C˜v with γ˜i := min{wi, vi/ϑ}.
This definition implies that any part of a request can be accepted, where the number of
accepted capacity units is bounded by, first, the capacity dimension featuring the lowest
inventory level (min{cw, c˜v}), and second, the lowest capacity requirement (γ˜i).
(iv) Transition law
pt(cw, c˜v, i, a, cw − a, c˜v − a, i′) = qt−1,i′
for all t = T, ..., 1, cw ∈ Cw, c˜v ∈ C˜v, i, i′ ∈ I, and a ∈ Aˆ(cw, c˜v, i).
(v) One-stage reward function rt(cw, c˜v, i, a) = ϕia
for all t = T, ..., 1, cw ∈ Cw, c˜v ∈ C˜v, i ∈ I, and a ∈ Aˆ(cw, c˜v, i).
(vi) Terminal reward function VM20 ≡ 0.
The maximum expected revenue at time t = T, ..., 1, given remaining capacity (cw, c˜v) ∈ Cw× C˜v
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and a request for shipment class i ∈ I, is the unique solution to the optimality equation
VM2t (cw, c˜v, i) = max
a∈Aˆ(cw,c˜v ,i)
{
ϕia+
m∑
i′=0
qt−1,i′VM2t−1 (cw − a, c˜v − a, i′)
}
. (4.11)
Even though the system state is two-dimensional, the set of admissible actions causes M2 to
simplify to M1 with a slightly different set of admissible actions.
Proposition 4.5. For cw ≤ c˜v, M2 is equal to M1 with optimality equation
VM1t (cw, i) = max
a∈A(cw,i)
{ϕia+ Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (cw − a)}
for cw ∈ Cw, i ∈ I, t = T, ..., 1 and with A(cw, i) := {0, ...,min{cw, γ˜i}}. Further, for cw ≥ c˜v,
M2 is equal to M1 with
VM1t (c˜v, i) = max
a∈A(c˜v ,i)
{ϕia+ Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c˜v − a)}
for c˜v ∈ C˜v, i ∈ I, t = T, ..., 1 and with A(c˜v, i) := {0, ...,min{c˜v, γ˜i}}.
Proof. If we have cw ≤ c˜v, c˜v does never affect any action. Accordingly, Aˆ(cw, c˜v, i) reduces to
A(cw, i) = {0, ...,min{cw, γ˜i}}. Furthermore, this also implies that once cw ≤ c˜v, c˜v can never be
lower than cw, i.e. volume can never be the bottleneck. Therefore, only cw must be considered
as a state variable, and M2 reduces to M1 with a different set of admissible actions. The proof
for the second part of the proposition follows analogously. Note that the total available capacity,
Cw and C˜v, already determines which capacity dimension can be neglected.
Since M2 is equal to M1 with different admissible actions, its optimal policy features the same
structures as the one of M1.
Theorem 4.2. The optimal policy of M2 is a control limit policy pi∗ = (f∗T , f
∗
T−1, ..., f
∗
1 ) with
decision rules,
(i) if cw ≤ c˜v,
f∗t (cw, i) =
0 cw ≤ c∗w(t, i)min{γ˜i, cw − c∗w(t, i)} cw > c∗w(t, i),
with control limits c∗w(t, i) = max{cw > 0 : ϕi < Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (cw) − Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (cw − 1)} and
c∗w(t, i) = 0 if the set is empty.
(ii) if c˜v ≤ cw,
f∗t (c˜v, i) =
0 c˜v ≤ c˜∗v(t, i)min{γ˜i, c˜v − c˜∗v(t, i)} c˜v > c˜∗v(t, i),
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with control limits c˜∗v(t, i) = max{c˜v > 0 : ϕi < Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c˜v) − Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c˜v − 1)} and
c˜∗v(t, i) = 0 if the set is empty.
The proof of this theorem can be done analogously to the one of Theorem 4.1 and is thus omitted.
Note that the properties in Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 also hold for the control limits outlined
above. Therefore, the interpretation of all structural properties of M1 apply as well to M2. Since
these structures alleviate computational load, M2 is able to solve large-scale problem instances
very efficiently.
One might argue that the option to accept parts of a request contradicts the practice of several
cargo carriers. If the only options are to entirely reject or to accept a request, one has to apply
the basic capacity control model. As we already outlined, determining an optimal policy of a
real-world problem might be computationally intractable in this case. Therefore, we propose
heuristics in the next section that provide acceptance decisions which are easy to obtain.
4.3 Heuristics and Bounds
Our motivation for developing heuristics is that the basic capacity control problem suffers from
the curse of dimensionality for large problems. The heuristics we propose provide control policies
which are easy to obtain and have a low storage requirement. Since the maximum expected
revenue cannot be determined for large problems either, we propose two different upper bounds.
Comparing these bounds to the maximum expected revenue in our numerical experiments allows
us to make a statement on the bounds’ quality.
In this section, we propose three different heuristics. First, we outline the approach introduced
by Amaruchkul et al. (2007) that just decomposes the underlying MDP into weight and volume
subproblems. This heuristic is among the best for solving the single-leg cargo capacity control
problem. Further, this approach provides also an upper bound on the optimal objective value.
Second, we propose a new decomposition heuristic that is based on the insights gained from
M1 yielding a comprehensible decision rule. Third, we describe a heuristic based on a piecewise
linear value function approximation. This approach provides an upper bound on the maximum
expected revenue.
Heuristic based on Decomposition (HD)
This heuristic was first proposed by Amaruchkul et al. (2007) who applied it to a single-leg cargo
capacity control problem which accounts for uncertain capacity requirement and overbooking.
HD can also be used to determine a policy for the basic capacity control problem when overbook-
ing and uncertain shipment capacity requirement are neglected. The heuristic’s major idea is to
split the two-dimensional MDP into two subproblems, one with weight as state space (indicated
by superscript w), the other having volume as state space (indicated by superscript v). Since
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total revenue depends on both weight and volume, a one-dimensional revenue function for each
capacity dimension has to be approximated in the subproblems. The revenue in each subproblem
generated by accepting a request is defined as follows:
ρwi := ϕiwi
ρvi := ρi − ϕiwi.
Accordingly, accepting a request for class i in the weight subproblem generates a revenue ρwi ,
which is defined as the revenue per chargeable weight unit times the weight requirement of class i.
The revenue generated in the volume subproblem is equal to the difference between total revenue
of i and the revenue of i in the weight subproblem. That means, accepting a request in the volume
subproblem gives only revenue if dimensional weight is greater than weight. According to this
definition, weight is the primary dimension, whereas volume is the supplementary dimension.
The weight subproblem is formulated as an MDP with one-dimensional system state cw and
the following optimality equation for all cw ∈ Cw, i ∈ I, and t = T, ..., 1:
V HD,wt (cw, i) = max
a∈A¯(cw,i)
{
aρwi + Hˆt−1V
HD,w
t−1 (cw − awi)
}
with A¯(cw, i) := {0} if cw < wi and A¯(cw, i) := {0, 1} otherwise. Likewise, the volume subprob-
lem’s optimality equation with cv as its system state can be formulated for all cv ∈ Cv, i ∈ I,
and t = T, ..., 1:
V HD,vt (cv, i) = max
a∈A¯(cv ,i)
{
aρvi + Hˆt−1V
HD,v
t−1 (cv − avi)
}
.
Note that we do not consider overbooking and thus let both terminal values V HD,w0 (cw, i) and
V HD,v0 (cv, i) be equal to zero for cw ∈ Cw, cv ∈ Cv, and i ∈ I.
The decision rule of HD is to accept a request for shipment class i ∈ I at time t given remaining
capacity cw ≥ wi and cv ≥ vi if
ρi ≥
[
Hˆt−1V
HD,w
t−1 (cw)− Hˆt−1V HD,wt−1 (cw − wi)
]
+
[
Hˆt−1V
HD,v
t−1 (cv)− Hˆt−1V HD,vt−1 (cv − vi)
]
.
Thus, the exact opportunity cost is approximated by the sum of the opportunity costs of the
weight and the volume subproblem. We see from this result that it is necessary to compute all
HˆtV
HD,w
t (cw) for any combination of t and cw and all HˆtV
HD,v
t (cv) for any combination of t and
cv in order to determine decision rules.
The sum of the maximum expected revenue of both subproblems gives an upper bound on the
total maximum expected revenue determined in the basic capacity control model. This is stated
in the following proposition (based on Amaruchkul et al., 2007).
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Proposition 4.6. For any t = T, ..., 0, cw ∈ Cw, cv ∈ Cv, and i ∈ I, we have Vt(cw, cv, i) ≤
V HD,wt (cw, i) + V
HD,v
t (cv, i).
Proof. The proof follows by induction on t. For t = 0, we have V0(cw, cv, i) = V
HD,w
0 (cw, i) =
V HD,v0 (cv, i) = 0 for all cw ∈ Cw, cv ∈ Cv, and i ∈ I. Thus, the proposition holds for t = 0. Now
assume the assertion holds for some t ≥ 0. Further, note that ρi = ρwi + ρvi . For t + 1, we then
have for any cw ∈ Cw, cv ∈ Cv, and i ∈ I
Vt+1(cw, cv, i)
= max
a∈A(cw,cv ,i)
{ρia+HtVt(cw − awi, cv − avi)}
= max
a∈A(cw,cv ,i)
{(ρwi + ρvi )a+HtVt(cw − awi, cv − avi)}
≤ max
a∈A(cw,cv ,i)
{
(ρwi + ρ
v
i )a+ HˆtV
HD,w
t (cw − awi) + HˆtV HD,vt (cv − avi)
}
≤ max
a∈A(cw,cv ,i)
{
ρwi a+ HˆtV
HD,w
t (cw − awi)
}
+ max
a∈A(cw,cv ,i)
{
ρvi a+ HˆtV
HD,v
t (cv − avi)
}
≤ max
a∈A¯(cw,i)
{
ρwi a+ HˆtV
HD,w
t (cw − awi)
}
+ max
a∈A¯(cv ,i)
{
ρvi a+ HˆtV
HD,v
t (cv − avi)
}
= V HD,wt+1 (cw, i) + V
HD,v
t+1 (cv, i).
The first inequality follows from the induction assumption and the second from subadditivity of
the maximum function. The third inequality follows from the fact that A(cw, cv, i) ⊂ A¯(cw, i)
and A(cw, cv, i) ⊂ A¯(cv, i).
Note that this proposition is also valid if the optimality equation is written in observable-
disturbance form. In this case, we define the upper bound given by the subproblems as zACG :=
HˆTV
HD,w
T (Cw)+HˆTV
HD,v
T (Cv) (subscripts representing the initial letters of Amaruchkul, Cooper,
and Gupta).
Heuristic based on Decomposition and Partial Acceptance (HDP)
This heuristic decomposes the two-dimensional MDP into two subproblems as done in HD. More-
over, the major idea is to pretend any part of a request can be accepted. By pretending partial
acceptance, we obtain concavity of each subproblem’s value function in its capacity dimension.
Note that this assumption is only made in the subproblems. The resulting heuristic control
policy accepts or denies requests only in their entirety.
Decomposing the problem is associated with the question of how to assign revenue that is
generated by accepting parts of a request to the weight and volume subproblem. We allocate
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revenues generated by accepting one capacity unit as follows:
ϕwi := ϕi (4.12)
ϕvi := ϕi
(
vi
ϑ − wi
)
vi
1{ viϑ >wi} = ϕi
(
1
ϑ
− wi
vi
)
1{ viϑ >wi}. (4.13)
The revenue generated by accepting one weight unit in the weight subproblem (4.12) is equal to
the class i’s revenue per chargeable weight unit. The revenue in the volume subproblem (4.13) is
equal to the difference between the standard ratio of weight to volume and the particular ratio
of the requested class times its per unit revenue. The term 1{B} in (4.13) is an indicator function
which is equal to 1 if the expression B is true. Thus, accepting one volume unit in the volume
subproblem only generates revenue if dimensional weight is greater than weight. According to
this definition, weight is the primary dimension, whereas volume is the supplementary dimension.
The whole expression in (4.13) can be considered as the additional revenue from accepting one
volume unit of shipment class i. Consider the following example in order to get a better idea of
how total revenue is partitioned and assigned to the subproblems. Accepting shipment class i
with ϕi = 1.2, wi = 45, and vi = 30 generates a revenue ϕi max {wi, vi/ϑ} = 60. In the weight
subproblem, the generated revenue from accepting one capacity unit is ϕwi = 1.2. On the other
hand, the generated revenue in the volume subproblem is ϕvi = 1.2(1.67 − 1.5)1{50>45} = 0.2.
That means, the sum of the revenues from accepting the entire request is 1.2×45+0.2×30 = 60,
which is equal to the total revenue. The difference is that additional revenue in the volume
subproblem is only generated if dimensional weight exceeds actual weight.
The weight subproblem is a one-dimensional MDP like M1 with system state cw. It features
the following optimality equation for all cw ∈ Cw, i ∈ I, and t = T, ..., 1:
VM1,wt (cw, i) = max
a∈A(cw,i)
{
aϕwi + Hˆt−1V
M1,w
t−1 (cw − a)
}
.
Likewise, we can formulate the volume subproblem’s optimality equation for all cv ∈ Cv, i ∈ I,
and t = T, ..., 1.
VM1,vt (cv, i) = max
a∈A(cv ,i)
{
aϕvi + Hˆt−1V
M1,v
t−1 (cv − a)
}
.
Again, both terminal values VM1,w0 (cw, i) and V
M1,v
0 (cv, i) are equal to zero for all cw ∈ Cw,
cv ∈ Cv, and i ∈ I.
The heuristic decision rule based on HDP is to accept a request for shipment class i ∈ I at
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time t when cw ≥ wi weight and cv ≥ vi volume is remaining and if
ρi ≥
[
Hˆt−1V
M1,w
t−1 (cw)− Hˆt−1VM1,wt−1 (cw − wi)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δt−1(cw,i)
+
[
Hˆt−1V
M1,v
t−1 (cv)− Hˆt−1VM1,vt−1 (cv − vi)
]
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δt−1(cv ,i)
That means, a request is accepted if sufficient capacity is remaining and if opportunity cost of the
weight subproblem plus opportunity cost of the volume subproblem is lower than the generated
revenue. At first glance, it seems necessary to compute all HˆtV
M1,w
t (cw) for any combination of
t and cw and all HˆtV
M1,v
t (cv) for any combination of t and cv in order to determine heuristic
decisions. However, due to the value functions’ special structure, computational load can be
reduced. We know from M1 that VM1,wt (cw) and V
M1,v
t (cv) are concave and non-decreasing
in their capacity dimension which implies that the opportunity costs δt(cw, i) and δt(cv, i), as
differences in VM1, are non-increasing in cw and cv, respectively. Therefore, we can formulate
heuristic policies based on HDP as control limit policies with respect to weight or volume.
Moreover, since δt(cw, i) + δt(cv, i) is non-increasing in both cw and cv, these control limits
are functions of cw and cv giving switching curves.
Proposition 4.7. The heuristic policy based on HDP is a monotone (non-increasing) switching
curve policy pi = (fT , fT−1, ..., f1) with decision rules
ft(cw, cv, i) =
1 cw > cw(t, cv, i), cw ≥ wi, cv ≥ vi0 otherwise
and with switching curves cw(t, cv, i) = max{cw ≥ wi : ρi < δt−1(cw, i) + δt−1(cv, i), cv ≥ vi},
which are non-increasing in cv. If the set is empty, we define cw(t, cv, i) = 0.
The proof of this proposition follows directly from concavity of HˆtV
M1,w
t (cw) and HˆtV
M1,v
t (cv).
Note that an analog policy can be formulated for volume with switching curves cv(t, cw, i). The
interpretation of this policy is that a request tends to be accepted, the more weight and/or
volume is remaining.
Due to this special structure, only switching curves need to be determined in order to derive
decisions. Since δt−1(cw, i) = Hˆt−1V
M1,w
t−1 (cw) − Hˆt−1VM1,wt−1 (cw − wi) is monotone in cw, not
all values for Hˆt−1V
M1,w
t−1 (cw) have to be determined. This alleviates computational load signif-
icantly. Further, switching curves are much easier to implement and more comprehensible for
revenue managers.
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Heuristic based on Piecewise Linear Value Function Approximation (HPL)
Next, we propose a heuristic that is based on the linear programming approach to approximate
dynamic programming as introduced in Section 3.3. We know that the maximum expected
revenue can be computed by a linear program. For this purpose, we define a := (a0, a1, ..., am)
with ai as the action taken if class i is requested. We further define A(cw, cv) := {a ∈ {0} ×
{0, 1}m : cw ≥ aiwi, cv ≥ aivi} for all cw ∈ Cw = {0, ...,Cw} and cv ∈ Cv = {0, ...,Cv}.
We consider time-dependent system states Cw,t := {max{0,Cw − (T − t)wmax}, ...,Cw} and
Cv,t := {max{0,Cv − (T − t)vmax}, ...,Cv} with wmax := maxi∈I{wi} and vmax := maxi∈I{vi} as
the maximum weight and volume requirement, respectively. Note that we can use time-dependent
system states here since we start with an initial system state. Thus, not all combinations of weight
and volume can be realized in every decision period. More specifically, the remaining weight and
volume in period t must be at least as high as the total available weight and volume minus (T−t)
times the maximum capacity requirement in weight and volume, respectively.
We can determine the maximum expected revenue at time T starting with capacity Cw and
Cv by means of the following linear program:
(L) min
HTVT ,...,H1V1
HTVT (Cw,Cv)
s.t. HtVt(cw, cv)−
∑
i∈I
qt,iHt−1Vt−1(cw − aiwi, cv − aivi)
≥
∑
i∈I
qt,iρiai ∀t = T, ..., 1, cw ∈ Cw,t, cv ∈ Cv,t,a ∈ A(cw, cv)
HtVt(cw, cv) ∈ R ∀t = T, ..., 1, cw ∈ Cw,t, cv ∈ Cv,t.
Note that we could simplify the problem by allowing only non-negative decision variables. Since
terminal and one-stage rewards are non-negative, the value function has to be non-negative, too.
Now we approximate the value function by simpler functions in order to reduce its complexity.
While a linear value function approximation is very common in currently available literature
(e.g. Adelman, 2007 and Patrick et al., 2008), we use a piecewise linear approximation scheme
in order to better reflect the value function’s curvature. The underlying idea is that the value
of remaining capacity is differently approximated depending on whether it is above or below
a particular threshold. For weight, this threshold is c¯w < Cw, and for volume it is c¯v < Cv.
Accordingly, we approximate the value function (in observable-disturbance form) in the following
way for all (cw, cv) ∈ Cw × Cv and t = T, ..., 1:
HtVt(cw, cv) ≈ ψt+αw,tcw + βw,t(cw − c¯w)1{cw>c¯w}
+αv,tcv + βv,t(cv − c¯v)1{cv>c¯v}
(4.14)
with approximation parameters ψ, α, and β. In this approximation scheme, αw,t and αv,t measure
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the marginal value in period t of a remaining weight and volume unit that is equal to or below
c¯w and c¯v, respectively. αw,t + βw,t and αv,t + βv,t measure the marginal value in period t of a
weight and volume unit that is above c¯w and c¯v, respectively. ψt is a constant offset.
In order to determine the approximation parameters required for making decisions, we apply
the linear programming approach to approximate dynamic programming. Plugging approxima-
tion (4.14) into (L) (with ψ0 = 0, αw,0 = βw,0 = 0, αv,0 = βv,0 = 0) yields
(P1) min
α,β,ψ
ψT + αw,TCw + βw,T (Cw − c¯w) + αv,TCv + βv,T (Cv − c¯v)
s.t. ψt + αw,tcw + βw,t(cw − c¯w)1{cw>c¯w} + αv,tcv + βv,t(cv − c¯v)1{cv>c¯v}
−
∑
i∈I
qt,i
[
ψt−1 + αw,t−1(cw − aiwi) + βw,t−1(cw − aiwi − c¯w)1{cw−aiwi>c¯w}
+αv,t−1(cv − aivi) + βv,t−1(cv − aivi − c¯v)1{cv−aivi>c¯v}
]
≥
∑
i∈I
qt,iρiai ∀t = T, ..., 1, cw ∈ Cw,t, cv ∈ Cv,t,a ∈ A(cw, cv)
αw,t, βw,t, αv,t, βv,t, ψt ∈ R ∀t = T, ..., 1.
Note that we do not allow only non-negative decision variables here since a combination of nega-
tive and positive approximation parameters can also approximate a non-negative value function.
The dual of (P1) is
(D1) max
∑
1≤t≤T,cw∈Cw,t,cv∈Cv,t,a∈A(cw,cv)
Xt,cw,cv ,a
∑
i∈I
qt,iρiai (4.15)
s.t.
∑
cw,cv ,a
Xt,cw,cv ,acw
=

Cw t = T∑
cw,cv ,a
Xt+1,cw,cv ,a
∑
i∈I
qt+1,i(cw − aiwi) 1 ≤ t < T
(4.16)
∑
cw,cv ,a
Xt,cw,cv ,acv
=

Cv t = T∑
cw,cv ,a
Xt+1,cw,cv ,a
∑
i∈I
qt+1,i(cv − aivi) 1 ≤ t < T
(4.17)
∑
cw,cv ,a
Xt,cw,cv ,a(cw − c¯w)1{cw>c¯w}
=

Cw − c¯w t = T∑
cw,cv ,a
Xt+1,cw,cv ,a
∑
i∈I
qt+1,i(cw − aiwi − c¯w)1{cw−aiwi>c¯w} 1 ≤ t < T
(4.18)
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∑
cw,cv ,a
Xt,cw,cv ,a(cv − c¯v)1{cv>c¯v}
=

Cv − c¯v t = T∑
cw,cv ,a
Xt+1,cw,cv ,a
∑
i∈I
qt+1,i(cv − aivi − c¯v)1{cv−aivi>c¯v} 1 ≤ t < T
(4.19)
∑
cw,cv ,a
Xt,cw,cv ,a
=

1 t = T∑
cw,cv ,a
Xt+1,cw,cv ,a 1 ≤ t < T
(4.20)
Xt,cw,cv ,a ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T, cw ∈ Cw,t, cv ∈ Cv,t,a ∈ A(cw, cv) (4.21)
Note that constraint (4.20) can be simply replaced by∑
cw,cv ,a
Xt,cw,cv ,a = 1 1 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.22)
Note that for an optimal solution, we have for each combination of cw ∈ Cw,t and cv ∈ Cv,t a
vector of actions (a0, ..., am) with X
∗
t,cw,cv ,a > 0 (cf. Waldmann & Stocker, 2012, p. 163). This
in combination with (4.22) and (4.21) allows us to interpret the optimal solution X∗t,cw,cv ,a as the
probability of choosing actions a = (a0, ..., am) ∈ A(cw, cv) in state (cw, cv) at time t. Further,
constraints (4.16)-(4.19) ensure that the remaining capacity at time t equals the capacity at time
t + 1 minus the capacity sold in that period. Thus, this optimization problem maximizes total
expected revenue in (4.15) subject to flow-balance constraints for weight and volume.
(P1) and (D1) give a feasible solution to (L), and we know from Proposition 3.5 that any
feasible solution of (L) gives an upper bound on the maximum expected reward of the underlying
MDP. Thus, with zPL as the optimal objective value of (P1)-(D1), we can state the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.8. We have zPL ≥ HTVT (Cw,Cv).
That is, by determining the approximation parameters required for HPL, we obtain an upper
bound on the maximum expected revenue when the optimality equation is written in observable-
disturbance form.
(P1) is a linear problem with only 5 × T decision variables but a very large number of con-
straints. Accordingly, (D1) features only 5 × T constraints but a large number of decision
variables. Thus, an appropriate solution approach is to solve (D1) by using column generation.
The general idea of column generation is to start with a subset of all variables and add, during
an iterative process, further variables that increase the objective value. Thereby, a reduced op-
timization problem can be considered. For an introduction to column generation, the reader is
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referred to Bertsimas & Tsitsiklis (1997, Chapter 6). We have the following pricing subproblem
(PS) for fixed t, which maximizes the reduced revenue of variable Xt,cw,cv ,a.
(PS) max
cw,cv ,a
∑
i∈I
qt,i [ρiai + ψt−1
+αw,t−1(cw − aiwi) + βw,t−1(cw − aiwi − c¯w)1{cw−aiwi>c¯w}
+αv,t−1(cv − aivi) + βv,t−1(cv − aivi − c¯v)1{cv−aivi>c¯v}
]
− ψt − αw,tcw − βw,t(cw − c¯w)1{cw>c¯w} − αv,tcv − βv,t(cv − c¯v)1{cv>c¯v}
s.t. cw ∈ Cw,t, cv ∈ Cv,t,a ∈ A(cw, cv)
Note that the piecewise linear approximation causes the pricing subproblem to be non-linear.
Therefore, we need to introduce a number of auxiliary variables and constraints in order to obtain
the following equivalent linear problem.
(PS’) max
cw,cv ,a,ς,χ
∑
i∈I
qt,i [ρiai + ψt−1 + αw,t−1(cw − aiwi) + βw,t−1χw,i
+αv,t−1(cv − aivi) + βv,t−1χv,i]− ψt − αw,tcw − βw,tχw,0 − αv,tcv − βv,tχv,0
s.t. cw − aiwi − c¯w ≤ ςw,iM ∀i ∈ I
cw − aiwi − c¯w ≥ −(1− ςw,i)M ∀i ∈ I
cv − aivi − c¯v ≤ ςv,iM ∀i ∈ I
cv − aivi − c¯v ≥ −(1− ςv,i)M ∀i ∈ I
χw,i ≤Mςw,i ∀i ∈ I
χw,i ≤ cw − aiwi − c¯w + (1− ςw,i)M ∀i ∈ I
χw,i ≥ cw − aiwi − c¯w ∀i ∈ I
χv,i ≤Mςv,i ∀i ∈ I
χv,i ≤ cv − aivi − c¯v + (1− ςv,i)M ∀i ∈ I
χv,i ≥ cv − aivi − c¯v ∀i ∈ I
cw, χw,i ∈ Cw,t ∀i ∈ I
cv, χv,i ∈ Cv,t ∀i ∈ I
ςw,i, ςv,i ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ I
a ∈ A(cw, cv)
with M as a very large integer.
(PS’) maximizes the reduced revenue of a variable Xt,cw,cv ,a, which is the approximated ex-
pected revenue from accepting a shipment class less the approximated expected revenue from
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rejecting it. According to the complementary slackness condition (see Theorem 3.2), a variable
can only be part of the optimal solution if the associated constraint is active; in other words, the
associated reduced revenue has to be zero. Thus, if the reduced revenue is greater than zero, a
solution containing the associated variable is not optimal. This relationship is used by column
generation. The solution process is as follows:
(i) Use an initial feasible solution to (D1), which is cw = Cw, cv = Cv, and a = ~0 for all t (i.e.
offer nothing) to create an initial set of variables; then solve (D1).
(ii) Use dual prices of (D1) as input for (PS’) and solve (PS’) for all t.
(iii) If the objective value of (PS’) is greater than zero, the solution determined in (i) is not
optimal. In other words, a constraint in the primal problem is violated. Thus, add the
variable that is associated with the violated constraint to the existing set of variables for
(D1).
(iv) Solve (D1) with updated set of variables.
(v) If the sum of the objective values of (PS’) from step (ii) is lower than a particular optimality
tolerance times the objective value of (D1), an optimal solution is determined. Otherwise
go back to step (ii).
The heuristic decision rule under this value function approximation is as follows:
ft(cw, cv, i) =

1 ρi ≥ αw,t−1wi + αv,t−1vi
+βw,t−1
[
(cw − c¯w)1{cw>c¯w} − (cw − wi − c¯w)1{cw−wi>c¯w}
]
+βv,t−1
[
(cv − c¯v)1{cv>c¯v} − (cv − vi − c¯v)1{cv−vi>c¯v}
]
,
cw ≥ wi, cv ≥ vi
0 otherwise.
The interpretation of this decision rule is as follows: Accept a request if its revenue is at least
as high as the sum of the value of required weight and volume. If remaining capacity is below
the threshold, the capacity requirement is weighted by α. If remaining capacity is above the
threshold, the value is corrected by β. If remaining capacity is above the threshold before the
request is accepted and below the threshold afterwards, the capacity requirement is weighted by
β and α for units above the threshold and by α for units below the threshold. HPL applies this
decision rule in the booking process.
In the following numerical experiments, we address the question of how well all proposed
heuristics perform.
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4.4 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we assess the quality of the described heuristics HD, HDP, and HPL. Additionally,
we test a first-come-first-served policy (FCFS) which accepts requests as long as capacity is
available. The approximation parameters in HPL are computed with c¯w = Cw/2 and c¯v = Cv/2.
As a benchmark for the heuristics’ achieved revenue over the simulated booking processes, we
use the maximum average revenue determined in (4.3). We computed this value by means of
a HP XC3000 high performance computer. We compare the upper bounds zPL and zACG to
the maximum expected revenue in order to make a statement on the bounds’ quality. Initially,
we present a numerical study that uses the data set provided in Huang & Chang (2010). The
second study uses a modification of this data set which contains classes featuring a non-standard
weight-volume ratio. All experiments were conducted on an Intel Core2 Quad CPU at 2.83
GHz and 8 GB RAM. In order to obtain the approximation parameters in HPL, we solved the
linear program by means of Gurobi 5.0 (Gurobi Optimization, 2012). In the column generation
procedure we used an optimality tolerance of 1%.
Setting 1: Base Case
The data set we consider contains shipment categories b = 1, ..., 9 that all have a different weight
and volume requirement wb, vb as shown in Table 4.1.
Category b 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Weight requirement wb (kg) 80 160 400 100 200 500 100 200 500
Volume requirement vb (×104 cm3) 60 120 300 60 120 300 50 100 250
Table 4.1: Weight and volume requirement of shipment categories
Categories 1-3 represent loose cargo since the ratio of volume to weight is greater than the
one of a standard shipment (0.6 × 104 cm3/kg). Categories 7-9 represent dense cargo for the
opposite reason. Categories 4-6 feature the volume-weight ratio of a standard shipment. In
each time period t, either a shipment with revenue per chargeable weight ϕ or no shipment is
requested. Table 4.2 shows the probabilities for incoming requests with revenue ϕ. Note that
the probability for high-value requests increases as departure approaches. Given a shipment
Revenue Request probabilities in periods
ϕ 1-20 21-40 41-60
1.2 0.25 0.1667 0.10
1.0 0.15 0.1666 0.15
0.8 0.10 0.1667 0.25
Table 4.2: Request probabilities for different revenues per chargeable weight
69
4 Single-Leg Cargo Capacity Control
request, the probability that the shipment belongs to a particular category is constant in time
as displayed in Table 4.3. We assume that the observed category is independent of the observed
Category b 1-3 4 5 6 7-9
Request probability 0.0833 0.1667 0.1668 0.1667 0.0833
Table 4.3: Request probabilities for shipment categories
per-unit revenue. Thus, the request probability for a particular class i = (b, ϕ) at time t (i.e.
qt,i) equals the probability of observing a revenue per chargeable weight ϕ multiplied by the
probability of observing a category b request at this time. For example, the probability for an
arrival of a class with ϕ = 1.0 and b = 4 at t = 45 is 0.1667× 0.15 = 0.025. Accepting a request
for class i gives a revenue of ϕi max{wi, vi/ϑ} with ϑ = 0.6. Note that for i = 0, the request
probability is qt,0 = 1 −
∑m
i=1 qt,i. Thus, the probability for no request is 0.5 in each period.
Combining nine shipment categories and three different revenues per chargeable weight results
in 27 shipment classes that are considered in these experiments.
We consider a booking horizon of T = 60 time periods. Further, multiplying capacity require-
ments by request probabilities over the entire booking horizon yields expected demand in weight
and volume of Dw=7600 kg and Dv=4600×104 cm3, respectively. This corresponds to approx-
imately 19% of a Boeing 757-200 freighter’s payload and cargo volume (Boeing, 2012). While
total demand is given, we let total available capacity (Cw,Cv) vary in order to demonstrate the
heuristics’ performance for different capacity-demand ratios. We test different ratios for weight
restricted, volume restricted, and both weight and volume restricted flights.
In order to determine the performance of our heuristics, we repeatedly simulated the arrival
process and computed the average revenue gained in the selling process over all simulation runs.
In order to obtain reliable results, we simulated 100,000 booking processes. Figure 4.3 displays the
heuristics’ performance relative to the maximum expected revenue for flights that are restricted
with respect to both weight and volume (i.e. Cw/Dw=Cv/Dv). One major finding is that the
heuristics’ performance relative to FCFS increases as less capacity is available. This result is
intuitive since the optimal control policy in a situation with sufficient capacity is to simply accept
every request. This policy becomes worse as less capacity is available. Another observation
is that all heuristics (except FCFS) are quite close to the maximum expected revenue for all
capacity-demand ratios. Further, HD and HDP outperform HPL for slightly restricted flights.
On the other hand, if a flight is heavily restricted (Cw/Dw=Cv/Dv < 0.6), HPL performs as well
as the other heuristics. The observed slight disadvantage of HDP relative to HD is caused by
approximating actual non-monotone opportunity cost through monotone functions.
Figure 4.4 summarizes the heuristics’ performance for flights with sufficient volume and scarce
weight. Observe that, for all capacity-demand ratios, HDP and HD do better than all other
heuristics. Since they both have a priority on weight, they demonstrate a strong performance if
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Figure 4.3: Heuristics’ performance for both weight and volume restricted flights
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
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Figure 4.4: Heuristics’ performance for weight restricted flights
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
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weight is the valuable resource. Another observation is that HPL performs quite well and is not
very sensitive to the availability of weight.
Figure 4.5 shows the percent difference of the heuristics’ achieved revenue relative to the
maximum expected revenue when sufficient weight is available and volume is the bottleneck.
Observe that HPL performs significantly better than HD and HDP. The reason for the poor
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Figure 4.5: Heuristics’ performance for volume restricted flights
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
performance of heuristics based on decomposition is that opportunity cost is miscalculated when
volume is scarce since the availability of volume does not at all affect the calculation of weight
opportunity cost. Further, the change in supplementary volume opportunity cost does not have
a significant impact on the heuristics’ decision. Thus, total opportunity cost is too low, which
leads to excessive acceptance of requests. HPL does not feature this drawback since it does not
prioritize a capacity dimension. Thus, its performance is approximately the same as in case of
insufficient weight as well as in case of flights that are both weight and volume restricted.
Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 report the relative difference between the upper bounds and the
maximum expected revenue. If both weight and volume capacity is less than expected demand,
zPL’s quality is approximately constant, and zACG becomes less tight as capacity decreases (see
Table 4.4). If either weight or volume capacity is insufficient, it can be observed that zPL becomes
tighter as available capacity decreases, whereas zACG becomes less tight (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6).
Further, zACG shows a better quality than zPL for most scenarios of weight restricted flights
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(see Table 4.5). If very little weight is available, zPL is again tighter than zACG. The quality
of zACG in case of volume restricted flights is particularly poor due to the already mentioned
shortcomings of ACG (see Table 4.6).
Cw/Dw Cv/Dv
zPL
HTVT (Cw,Cv)
% zACGHTVT (Cw,Cv) %
1.0 1.0 106.42 100.98
0.9 0.9 105.00 101.50
0.8 0.8 104.89 102.06
0.7 0.7 104.78 102.79
0.6 0.6 104.95 103.98
0.5 0.5 104.83 105.39
0.4 0.4 105.07 106.96
Table 4.4: Upper bound quality depending on both available weight and volume
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
Cw/Dw Cv/Dv
zPL
HTVT (Cw,Cv)
% zACGHTVT (Cw,Cv) %
1.0 1.0 106.42 100.98
0.9 1.0 104.02 100.52
0.8 1.0 103.74 100.78
0.7 1.0 104.06 101.12
0.6 1.0 103.04 102.08
0.5 1.0 103.00 103.41
0.4 1.0 103.81 104.69
Table 4.5: Upper bound quality depending on available weight
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
In summary, this example demonstrates that HPL provides a very constant and reliable per-
formance. While HPL is not sensitive to the availability of a particular capacity dimension, HD’s
and HDP’s performance significantly depends on the particular capacity-demand scenario. Thus,
HD and HDP are only appropriate if the short capacity dimension is known in advance. Further,
for all tested capacity-demand ratios, the upper bound zPL features a very good quality.
Setting 2: Non-Standard Capacity Requirement
In these experiments, we modify the previously presented data in the way that we change the
resource requirement of shipment categories 2 and 7, as shown in Table 4.7 (changes in bold).
Now the data set contains two shipment classes that have a capacity requirement with a weight-
volume ratio which we hereafter refer to as ”non-standard”. All other data remains unchanged.
These changes result in an expected demand in weight and volume of Dw=9000 kg and
Dv=6000×104 cm3, respectively. We conducted the same experiments as described in the previ-
ous section. For weight and volume restricted flights (see Figure 4.6), we discover the following
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Cw/Dw Cv/Dv
zPL
HTVT (Cw,Cv)
% zACGHTVT (Cw,Cv) %
1.0 1.0 106.42 100.98
1.0 0.9 104.06 107.02
1.0 0.8 103.76 116.62
1.0 0.7 104.05 129.28
1.0 0.6 103.37 146.60
1.0 0.5 103.19 171.40
1.0 0.4 103.91 208.03
Table 4.6: Upper bound quality depending on available volume
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Weight requirement (× 10 kg) 80 160 400 100 200 500 660 200 500
Volume requirement (× 105 cm3) 60 680 300 60 120 300 50 100 250
Table 4.7: Non-standard capacity requirement - weight and volume of shipment categories
differences to the situation without non-standard capacity requirement: First, observe that HD
and HDP are inferior to HPL if capacity is scarce. This result demonstrates the disadvantage
of prioritizing a capacity dimension if capacity requirement is extremely uneven. For instance,
if a class has a very high volume requirement, accepting it in the volume subproblem gives lit-
tle revenue for a large decrease in remaining volume. Thus, it is likely to be rejected yielding
miscalculated opportunity cost in the decision rule.
Observe that now HDP outperforms HD. Since the characteristics of HD and HDP do not offer
an intuitive explanation for this observation, a detailed investigation is necessary. A closer look
at the opportunity cost of both heuristics shows that volume opportunity cost of HDP is signifi-
cantly higher than HD’s volume opportunity cost for all shipment classes that feature a standard
capacity requirement. This observation cannot be made when the data set does not contain
non-standard shipments. This result suggests that HD underestimates volume opportunity cost
of regular shipments yielding a worse performance compared to the case without non-standard
shipments. This result is confirmed by Figure 4.7 which shows a comparison between the basic
model’s, HD’s, and HDP’s opportunity cost for a particular regular shipment class. Moreover,
the figure provides a further explanation why HDP outperforms HD. Observe that HD tends to
overestimate opportunity cost significantly when remaining capacity is just sufficient to accom-
modate an additional shipment with non-standard capacity requirement (approximately when
remaining volume is 700, 1400, and 2100). HDP does not feature such ”peaks” since opportunity
cost is monotone. The effect of overestimating opportunity cost for particular values of remaining
volume additionally contributes to the bad performance of HD compared to HDP.
The difference between the heuristics’ performance and the maximum expected revenue for
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Figure 4.6: Heuristics’ performance for both weight and volume restricted flights
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
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weight restricted flights is depicted in Figure 4.8. Again, HDP outperforms HD as observed in
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Figure 4.8: Heuristics’ performance for weight restricted flights
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
the previous setting, and HPL performs well. The explanation for both observations is analog to
the ones given in the case of equally restricted flights. The observations of HDP outperforming
HD and HPL performing well can also be made for volume restricted flights (see Figure 4.9).
Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 summarize the relative difference between the upper bounds and the
maximum expected revenue. The same observations as in the base case can be made. The only
Cw/Dw Cv/Dv
zPL
HTVT (Cw,Cv)
% zACGHTVT (Cw,Cv) %
1.0 1.0 108.23 105.36
0.9 0.9 108.27 107.45
0.8 0.8 108.84 109.40
0.7 0.7 109.39 111.65
0.6 0.6 110.01 114.37
0.5 0.5 110.74 117.07
0.4 0.4 111.72 120.22
Table 4.8: Upper bound quality depending on both available weight and volume
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
difference is that if both weight and volume is scarce, zPL’s quality slightly decreases as available
capacity decreases (see Table 4.8). However, zPL’s overall quality is very good.
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Figure 4.9: Heuristics’ performance for volume restricted flights
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
Cw/Dw Cv/Dv
zPL
HTVT (Cw,Cv)
% zACGHTVT (Cw,Cv) %
1.0 1.0 108.23 105.36
0.9 1.0 106.69 103.99
0.8 1.0 105.13 102.91
0.7 1.0 104.60 102.43
0.6 1.0 103.33 102.70
0.5 1.0 103.05 103.40
0.4 1.0 103.45 104.29
Table 4.9: Upper bound quality depending on available weight
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
Cw/Dw Cv/Dv
zPL
HTVT (Cw,Cv)
% zACGHTVT (Cw,Cv) %
1.0 1.0 108.23 105.36
1.0 0.9 106.32 109.99
1.0 0.8 104.86 117.07
1.0 0.7 104.64 126.64
1.0 0.6 103.72 138.96
1.0 0.5 103.26 155.40
1.0 0.4 103.66 177.71
Table 4.10: Upper bound quality depending on available volume
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
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In summary, HPL gives in most scenarios the highest revenue in the presence of shipments hav-
ing a non-standard capacity requirement. Further, HDP outperforms HD for all tested scenarios.
Even though HD and HDP perform well for weight restricted flights, their overall performance
is lower than the one of HPL. Furthermore, zPL gives a good upper bound on the maximum
expected revenue.
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Chapter 5
Integrated Capacity Control of Cargo
Space and Passenger Seats
In this chapter, we model the decision problem that maximizes the total revenue from selling
both cargo space and passenger seats. Thus, the whole aircraft’s capacity is controlled. Note that
this implies that passenger demand can be rejected in favor of cargo. In Section 5.1, we propose
a basic integrated decision model for simultaneously controlling a combination carrier’s cargo
and seat capacity. Since this model does not offer monotone optimal decision rules, we propose
a further decision model in Section 5.2 that makes specific assumptions and thereby provides a
simply structured optimal control policy. Section 5.3 outlines two different heuristics that can
be applied to determine a solution to the basic decision model, which suffers from the curse of
dimensionality. Further, we provide an upper bound on the maximum expected revenue of the
basic model. In Section 5.4, the heuristics’ performance and the bound’s quality are assessed
using numerical experiments.
5.1 Basic Integrated Capacity Control Model
We consider an airline that operates flights on single legs like in Chapter 4. Contrary to the cargo
capacity control models, we now take into account the entire capacity of an aircraft, that is both
passenger seats on the upper deck and cargo space on the lower deck. A combination carrier
on a particular leg has a remaining weight capacity cw ∈ Cw = {0, 1, ...,Cw}, volume capacity
cv ∈ Cv = {0, 1, ...,Cv}, and seats cs ∈ Cs = {0, 1, ...,Cs}. While Cw and Cv denote the aircraft’s
total weight and volume capacity, respectively, Cs represents the total number of passenger seats.
In each of T decision periods, at most one request for either a particular cargo shipment class
i ∈ Ic = {1, ...,m1}, or for a particular passenger booking class i ∈ Is = {m1 + 1, ...,m2}, or no
request may arrive. We let i = 0 represent the event of no arriving request. Like in the cargo
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capacity control models, each shipment class i ∈ Ic is characterized by its weight and volume
requirement wi ∈ N0 and vi ∈ N0, respectively, and its per unit revenue ϕi ≥ 0. For i = 0, we
define w0 = ∞, v0 = ∞, and ϕ0 = 0. Each passenger booking class i ∈ Is requires exactly one
seat, and we define the seat requirement as σi := 1 if i ∈ Is and σi := 0 otherwise. A passenger
booking class is further characterized by revenue per seat ϕi ≥ 0 and a particular weight and
volume requirement wi ∈ N0 and vi ∈ N0, respectively, which is assumed to be constant for all
i ∈ Is. Note that a passenger requires weight due to his or her body weight and luggage, and
the volume requirement is only caused by luggage. If an aircraft is equipped with a particular
luggage compartment, which cannot be used by other cargo shipments, volume requirement can
be neglected. Further, note that we denote the per-unit revenue of both passenger and cargo
requests as ϕ. In case of a cargo request the unit is one chargeable weight unit, and in case of a
passenger request the unit is one seat.
We count time backwards with time period T denoting the beginning of the booking process
and t = 0 representing the departure of the aircraft. We choose T sufficiently large to ensure
that the probability of more than one arrival per time period can be neglected. At each time
t = T, ..., 0, the probability of an arriving class-i request is denoted by qt,i ≥ 0. The probability
that no request arrives is given by qt,0 = 1−
∑m2
i=1 qt,i ≥ 0. We further define q0,0 = 1 and q0,i = 0
for i = 1, ...,m2. That means, no request arrives at t = 0.
In each period, in which a request for i ∈ Iˆ = {0, ...,m2} is observed, the decision maker has to
decide if the incoming request is accepted or rejected. We assume that at the time the decision
is made, weight and volume requirement is known. Thus, accepting a request for a shipment
class i = 1, ...,m1 gives a revenue ϕi max{wi, vi/ϑ}, where ϑ denotes a constant representing the
ratio of volume to weight of a standard shipment. Further, accepting a request for a passenger
booking class i = m1 + 1, ...,m2 yields a revenue ϕi which is the price of class i.
We make the same assumptions as in the basic model in the previous chapter, which are
the following: Demand is independent between booking classes, demand is independent of the
availability of other classes, the arrival process follows a (discretized) Poisson process, neither
cancellations nor no-shows occur (thus, overbooking is not required), the decision maker is risk-
neutral, customers do not behave strategically and request only single-leg flights. In this model,
we make the additional assumption that passenger group bookings do not occur. That is, at
most one seat is requested within one decision period.
The decision problem that needs to be solved is the following: The decision maker faces
the problem of whether to generate revenue by accepting a request or saving capacity for later
requests that may have a higher revenue. This problem implies that the revenue manager has
to decide whether to deny passenger requests in order to save weight and volume for later high-
value cargo bookings. The objective is to identify an optimal control policy that maximizes total
expected revenue over the entire booking horizon. This can be reduced to solving the optimality
equation of the following finite-horizon MDP (T, S,E,A, pt, rt, V0) with:
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(i) Planning horizon T ∈ N0, indexed by t.
(ii) State space S × E = (Cw × Cv × Cs)× Iˆ
with Iˆ = {0, ...,m2}. The state space comprises remaining weight, volume, and seats
as system states (all integer values) and the requested shipment or booking class as an
environmental state.
(iii) Action space A ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether a request is rejected or accepted. The set of
admissible actions is defined as
A(cw, cv, cs, i) :=
{0, 1} cw ≥ wi, cv ≥ vi, cs ≥ σi, i ∈ Iˆ{0} otherwise.
(iv) Transition law pt(cw, cv, cs, i, a, cw − awi, cv − avi, cs − aσi, i′) = qt−1,i′
for all t = T, ..., 1, cw ∈ Cw, cv ∈ Cv, cs ∈ Cs, i, i′ ∈ Iˆ, and a ∈ A(cw, cv, cs, i). That
means, the transition probability represents the probability of a class-i′ request arriving in
the next decision period.
(v) One-stage reward function
rt(cw, cv, cs, i, a) = aρi :=
aϕi max{wi, vi/ϑ} 0 ≤ i ≤ m1aϕi m1 < i ≤ m2
for all t = T, ..., 1, cw ∈ Cw, cv ∈ Cv, cs ∈ Cs, i ∈ Iˆ, and a ∈ A(cw, cv, cs, i).
(vi) Terminal reward function V0 ≡ 0.
The maximum expected revenue in t = T, ..., 1, given remaining capacity cw ∈ Cw, cv ∈ Cv,
cs ∈ Cs and a request for i ∈ Iˆ, is the unique solution to the optimality equation
Vt(cw, cv, cs, i) = max
a∈A(cw,cv ,cs,i)
aρi +∑
i′∈Iˆ
qt−1,i′Vt−1(cw − awi, cv − avi, cs − aσi, i′)
 . (5.1)
For an arbitrary real-valued function u on Cw × Cv × Cs × Iˆ, we define the operator Q as
Qtu(cw, cv, cs) :=
∑
i∈Iˆ
qt,iu(cw, cv, cs, i) ∀t = T, ..., 0.
Then, we can write (5.1) as
Vt(cw, cv, cs, i) = max
a∈A(cw,cv ,cs,i)
{aρi +Qt−1Vt−1(cw − awi, cv − avi, cs − aσi)} . (5.2)
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The observable-disturbance form of (5.2) is
QtVt(cw, cv, cs) =
∑
i∈Iˆ
qt,i max
a∈A(cw,cv ,cs,i)
{aρi +Qt−1Vt−1(cw − awi, cv − avi, cs − aσi)} . (5.3)
The maximum expected revenue determined in (5.3) will be used later in the numerical experi-
ments.
Instead of considering non-negative capacities and restricting admissible actions, we can also
allow for negative capacities, define admissible actions A ≡ {0, 1}, and define Vt(cw, cv, cs, i) =
−T maxi∈Iˆ{ρi} for all t = T, ..., 0 if min{cw, cv, cs} < 0. Using this alternative formulation, we
can write (5.2) for cw ≥ 0, cv ≥ 0, cs ≥ 0, and i ∈ Iˆ as
Vt(cw, cv, cs, i) = max {ρi +Qt−1Vt−1(cw − wi, cv − vi, cs − σi), Qt−1Vt−1(cw, cv, cs)} . (5.4)
The optimal decision rule can be directly inferred: If a request for i ∈ Iˆ is accepted at time t,
the expected revenue is ρi + Qt−1Vt−1(cw − wi, cv − vi, cs − σi). If it is rejected, the expected
revenue is Qt−1Vt−1(cw, cv, cs). Thus, the optimal decision rule in t is
f∗t (cw, cv, cs, i) =

1 ρi ≥ Qt−1Vt−1(cw, cv, cs)−Qt−1Vt−1(cw − wi, cv − vi, cs − σi),
cw ≥ 0, cv ≥ 0, cs ≥ 0, i ∈ Iˆ
0 otherwise.
That means, a request is accepted if its revenue is at least as high as the opportunity cost
of the capacity the request requires. If insufficient capacity is available, opportunity cost is
infinitely large. For the ease of notation, we define δt−1(cw, cv, cs, i) := Qt−1Vt−1(cw, cv, cs) −
Qt−1Vt−1(cw−wi, cv−vi, cs−σi). Note that in order to determine optimal actions in t, all values
Qt−1Vt−1(cw, cv, cs) for cw ≥ 0, cv ≥ 0, and cs ≥ 0 are required. Determining these values for
real world problems is computationally infeasible. For example, consider 60 time periods and
an A320 combination carrier having 150 seats and approximately a cargo capacity of 32 m3 and
total payload of 16600 kg. In this example, 4.8×109 different values need to be computed. As we
remarked earlier, a potential way out of this curse of dimensionality might be the identification
of monotone policies. Unfortunately, since opportunity cost is not monotone, the integrated
capacity control model does not feature an optimal control policy which is structured with
respect to capacity or time. This is outlined below.
Proposition 5.1. δt(cw, cv, cs, i) is not monotone in cw, neither in cv, and neither in cs for
(cw, cv, cs, i) ∈ Cw × Cv × Cs × Iˆ and t = T − 1, ..., 0.
Due to the same reasons given for the cargo capacity control model in Section 4.1, opportunity
cost is neither monotone in cw nor in cv. A similar example as in the pure cargo case can be
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easily constructed. Moreover, opportunity cost is not monotone in cs as the following example
demonstrates.
Example 5.1. Consider a combination carrier with remaining capacity of cw = 3, cv = 3,
and cs = 3. In each period a request for one of three different request classes arrives. Classes
1 and 2 are cargo booking classes with ϕ1 = ϕ2 = 9, w1 = v1 = 1, w2 = v2 = 2, qt,1 =
0.01, and qt,2 = 0.89 for all t = T, ..., 1. Class 3 is a passenger booking class with ϕ3 = 16,
w3 = v3 = 1, and qt,3 = 0.1 for all t = T, ..., 1. For the sake of simplicity, we let ϑ = 1.
Accordingly, we have ρ1 = 9, ρ2 = 18, and ρ3 = 16. Now consider the opportunity cost of a
class-3 request in period t = 4, which is required if a decision is made at t = 5. This is computed
as δ4(3, 3, 3, 3) = Q4V4(3, 3, 3)−Q4V4(2, 2, 2) = 5.3767. Now assume only 2 seats are remaining,
i.e. cs = 2. We expect opportunity cost not to decrease since capacity becomes more valuable
if it is scarce. Indeed, opportunity cost is δ4(3, 3, 2, 3) = 5.7254. Now assume only one seat is
remaining (cs = 1). We again expect opportunity cost not to decrease; however, it is computed
as δ4(3, 3, 1, 3) = 5.7243. That means, opportunity cost decreases even though less capacity is
available.
The reason for the observed non-monotonicity is that cargo requests have to be accepted in
their entirety. This is also the reason for the non-monotone behavior in time.
Proposition 5.2. δt(cw, cv, cs, i) is not monotone in time for (cw, cv, cs, i) ∈ Cw ×Cv ×Cs × Iˆ.
Example 4.2 in Section 4.1 can be considered as a special case for the integrated capacity control
model when assuming no customer requests arrive. This demonstrates the above proposition’s
validity.
We now turn to an integrated capacity control model that features an optimal monotone policy.
5.2 A Capacity Control Model featuring a Structured Control Policy
The decision model introduced in the previous section is very complex since its system state
comprises three dimensions. Further, the model lacks a monotone optimal policy which could
potentially decrease computational complexity. Thus, we propose a decision model in this section
which overcomes these drawbacks. We refer to this decision model hereafter as M˜ .
In M˜, we make the following assumptions: Cargo capacity is assumed to be one-dimensional
as done in M1. We already mentioned in Section 4.2 that this approach is reasonable if the
expected ratio of capacity to demand is much lower for one capacity dimension than for the
other one (e.g. an aircraft carrying largely flowers). A further assumption we make in this model
is that cargo requests can be partially accepted. This assumption is not unrealistic for the same
reasons given for the cargo capacity control model M1. We also assume that a passenger request
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requires exactly one cargo unit. This can be easily achieved by adjusting the cargo space’s scale.
Furthermore, we make the same assumptions as in the basic integrated model.
We again consider a carrier that operates flights on single legs. Now a combination carrier
has a remaining cargo capacity c ∈ C = {0, 1, , ...,C} with C as the aircraft’s total capacity. It
further has a number of remaining seats cs ∈ Cs = {0, 1, ...,Cs}. Each cargo shipment class,
which may be requested, is characterized by its capacity requirement γi ∈ N0 and its per unit
revenue ϕi ≥ 0. Further, we define γ0 = 0 and ϕ0 = 0. The cargo capacity requirement of a
passenger request is defined as γi := 1 for all i ∈ Is. All other notations are equal to the notation
of the basic model described in the previous section.
In each period, in which a passenger request arrives, the decision maker has to decide if the
incoming request is accepted or rejected. Accepting a passenger request for class i ∈ Is yields
a revenue ϕi. In case of an arriving cargo request, the decision maker has to decide which part
of the request to accept. Accepting an amount of a capacity units of a request i ∈ Ic gives a
revenue ϕia.
The objective is to identify an optimal acceptance policy that maximizes the total expected
revenue over the entire booking horizon. This can be reduced to solving the optimality equation
of the following finite-horizon MDP (T, S,E,A, pt, rt, V˜0) with:
(i) Planning horizon T ∈ N0.
(ii) State space S × E = (C × Cs)× Iˆ.
(iii) Action space A ⊂ N0 with a ∈ A as the number of accepted capacity units in case of a cargo
request and the accept/reject decision in case of a passenger request. The set of admissible
actions is defined as
A(c, cs, i) :=

{0, ...,min{c, γi}} i ∈ {0, ...,m1}, c ∈ C, cs ∈ Cs
{0, 1} i ∈ {m1 + 1, ...,m2}, c ≥ 1, cs ≥ 1
{0} otherwise.
(iv) Transition law pt(c, cs, i, a, c− a, cs − aσi, i′) = qt−1,i′
for all t = T, ..., 1, c ∈ C, cs ∈ Cs, i, i′ ∈ Iˆ, and a ∈ A(c, cs, i).
(v) One-stage reward function rt(c, cs, i, a) = aϕi
for all t = T, ..., 1, c ∈ C, cs ∈ Cs, i ∈ Iˆ, and a ∈ A(c, cs, i).
(vi) Terminal reward function V˜0 ≡ 0.
The maximum expected revenue at time t = T, ..., 1, given remaining capacity c ∈ C, cs ∈ Cs
and a request for class i ∈ Iˆ, is the unique solution to the optimality equation
V˜t(c, cs, i) = max
a∈A(c,cs,i)
aϕi +∑
i′∈Iˆ
qt−1,i′ V˜t−1(c− a, cs − aσi, i′)
 . (5.5)
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Using the operator Q˜tu(c, cs) :=
∑
i∈Iˆ qt,iu(c, cs, i) for any real-valued function u defined on
C × Cs × Iˆ and t = T, ..., 0, we can write (5.5) as
V˜t(c, cs, i) = max
a∈A(c,cs,i)
{
aϕi + Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− a, cs − aσi)
}
.
We now explore structural properties of M˜, which lead to the optimal policy.
Structural Properties
Lemma 5.1. For all i ∈ Iˆ and t = T, ..., 0, we have
(i) V˜t(c, cs, i) is non-decreasing in c for all cs ∈ Cs,
(ii) V˜t(c, cs, i) is non-decreasing in cs for all c ∈ C.
Proof. The proof can be done analogously to the one of Lemma 4.1.
Due to the two-dimensional system state and the chosen set of admissible actions, the value
function is multimodular in cargo capacity and seats as stated below.
Lemma 5.2. For any t = T, ..., 0 and i ∈ Iˆ, V˜t(c, cs, i) is multimodular in c and cs in the context
of concavity. Thus, V˜t(c, cs, i) is supermodular and superconcave in c and cs.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Even though M˜’s system state is two-dimensional, it reduces to one dimension once cargo
capacity becomes the bottleneck. The reason for this characteristic is that from this point on,
capacity is always shorter than the number of remaining seats. In other words, there are more
seats remaining than could be sold. Thus, the number of seats will never affect the acceptance
decision.
Proposition 5.3. For c ≤ cs, M˜ reduces to M1 with optimality equation
VM1t (c, i) = max
a∈A(c,i)
{
ϕia+ Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− a)
}
for all i ∈ Iˆ, t = T, ..., 1, and set of admissible actions A(c, i) = {0, ...,min{c, γi}}.
Proof. The proof can be done analogously to the one of Proposition 4.5.
We are now able to formulate the decision model’s optimal policy. For the sake of exposition,
we distinguish between cargo and passenger requests and describe the policy in two different
theorems.
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Theorem 5.1. The optimal policy of M˜ is a structured policy pi∗ = (f∗T , f
∗
T−1, ..., f
∗
1 ) with deci-
sion rules,
(i) if c > cs and i ∈ {0, ...,m1},
f∗t (c, cs, i) =
0 c ≤ c∗(t, cs, i)min{γi, c− c∗(t, cs, i)} c > c∗(t, cs, i),
with switching curves c∗(t, cs, i) = max{c > 0 : ϕi < Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs)},
which are non-decreasing in cs, and with c
∗(t, cs, i) = 0 if the set is empty;
(ii) if c ≤ cs and i ∈ {0, ...,m1},
f∗t (c, i) =
0 c ≤ c∗(t, i)min{γi, c− c∗(t, i)} c > c∗(t, i),
with control limits c∗(t, i) = max{c > 0 : ϕi < Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c) − Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c − 1)} and
c∗(t, i) = 0 if the set is empty.
Proof. We start with the case c > cs. Since V˜t(c, cs, i) is multimodular in c and cs for t = T, ..., 0
and i ∈ {0, ...,m1}, Q˜tV˜t(c, cs) is multimodular, too. This does also imply concavity in c, which
is (for c ≥ 2)
Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs) ≤ Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 2, cs).
That means, Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)−Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c−1, cs) is non-increasing in c. Thus, there are thresholds
c∗(t, i) = max{c > 0 : ϕi < Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs)}. (5.6)
Now fix c ∈ C, cs ∈ Cs, t > 0, i ∈ {0, ...,m1} and let d ∈ N0. If an action a is the largest
a ∈ A(c, cs, i) that maximizes the right hand side of (5.5) in t, we have
aϕi + Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− a, cs) ≥ dϕi + Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− d, cs) for a > d ≥ 0, and
aϕi + Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− a, cs) > dϕi + Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− d, cs) for a < d ≤ γi.
Since Q˜t−1V˜t−1 is concave, we can rewrite the above inequalities as
aϕi + Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− a, cs) ≥ (a− 1)ϕi + Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− (a− 1), cs)
aϕi + Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− a, cs) > (a+ 1)ϕi + Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− (a+ 1), cs),
where the expression reduces to the first (second) equation if a = γi (a = 0). This can be
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rearranged as
ϕi ≥ Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− a+ 1, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− a, cs) (5.7)
ϕi < Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− a, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− a− 1, cs). (5.8)
Applying (5.6) to the above inequalities yields that c∗(t, i) = c − a. For c ≤ c∗(t, i), it follows
that the optimal action is a = 0. For all c > c∗(t, i), we have a = c− c∗(t, i). The optimal action
is only limited by the request size γi. Thus, we have a = min{γi, c− c∗(t, i)} if c > c∗(t, i).
Moreover, supermodularity of Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs) gives (for c ≥ 1)
Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs) ≤ Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs + 1)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs + 1)
Thus, Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs) is non-decreasing in cs. Consequently, the thresholds
c∗(t, i) are also non-decreasing in cs and can thus be extended to monotone switching curves
c∗(t, cs, i).
The proof for c ≤ cs is analog to the proof of Theorem 4.1.
For an example of the described policy, see Figure 5.1. We can use this example to interpret
c
sc
1a
0a
2a
Figure 5.1: Example for a switching curve in case of a cargo request
the switching curves’ shape. For c > cs, the decision rule says that a greater fraction of a request
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should be accepted the more cargo capacity is remaining. The decision rule also suggests that
less capacity should be sold the more seats are remaining. That is, if there are still a lot of
seats available for sale, cargo capacity should be saved so that these seats can be sold later in
the booking process. If c < cs, decisions are independent of the number of remaining seats since
more seats are remaining than could be sold. The decision rule then says that more units of a
cargo request should be accepted the more capacity is remaining.
We now turn to the optimal policy in case a passenger request arrives.
Theorem 5.2. The optimal policy of M˜ is a structured policy pi∗ = (f∗T , f
∗
T−1, ..., f
∗
1 ) with deci-
sion rules,
(i) if c > cs and i ∈ {m1 + 1, ...,m2},
f∗t (c, cs, i) =
0 cs ≤ c∗s(t, c, i)1 cs > c∗s(t, c, i),
with switching curves c∗s(t, c, i) = max{cs > 0 : ϕi < Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs −
1)}, which are non-increasing in c > 0, and with c∗s(t, c, i) = 0 if the set is empty;
(ii) if c ≤ cs and i ∈ {m1 + 1, ...,m2},
f∗t (c, i) =
0 c ≤ c∗(t, i)1 c > c∗(t, i),
with control limits c∗(t, i) = max{c > 0 : ϕi < Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c) − Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c − 1)} and
c∗(t, i) = 0 if the set is empty.
Proof. We begin the proof for the case c > cs: Since V˜t(c, cs, i) is multimodular in c and cs,
Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs) is also multimodular for t = T, ..., 1. It follows from superconcavity that (for
c ≥ 1 and cs ≥ 2)
Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs − 1) ≤ Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs − 1)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs − 2),
which can be rearranged as
Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs − 1) ≤ Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs − 1)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs − 2).
That means, Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs − 1) is non-increasing in cs. Accordingly, there
exist thresholds
c∗s(t, i) := max{cs > 0 : ϕi < Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs − 1)} (5.9)
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for all i ∈ {m1 + 1, ...,m2} and t = T, ..., 1. If a request for class i ∈ {m1 + 1, ...,m2} arrives at
t, action a = 1 is optimal for cs > c
∗
s(t, i), and a = 0 is optimal for cs ≤ c∗s(t, i).
Furthermore, superconcavity implies that (for c ≥ 2 and cs ≥ 1)
Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs) ≤ Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs − 1)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 2, cs − 1),
which can be rearranged as
Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs − 1) ≤ Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 2, cs − 1).
That means, Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs − 1) is also non-increasing in c. Consequently,
the thresholds c∗s(t, i) can be extended to switching curves c∗s(t, c, i) which are non-increasing in
c.
We now consider the case for c ≤ cs. It follows from concavity of Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c) in c (for c ≥ 2)
Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1) ≤ Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 2)
That means, Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1) is non-increasing in c, which ensures the existence
of the thresholds
c∗(t, i) := max{c > 0 : ϕi < Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c)− Hˆt−1VM1t−1 (c− 1)},
and with c∗(t, i) = 0 if the set is empty. If a request for class i ∈ {m1 + 1, ...,m2} arrives at time
t, action a = 1 is optimal for c > c∗(t, i), and a = 0 is optimal for c ≤ c∗(t, i).
In order to get an idea of the switching curves’ shape, see Figure 5.2 as an example. This figure
does also help to interpret the optimal policy. Consider first the area c > cs. The policy suggests
that if many seats are remaining, a passenger request should be accepted. That means, if only a
few seats are remaining, capacity is saved for later passenger requests. This reflects the typical
rationale in revenue management which is to save capacity for later requests which might have
a higher revenue. Further, if much cargo capacity is remaining, a passenger request should be
accepted. That is, if cargo capacity is scarce, passenger requests tend to be rejected in order to
save capacity for profitable cargo requests. For c ≤ cs, decisions are independent of the number
of available seats because there are more seats remaining than could be sold. The decision rule
says that a passenger request should be accepted if much cargo capacity is remaining.
Note that we might as well define switching curves c∗(t, cs, i), which are non-increasing in cs,
and define optimal decisions based on them.
The optimal policy can also be structured with respect to time. In order to show this, we need
the following lemma.
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Figure 5.2: Example for a switching curve in case of a passenger request
Lemma 5.3. For all c ∈ C, cs ∈ Cs, a∗i = f∗t+1(c, cs, i) for some i ∈ Iˆ, and t = T − 1, ..., 0, we
have
Q˜tV˜t(c, cs)− Q˜tV˜t(c− 1, cs − 1) ≤ Q˜tV˜t(c− a∗i , cs − a∗iσi)− Q˜tV˜t(c− 1− a∗i , cs − 1− a∗iσi).
(5.10)
Proof. It is easy to see that (5.10) holds for a∗i = 0. We now consider (5.10) for some i 6= 0,
a∗i > 0, and t ≥ 0:
(i) For cargo requests (i ∈ Ic), it follows from subconcavity that
Q˜tV˜t(c, cs)− Q˜tV˜t(c− 1, cs − 1) ≤ Q˜tV˜t(c− 1, cs)− Q˜tV˜t(c− 2, cs − 1)
≤ Q˜tV˜t(c− 2, cs)− Q˜tV˜t(c− 3, cs − 1)
...
≤ Q˜tV˜t(c− a∗, cs)− Q˜tV˜t(c− 1− a∗, cs − 1).
(ii) For passenger requests (i ∈ Is), the only action greater zero is a∗i = 1. It follows from
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subconcavity that
Q˜tV˜t(c, cs)− Q˜tV˜t(c− 1, cs − 1) ≤ Q˜tV˜t(c− 1, cs)− Q˜tV˜t(c− 2, cs − 1)
≤ Q˜tV˜t(c− 1, cs − 1)− Q˜tV˜t(c− 2, cs − 2).
The two cases together complete the proof.
Proposition 5.4. For any i ∈ {m1 + 1, ...,m2} and c > cs, the switching curves c∗s(t, c, i) are
non-decreasing in t.
Proof. In order to prove this proposition, we have to show that opportunity cost Q˜tV˜t(c, cs) −
Q˜tV˜t(c−1, cs−1) is non-decreasing in time. We fix c > 0 and cs > 0 as well as t > 0. Further, we
let a∗i = f
∗
t (c−1, cs−1, i) be the optimal action at time t if class i ∈ Iˆ is requested, c−1 capacity
and cs − 1 seats are remaining. Note that we have a∗i ∈ A(c− 1, cs − 1, i) and a∗i ∈ A(c, cs, i). It
follows that
Q˜tV˜t(c, cs)− Q˜tV˜t(c− 1, cs − 1)
=
∑
i∈Iˆ
qt,i
[
max
a∈A(c,cs,i)
{
aϕi + Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− a, cs − aσi)
}
− max
a∈A(c−1,cs−1,i)
{
aϕi + Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1− a, cs − 1− aσi)
}]
≥
∑
i∈Iˆ
qt,i
[
Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− a∗i , cs − a∗iσi)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1− a∗i , cs − 1− a∗iσi)
]
≥Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c, cs)− Q˜t−1V˜t−1(c− 1, cs − 1).
The last inequality follows from Lemma 5.3. Accordingly, the switching curves c∗s(t, c, i) are
non-decreasing in time.
Proposition 5.5. For any i ∈ {0, ...,m1} and c > cs, the switching curves c∗(t, cs, i) are non-
decreasing in t.
Proof. The proof can be done analogously to the one shown above, but the last inequality follows
from concavity.
Note that for c ≤ cs, the control limits c∗(t, i) are also non-decreasing in time as it was shown
in Proposition 4.3. This property implies that requests (or parts of them) should be accepted as
departure approaches.
The policy can be further characterized by the following property.
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Proposition 5.6. For t = T, ..., 1 we have c∗(t, cs, i1) ≤ c∗(t, cs, i2) with ϕi1 ≥ ϕi2 and i1, i2 ∈
{0, ...,m1}. Further, for t = T, ..., 1, we have c∗s(t, c, i1) ≤ c∗s(t, c, i2) with ϕi1 ≥ ϕi2 and i1, i2 ∈
{m1 + 1, ...,m2}.
Proof. The proof can be done analogously to the one of Proposition 4.4.
Note that this property applies as well to the control limits c∗(t, i) for c ≤ cs (cf. Proposition
4.4). The implication of this property is that a request with a higher revenue is rather (partially)
accepted than a request having a lower revenue.
The model M˜ provides a very comprehensible decision rule, which increases acceptance of the
model in practice. However, if an airline’s business policy only allows for entirely accepting
requests or if both weight and volume have to be considered, M˜ cannot be applied. For this
case, we provide, in the next section, two efficient heuristics that can be applied to determine a
solution to the basic model outlined in Section 5.1.
5.3 Heuristics and Bounds
Optimal policies of the basic integrated capacity control model cannot be determined directly for
real-world problems. Since the system state is three-dimensional, the model suffers from the curse
of dimensionality. Thus, we provide two different heuristics that efficiently find feasible solutions.
The first heuristic decomposes the decision problem into three one-dimensional subproblems and
allows for partially accepting cargo requests. This yields that the heuristic’s decision rule is
simply structured. The second heuristics makes decisions based on bid prices for weight, volume,
and seats, which are determined by a deterministic linear program. This linear program provides
an upper bound on the maximum expected revenue.
Heuristic based on Decomposition into Three Subproblems (HD3)
This heuristic decomposes the three-dimensional MDP into three one-dimensional subproblems.
Thereby, the well-known passenger capacity control problem is obtained. Further, the two cargo
subproblems are almost identical to the ones described in Section 4.3. The difference is the way
the revenue generated by accepting one unit of a request is allocated among the subproblems.
This is outlined below.
ϕwi :=
ϕ¯ i ∈ Isϕi otherwise
ϕvi :=
ϕi
( viϑ −wi)
vi
1{ viϑ >wi} = ϕi
(
1
ϑ − wivi
)
1{ viϑ >wi} i ∈ Ic
0 otherwise
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ϕsi :=
max{ϕi − ϕ¯wi, 0} i ∈ Is0 otherwise
with ϕ¯ = (
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈Ic qt,iϕi)/(
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈Ic qt,i) as the expected average revenue per chargeable
weight unit over all cargo requests. This allocation implies that a passenger request generates
revenue in both the seat subproblem and in the weight subproblem. This ensures that a passenger
request is not always rejected in the weight subproblem; note that this would happen if its
acceptance did not generate revenue. We only account for passengers requiring cargo capacity
in the weight subproblem because weight requirement is relatively high compared to volume
requirement.
All subproblems can be formulated as an MDP of the form of M1 as described in Section 4.2.
Thus, the weight subproblem has the following optimality equation for all cw ∈ Cw, i ∈ Iˆ, and
t = T, ..., 1:
VM1,wt (cw, i) = max
a∈A(cw,i)
{
aϕwi + Hˆt−1V
M1,w
t−1 (cw − a)
}
.
The volume subproblem’s optimality equation is for all cv ∈ Cv, i ∈ Iˆ, and t = T, ..., 1
VM1,vt (cv, i) = max
a∈A(cv ,i)
{
aϕvi + Hˆt−1V
M1,v
t−1 (cv − a)
}
.
And the seat subproblem’s optimality equation for all cs ∈ Cs, i ∈ Iˆ, and t = T, ..., 1 is
VM1,st (cs, i) = max
a∈A(cs,i)
{
aϕsi + Hˆt−1V
M1,s
t−1 (cs − a)
}
.
In the seat subproblem, we have A(cs, i) = {0, ...,min{σi, cs}. We set all terminal values of the
subproblems to zero since we do not consider overbooking.
The decision rule based on HD3 says that a request for shipment type i ∈ Iˆ should be accepted
at time t when cw ≥ wi, cv ≥ vi, and cs ≥ σi weight, volume, and seats, respectively, are
remaining and if
ρi ≥
[
Hˆt−1V
M1,w
t−1 (cw)− Hˆt−1VM1,wt−1 (cw − wi)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δt−1(cw,i)
+
[
Hˆt−1V
M1,v
t−1 (cv)− Hˆt−1VM1,vt−1 (cv − vi)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δt−1(cv ,i)
+
[
Hˆt−1V
M1,s
t−1 (cs)− Hˆt−1VM1,st−1 (cs − σi)
]
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δt−1(cs,i)
This decision rule suggests that a cargo request is accepted if sufficient capacity is available
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and if the generated revenue is at least as high as the opportunity cost of the weight plus the
opportunity cost of the volume subproblem. Further, a passenger request should be accepted if
at least one seat is remaining and if the sum of the opportunity costs of all three subproblems is
not greater than the price associated with the booking class.
We know from Section 4.3 that the opportunity costs δt(cw, i), δt(cv, i), and δt(cs, i) are non-
increasing in cw, cv, and cs, respectively. This monotonicity property applies as well to the sum
of the opportunity costs, δt(cw, i) + δt(cv, i) + δt(cs, i). This allows us to make a statement on
the structure of the policy based on HD3.
Proposition 5.7. The heuristic policy based on HD3 is a structured policy pi = (fT , fT−1, ..., f1)
with decision rules
ft(cw, cv, cs, i) =
1 cs > cs(t, cw, cv, i), cw ≥ wi, cv ≥ vi, cs ≥ σi0 otherwise
and with thresholds cs(t, cw, cv, i) = max{cs > 0 : ρi < δt−1(cw, i) + δt−1(cv, i) + δt−1(cs, i), cw ≥
wi, cv ≥ vi} which are non-increasing in cw and cv. If the set is empty, we define cs(t, cw, cv, i) = 0
for all i ∈ Is and cs(t, cw, cv, i) = −1 for all i ∈ Ic.
Note that the policy based on this heuristic might as well be defined with respect to volume
or weight. Note further that the thresholds depend on two variables, and thus the concept of
switching curves is not applicable in this context. The interpretation of the policy is that, first,
if many seats are remaining, a request should be accepted, and second, if much cargo capacity
(weight and/or volume) is remaining, a request should be accepted. Note that this contradicts
the optimal policy of M˜ which saves cargo capacity if a lot of seats are remaining in order to sell
these seats at a later time. This contradiction is caused by the decomposition of the state space.
Heuristic based on Bid Prices (HBP)
The capacity control problem can be simplified by considering the number of incoming requests
for each class over the entire booking horizon as deterministic. Letting them be equal to the
expected number of requests, the decision problem is then to maximize the revenue from accepting
requests subject to the available capacity. Allowing for partially accepting requests (both cargo
and passengers), this yields the following LP:
(BP) max
y
m2∑
i=1
yiρi (5.11)
s.t.
m2∑
i=1
yiwi ≤ Cw (5.12)
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m2∑
i=1
yivi ≤ Cv (5.13)
m2∑
i=m1+1
yi ≤ Cs (5.14)
yi ≤
T∑
t=1
qt,i ∀i = 1, ...,m2 (5.15)
yi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ...,m2. (5.16)
Let zBP denote the maximum objective value of the optimization problem. It gives an upper
bound on the maximum expected revenue determined in (5.3).
Proposition 5.8. We have QTVT (Cw,Cv,Cs) ≤ zBP .
Proof. The proof can be done very similarly to the proof of Proposition 2 in Amaruchkul et al.
(2007) and is thus omitted.
We denote the dual variables of (5.12), (5.13), and (5.14) as λw, λv, and λs which are interpreted
as the marginal value (bid price) of one weight unit, volume unit, and seat, respectively. These
bid prices can be utilized to construct the following heuristic decision rule at time t:
ft(cw, cv, cs, i) =
1 ρi ≥ λwwi + λvvi + λsσi, cw ≥ wi, cv ≥ vi, cs ≥ σi0 otherwise.
Note that this approach is very similar to the deterministic linear programming approach that
is used in passenger network revenue management (see Talluri & van Ryzin, 2004, pp. 93-95).
The decision rule’s advantage is that it is very comprehensible, and the bid prices can be obtained
easily. However, it is not time-dependent and does not consider remaining capacity. The following
numerical experiments demonstrate its performance compared to the decomposition heuristic.
5.4 Numerical Experiments
We now assess the quality of HD3 and HBP. Further, the revenue of one more heuristic is
evaluated. This heuristic accepts cargo as long as sufficient capacity is available, and it accepts
passenger requests according to the optimal policy of the one-dimensional passenger decision
problem. This heuristic is hereafter referred to as IFCFS since it integrates a cargo first-come-
first-served policy and optimal passenger acceptance decisions. As a benchmark for the heuristics’
achieved revenue over the simulated booking processes, we use the maximum expected revenue
as determined in (5.3). This value was computed by means of a HP XC3000 high performance
computer. Further, the upper bound zBP is compared to the maximum expected revenue in
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order to assess its quality. All experiments were conducted on an Intel Core2 Quad CPU at 2.83
GHz and 8 GB RAM. In order to obtain the bid prices for HBP, we solved the linear program
by means of Gurobi 5.0 (Gurobi Optimization, 2012).
In the experiments, we use the same shipment categories as in Section 4.4 (see Table 4.1).
Thus, we consider shipment categories b = 1, ..., 9 that all have a different weight and volume
requirement wb, vb. In each time period, either a shipment with revenue per chargeable weight
ϕ, a passenger seat with revenue ϕ, or neither a shipment nor a seat is requested. Table 5.1
outlines the probabilities for an incoming request with a per unit revenue ϕ. The rationale
Cargo requests Request probabilities
Revenue Period 1-10 Period 11-20 Period 21-30 Period 31-40
1.2 0.25 0.1667 0.04 0
1.0 0.15 0.1666 0.06 0
0.8 0.1 0.1667 0.1 0
Passenger requests
Revenue
140 0.035 0.03 0.03 0.04
130 0.035 0.03 0.03 0.04
120 0.035 0.03 0.03 0.04
110 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
100 0.03 0.03 0.036 0.06
90 0.03 0.03 0.036 0.06
80 0.02 0.025 0.036 0.06
70 0.02 0.025 0.036 0.08
60 0.015 0.02 0.036 0.08
Table 5.1: Request probabilities for different revenues
behind this setting is that it is more likely that a passenger rather than a cargo request arrives
at the beginning of the booking period. On the other hand, close to departure the arrival of
a cargo request becomes more likely. Note that the probability of no arrival is 0.25 and 0.5 in
periods 1-20 and 21-40, respectively. Further, note that the probability for high-value requests
increases as departure approaches.
Given a cargo request, the probability that an incoming request belongs to a particular category
is the same as in the cargo experiments (see Table 4.3). If a passenger request is observed, it
belongs to category b = 10, which requires one seat, 100 kg, and 10 ×104 cm3. The request
probability for a particular class i = (b, ϕ) at time t equals the probability of observing a revenue
ϕ multiplied by the probability of observing a category b request at this time (since we assume
independence between requested categories and per-unit revenues). For example, the probability
of an arrival of a cargo shipment class with ϕ = 0.8 and b = 8 at t = 10 is 0.0833×0.1 = 0.00833.
The probability for an arrival of a passenger booking class with ϕ = 110 at t = 35 equals
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the probability of the revenue at this time, which is 0.04 since only one passenger category is
considered. Accepting a request for class i ∈ Ic gives a revenue of ϕi max{wi, vi/ϑ} with ϑ = 0.6.
Accepting a request for class i ∈ Is gives a revenue of ϕi.
We consider a booking horizon of T = 40 time periods. Multiplying capacity requirements by
request probabilities over the entire booking horizon yields expected demand in weight, volume,
and seats of Dw=4340 kg, Dv=1970×104 cm3, and Ds=13, respectively. We let total available
capacity (Cw,Cv,Cs) vary in order to assess the heuristics’ performance for different capacity-
demand ratios. These ratios represent two different scenarios: First, a flight that is both weight
and volume restricted, and second, a flight that is restricted with respect to weight, volume, and
passenger seats.
In order to determine the performance of our heuristics, we repeatedly simulated the arrival
process and computed the average revenue gained in the selling process over all simulation runs.
In order to obtain reliable results, we simulated 100,000 booking processes. The heuristics’
performance relative to the maximum expected revenue in case of a both weight and volume
restricted flight is display in Figure 5.3. Observe that HD3 outperforms HBP and IFCFS for
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Figure 5.3: Heuristics’ performance for both weight and volume restricted flights
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
all capacity-demand ratios lower than 1. Furthermore, the performance of HD3 is relatively
constant and revenues are very close to the maximum expected revenue for all scenarios. Another
observation is that the performance of IFCFS decreases as less capacity is available which can be
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explained by the poor performance of a cargo first-come-first-served policy in case of insufficient
capacity. Further, HBP’s performance does also become worse as less capacity is available. Our
explanation for this observation is that the inventory-insensitivity causes HBP to perform badly
if capacity is scarce.
The numerical results for flights that offer too few passenger seats relative to demand as well
as insufficient weight and volume are summarized in Figure 5.4. Here we keep weight and volume
capacity constant (Cw/Dw ≈ Cv/Dv ≈ 0.7) and let the number of available seats vary. We choose
a situation where cargo capacity is scarce since otherwise cargo capacity control would not yield
a benefit. Again HD3 demonstrates the best overall performance of all tested heuristics with
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Figure 5.4: Heuristics’ performance for weight, volume and passenger restricted flights
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
revenues very close to the maximum expected revenue. Another observation is that HD3 and
HBP perform worse as fewer seats are available, whereas IFCFS performs better under such
conditions. This is caused by the fact that IFCFS focuses on passenger capacity control, which
is particularly important in case of an insufficient number of available seats. In this case, IFCFS
can even balance the disadvantage from accepting cargo based on a first-come-first-served policy.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the relative difference between zBP and the maximum expected revenue
for different capacity-demand ratios. For weight and volume restricted flights (see Table 5.2),
observe that the upper bound’s quality is relatively constant and even tends to become better if
less capacity is available. Thus, the upper bound is quite a good approximation of the maximum
expected revenue under these conditions. For a flight that is restricted in all capacity dimensions
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Total capacity zBP
QTVT (Cw,Cv ,Cs)
%
Cw Cv Cs
4340 1970 13 113.44
3906 1773 13 111.63
3472 1576 13 111.25
3038 1379 13 111.07
2604 1182 13 109.98
2170 985 13 111.04
1736 788 13 111.29
Table 5.2: Upper bound quality depending on both available weight and volume
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
Total capacity zBP
QTVT (Cw,Cv ,Cs)
%
Cw Cv Cs
2400 1380 13 107.99
2400 1380 11 108.07
2400 1380 9 108.37
2400 1380 7 109.16
2400 1380 5 110.72
2400 1380 3 112.90
2400 1380 1 115.15
Table 5.3: Upper bound quality depending on available seats
(relative to maximum expected revenue)
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(see Table 5.3), the upper bound becomes less tight if fewer seats are available. In this situation,
the maximum expected revenue decreases since very few profitable passenger requests can be
accepted, and capacity has to be sold alternatively to cargo requests. (BP) sells this free capacity
selectively to the most profitable cargo requests and thus achieves a higher revenue. This is in
particular possible since parts of high-value requests can be accepted at the end of the booking
horizon even if capacity is insufficient to accept entire requests.
In summary, HD3 performs very well for all tested scenarios and achieves revenues that are
very close to optimal. However, note that HD3 features the same shortcomings as HDP in the
cargo capacity control experiments in case of volume restricted flights. On the other hand, it
is particularly strong for weight-restricted flights. Further, HBP performs quite well if capacity
is ample. IFCFS’s performance is only comparable to the performance of the other heuristics if
the number of total seats is very low or capacity is sufficient to accommodate expected demand.
The upper bound we proposed demonstrates a good quality, especially if capacity is ample.
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Chapter 6
Network Cargo Capacity Control
In Chapter 4, we already analyzed the single-leg cargo capacity control problem. Since we focused
on simply structured policies of the basic problem, we neglected some practical challenges. In this
chapter, we attempt to model a cargo capacity control problem that accounts for as many practi-
cal challenges as possible. This yields the following differences to the discussed single-leg model:
First, we consider a network of flights rather than a single leg. Second, we allow for uncertain
aircraft capacity and for an uncertain shipment capacity requirement. Third, in order to handle
these uncertainties, we allow for overbooking. All these aspects imply a tremendous increase in
complexity compared to the single-leg model, which is already computationally intractable for
large problems. Therefore, our focus in this chapter is, on the one hand, on determining upper
bounds on the maximum expected revenue, and on the other hand, on developing heuristics that
determine feasible solutions to the decision problem.
In Section 6.1, we outline the network cargo capacity control model. In Section 6.2, we propose
several bounds on the maximum expected revenue that are all based on linear programs. Section
6.3 provides an approximate dynamic programming approach to the network capacity control
problem. An affine value function approximation and its structural properties as well as a
piecewise linear approximation are proposed. As a further way of determining heuristic decision
rules, a dynamic programming decomposition approach is discussed in Section 6.4. In Section
6.5, we assess the quality of the proposed bounds and the performance of the heuristics using
numerical experiments.
The notation we use in this chapter deviates slightly from the notation we used in the previous
chapters. First, we let the value function in this chapter be denoted by G since V represents the
random volume requirement of shipments. Second, l represents a particular leg in this chapter,
whereas it denoted a two-dimensional function in the third chapter.
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6.1 Capacity Control Model
Consider a cargo carrier operating flights on a network. An aircraft’s cargo capacity on each
leg l ∈ L = {1, ...,L} is represented by the random vector (Kwl ,Kvl ), in which Kwl denotes the
random variable describing the maximum weight that can be transported on leg l and Kvl the
maximum volume, respectively. Over a booking horizon of T time periods, the carrier may receive
short-term booking requests for shipment classes i ∈ I = {0, ...,m}. Each class is characterized
by its uncertain weight and volume requirement, its per unit contribution margin, and the legs
it requests. We count time backwards with time period T denoting the first period of the selling
process and t = 0 representing the departure of the freighters in the network. We assume that
the arrival process follows a Poisson process, which is approximated by Bernoulli experiments.
Choosing T as a sufficiently large number ensures that the probability of more than one arrival per
time period can be neglected. In each period t = T, ..., 0, we denote the probability of an arrival
of a booking request from class i by qt,i ≥ 0. The probability that no request arrives is given by
qt,0 = 1−
∑m
i=1 qt,i ≥ 0. We further define q0,0 = 1 and q0,i = 0 for i = 1, ...,m. That means, no
request arrives at t = 0. Like in the previous chapters, we make the following assumptions that
are common in revenue management: First, customers do not behave strategically. Second, the
decision maker is risk-neutral. Third, demand is independent between shipment classes and also
independent of the availability of other classes.
In each period, in which a request is observed, a decision has to be made if the incoming request
is accepted or rejected for transportation by the carrier. We assume that at the time the decision
is made, the actual weight and volume of the requested class is only known in distribution. We
denote the weight and volume that a class of type i requires at the time of departure by random
variables Wi and Vi. It is common industry practice to only charge the weight and volume
that were actually used. In particular, a contribution margin ϕi (which we hereafter refer to as
revenue) is earned per chargeable weight unit of class i, and chargeable weight units are given
by max{Wi, Vi/ϑ}, where ϑ is a constant representing the volume-weight ratio of a standard
shipment. Rejected demand is lost. Class i = 0 represents the event of no arriving request, and
we define P (W0 = 0) = 1, P (V0 = 0) = 1, and ϕ0 = 0.
Note that we need to keep track of the number of accepted shipments of each booking class
over time since their distribution of weight and volume might differ and realizations are only
observed at departure. We denote the number of accepted class-i requests as ci ∈ N0.
Since the capacity, the required weight, and the required volume by a class are uncertain,
overbooking is allowed. Following Amaruchkul et al. (2007), we penalize overselling, i.e. the event
that at the time of departure more weight or volume was sold than capacity became available,
by non-negative per unit oﬄoading cost φwl and φ
v
l for oversold weight and volume on leg l,
respectively. This approach is reasonable since a flight might be oversold in only one dimension,
while units of the other dimension are still available. While this is a huge simplification of the
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actual oﬄoading problem, Luo et al. (2009) report that this assumption can be found in cargo
revenue management practice.
The objective of this decision problem is to identify an optimal control policy that maximizes
the total expected revenue over the entire booking horizon. This can be reduced to solving the
optimality equation of the following finite-horizon MDP (T, S,E,A, pt, rt, G˜0) with:
(i) Planning horizon T ∈ N0, indexed by t.
(ii) State space S × E = Ct × I
with Ct := {(c1, ..., cm) ∈ Nm0 :
∑m
i=1 ci ≤ T − t, ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T}. The state space comprises
the number of accepted requests of each class as system states and the currently requested
class as an environmental state. The upper bound of the state space is a consequence of
the assumption that at most one request can be accepted per period. Thus, the sum of all
accepted requests cannot be greater than the number of elapsed decision periods.
(iii) Action space A ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether a request is denied or accepted. The set of
admissible actions is defined as A(c, i) := {0, 1} for all c ∈ Ct and i ∈ I. Since the set
of admissible actions is independent of the current state, we define A(i) := A(c, i) for all
i ∈ I and c ∈ Ct.
(iv) Transition law pt(c, i, a, c+ aei, i
′) = qt−1,i′
for all t = T, ..., 1, c ∈ Ct, i, i′ ∈ I, and a ∈ A(i). ei is an m-dimensional vector, where
the i-th entry is one and all other entries are zero. We define e0 as the m-dimensional zero
vector.
(v) One-stage reward function rt(c, i, a) = aEWi,Vi [ϕi max{Wi, Vi/ϑ}] =: aρi
for all t = T, ..., 1, c ∈ Ct, i ∈ I, and a ∈ A(i).
(vi) Terminal reward function
G˜0(c, i
′) = −
∑
l∈L
EW ,V ,Kw,Kv
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
Wici −Kwl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
Vici −Kvl
+
for all c ∈ C0 and i′ ∈ I with I(l) denoting the set of classes that request leg l. We
define W = (W1, ...,Wm) and V = (V1, ..., Vm) as the vector of random weight and volume
requirement, respectively. Further, let Kw and Kv be a vector of capacities for weight and
volume, respectively, on all legs l ∈ L. Note that we allow for any general distributions
of actual weights, volumes, and capacities. In particular, weights and volumes might be
dependent. However, we assume that capacity is independent of both weight and volume
requirement.
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Note that one could also account for additional loading restrictions, such as limited positions
for certain pallets or containers, by introducing additional non-decreasing penalty functions per
leg. For the sake of simplicity, we consider only weight and volume restrictions on a leg hereafter.
Let G˜t(c, i) denote the maximum expected revenue that can be gained in periods t to departure
by accepting additional requests given that c ∈ Ct requests have already been accepted and class
i ∈ I is currently requested. This is the unique solution to the following optimality equation of
the MDP:
G˜t(c, i) = max
a∈A(i)
{
ρia+
∑
i′∈I
qt−1,i′G˜t−1(c+ aei, i′)
}
. (6.1)
Accordingly, if a class-i request is accepted, a revenue ρi will be generated and the system state
will be increased by 1 in dimension i. If a request is rejected or no request arrives, no revenue
will be generated and the system state will remain unchanged.
In order to reduce the MDP’s large system state, we use the observable-disturbance form of
(6.1) hereafter. That is, we define Gt(c) :=
∑
i∈I qt,iG˜t(c, i) for all t = T, ..., 0 and c ∈ Ct and
write
Gt(c) =
∑
i∈I
qt,i max{ρi +Gt−1(c+ ei), Gt−1(c)}. (6.2)
If a booking request for shipment class i ∈ I is accepted at time t, the expected revenue is
ρi + Gt−1(c + ei). If the request is rejected, the expected revenue is Gt−1(c). Accordingly, the
optimal decision rule in t, in state c ∈ Ct, and if shipment class i ∈ I is requested, is
f∗t (c, i) =
1 ρi ≥ Gt−1(c)−Gt−1(c+ ei)0 otherwise. (6.3)
The difference Gt−1(c) − Gt−1(c + ei) can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of the cargo
space a class-i request requires. It is the difference in the maximum expected revenue that can
be gained by accepting additional requests in future time periods when a request for class i is
rejected minus the maximum expected revenue when it is accepted. The decision rule says that
a request should only be accepted if its revenue is at least as big as its opportunity cost.
In this setting GT (0) yields the maximum expected revenue that can be gained within the
booking process if the freighter is initially empty. Although, in general, the initial state of
freighters is given by the quantities sold through long-term contracts, we will assume that the
freighters are empty when the booking process starts (c = 0). This is done for the ease of
exposition only, an extension to a general initial state is straightforward.
Due to the curse of dimensionality, determining the exact values of Gt(c), which are needed
for finding out optimal decisions, is computationally infeasible. Even single-leg problems are
intractable as we already showed in Chapter 4. In passenger network revenue management,
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several approaches to obtain heuristics and upper bounds on GT (0) are well known. In the
following sections, we will discuss how and if results from this stream of literature carry over to
cargo revenue management. In the next section, we apply linear programming approaches to our
decision problem in order to determine upper bounds.
6.2 Upper Bounds based on Linear Programming
One rather crude simplification to make the above problem tractable would be to replace all
random variables by their expected values (cf. heuristic HBP in Section 5.3). Instead of solving
an MDP, the resulting problem would simply determine how many shipments of which class
should be accepted under the condition that the number of accepted requests must be less than
or equal to expected demand. The objective is to maximize expected revenue from accepted
requests minus expected overbooking cost.
Allowing for partial (i.e. non-integer) acceptance of yi requests from class i ∈ I\{0} yields the
following optimization problem:
(DLP) max
y
m∑
i=1
ρiyi −
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
w¯iyi − k¯wl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
v¯iyi − k¯vl
+
s.t. yi ≤
T∑
t=1
qt,i ∀i = 1, ...,m
yi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ...,m
with w¯i = E [Wi], v¯i = E [Vi], k¯wl = E [Kwl ], and k¯vl = E [Kvl ].
Although this problem is non-linear in the formulation given above, it can easily be trans-
formed to a linear problem by introducing additional variables ζwl ≥ 0 and ζvl ≥ 0, replacing(∑
i∈I(l) w¯iyi − k¯wl
)+
and
(∑
i∈I(l) v¯iyi − k¯vl
)+
respectively in (DLP), and adding the following
constraints ∑
i∈I(l)
w¯iyi − k¯wl ≤ ζwl (6.4)∑
i∈I(l)
v¯iyi − k¯vl ≤ ζvl (6.5)
for all legs l ∈ L.
Let zDLP denote the maximum objective value of (DLP). This problem is a straightforward
extension of the upper bound problem given in Proposition 2 of Amaruchkul et al. (2007) to a
network model accounting for uncertain capacity. Amaruchkul et al. (2007) interpret the dual
variables of (6.4) and (6.5) as the bid prices of one weight and volume unit, respectively, on leg
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l. We denote those values by λwl and λ
v
l , respectively. Note that this problem is very similar to
approaches for computing passenger bid prices based on solving a deterministic linear program,
which is traditional in network revenue management (cf. Talluri & van Ryzin, 1998, pp. 93-95)
and was recently extended to overbooking by Kunnumkal et al. (2012).
To incorporate stochastic information in the deterministic linear program, a randomized linear
programming approach is common in passenger network revenue management and well known
to provide a tighter bound than (DLP), see Talluri & van Ryzin (1999) and Kunnumkal et al.
(2012). The underlying idea is that the expected values in (DLP) are replaced by random vectors.
Let D = (Dit) be a random matrix with Dit ∈ {0, 1} describing the incoming requests of different
classes over time with P (Dit = 1) = qt,i. Denoting a realization of D by d = (dit)i=1,...,m,t=T,...,1,
a value dit = 1 indicates that a class-i request arrived at time t. By assumption, we have∑m
i=1 dit ∈ {0, 1} for all t. We denote realizations of the random variables by their corresponding
lower case letters. Then, the optimal control given a realization of demand, capacities, and
capacity requirements is given by
(RLP) %(d,w,v,kw,kv) = max
y
m∑
i=1
ϕi max{wi, vi/ϑ}yi
−
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
wiyi − kwl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
viyi − kvl
+
s.t. yi ≤
T∑
t=1
dit ∀i = 1, ...,m
yi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ...,m.
Note that this problem represents a full information problem since complete knowledge about
all incoming demand and capacities is used in the maximization. The maximum expected rev-
enue under full information is then given by ED,W ,V ,Kw,Kv [%(D,W ,V ,Kw,Kv)]. Denote this
quantity by zRLP . Although zRLP is difficult to calculate directly, it can easily be obtained, e.g.
by Monte Carlo simulation (for an introduction to Monte Carlo simulation, see Rubinstein &
Kroese, 2008).
In a passenger revenue management context, Kunnumkal et al. (2012) also introduce a partially
randomized linear program, which only replaces a selection of expected values by their random
variables. Let (PLP) be the problem with revenues, capacities, as well as required weights and
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volumes equal to their expected values and with a random demand vector, i.e.
(PLP) κ(d) = max
y
m∑
i=1
ρiyi −
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
w¯iyi − k¯wl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
v¯iyi − k¯vl
+
s.t. yi ≤
T∑
t=1
dit ∀i = 1, ...,m
yi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ...,m
and zPLP = E[κ(D)].
The following theorem shows that all of the problems introduced above, zDLP , zRLP , and
zPLP give an upper bound on the maximum expected total revenue. Unlike in passenger revenue
management, zRLP does not always provide a tighter bound than zDLP . But zPLP can be shown
to be tighter than zDLP in general.
Theorem 6.1. GT (0) ≤ zPLP ≤ zDLP . Further, GT (0) ≤ zRLP . In general, zRLP might be a
tighter or a looser upper bound than zDLP or zPLP .
Proof. Let (A∗0t, ..., A∗mt) denote the vectors maximizing the right hand side of (6.2) depending
on the realization of (D,W ,V ,Kw,Kv) at time t (we drop the direct dependence of A∗it for
notational simplicity). Given this, the total number of accepted requests from class i 6= 0 given
those optimal actions is
∑T
t=1A
∗
itDit.
Denote the optimal solution to (PLP) depending on (D) by Y PLPi . Given a realization of (D),∑T
t=1A
∗
itDit is a feasible solution to (PLP). Combining this insight with Jensen’s inequality, we
have
GT (0)
= ED,W ,V ,Kw,Kv
 m∑
i=1
ϕi max
{
Wi,
Vi
ϑ
} T∑
t=1
A∗itDit −
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
Wi
T∑
t=1
A∗itDit −Kwl
+
+φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
Vi
T∑
t=1
A∗itDit −Kvl
+
= ED
[
m∑
i=1
ρi
T∑
t=1
A∗itDit
]
−
∑
l∈L
ED,W ,V ,Kw,Kv
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
Wi
T∑
t=1
A∗itDit −Kwl
+
+φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
Vi
T∑
t=1
A∗itDit −Kvl
+
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≤ ED
 m∑
i=1
ρi
T∑
t=1
A∗itDit −
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
w¯i
T∑
t=1
A∗itDit − k¯wl
+
+φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
v¯i
T∑
t=1
A∗itDit − k¯vl
+
≤ ED
 m∑
i=1
ρiY
PLP
i −
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
w¯iY
PLP
i − k¯wl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
v¯iY
PLP
i − k¯vl
+
= E[κ(D)] = zPLP .
Since κ(d) is a concave function, Jensen’s inequality yields
zPLP = E[κ(D)] ≤ κ(E[D]) = zDLP .
Summarizing the above, we have GT (0) ≤ zPLP ≤ zDLP . Now, consider the fully randomized
linear program. We have
GT (0)
= ED,W ,V ,Kw,Kv
 m∑
i=1
ϕi max{Wi, Vi
ϑ
}
T∑
t=1
A∗itDit −
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
Wi
T∑
t=1
A∗itDit −Kwl
+
+φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
Vi
T∑
t=1
A∗itDit −Kvl
+
≤ ED,W ,V ,Kw,Kv
 m∑
i=1
ϕi max{Wi, Vi/ϑ}Y RLPi −
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
WiY
RLP
i −Kwl
+
+φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
ViY
RLP
i −Kvl
+
= ED,W ,V ,Kw,Kv [%(D,W ,V ,Kw,Kv)] = zRLP .
At this point, it is unclear if zRLP is a tighter or a looser bound than zPLP or zDLP . To
see that in general, zRLP is neither tighter nor looser than the other two bounds, consider the
following two examples.
Example 6.1. Take T = 5, L = 1, m = 1, qt,1 = 1 for t = 1, ..., 5, ϑ = 1, P (V1 = 100) = 1,
P (W1 = 2) = 0.5 = 1 − P (W1 = 98), P (Kv1 = 100) = 1, P (Kw1 = 10) = 1, ϕ1 = 1, φv1 = 0,
108
6.3 An Approximate Dynamic Programming Approach
φw1 = 100 so that w¯1 = 50, v¯1 = 100, k¯
w
1 = 10, k¯
v
1 = 100. In this case, DLP and PLP solve
max
0≤y≤5
100y − 100(50y − 10)+
with y∗ = 1/5 and zDLP = zPLP = 100/5 = 20.
RLP, on the other hand, solves the problem for two possible sample paths, each of which
happen with a probability of 0.5. Simplifying the problems of those two sample paths gives:
Sample 1: w1 = 2 : max
0≤y˜≤5
100y˜ − 100(2y˜ − 10)+
Sample 2: w1 = 98 : max
0≤yˆ≤5
100yˆ − 100(98yˆ − 10)+.
We have y˜∗ = 5 and yˆ∗ = 10/98 giving zRLP = 0.5 × 100 × (5 + 10/98) > 20 = zDLP = zPLP .
As a consequence of this example, zRLP can be even looser than zDLP .
Example 6.2. To have an example showing that zRLP might produce a bound that is tighter
than zPLP or zDLP , take the data from Example 1 but change the booking horizon to T = 1 and
the capacity for weight to P (Kw1 = 50) = 1, with k¯
w
1 = 50. In this case, DLP and PLP solve
max
0≤y≤1
100y − 100(50y − 50)+
with y∗ = 1 and zDLP = zPLP = 100.
As before, RLP solves the problem for two possible sample paths, each of which happen with
a probability of 0.5. This gives
Sample 1: w1 = 2 : max
0≤y˜≤1
100y˜ − 100(2y˜ − 50)+
Sample 2: w1 = 98 : max
0≤yˆ≤1
100yˆ − 100(98yˆ − 50)+.
We have y˜∗ = 1 and yˆ∗ = 50/98 giving zRLP = 0.5 × 100 × (1 + 50/98) < 100 = zDLP = zPLP .
As a consequence of this example, zRLP can be tighter than zPLP .
We turn to an alternative, popular approach to determine upper bounds and bid prices in
passenger revenue management, which is approximate dynamic programming.
6.3 An Approximate Dynamic Programming Approach
In this section, we propose an affine value function approximation in order to make the capacity
control problem tractable. The approximation’s structural properties are analyzed in Section
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6.3.1. An enhanced approximation scheme that uses piecewise linear functions is proposed in
Section 6.3.2.
A standard approach in approximate dynamic programming is to approximate the value func-
tion by a function that is affine in the state space. If we approximate the value of one unit of
weight at time t on leg l by αwl,t and the value of one unit of volume at time t on leg l by α
v
l,t,
the approximation parameters can be interpreted as bid prices for weight and volume units on a
particular leg and at a particular time. An intuitive decision rule would accept a class-i request
if its revenue is at least as big as the sum of the bid prices of its requested weight and volume in
the next period, i.e.
∑
l∈L(i)[α
w
l,t−1w¯i + α
v
l,t−1v¯i], where L(i) is the set of legs that are requested
by class i ∈ I (for i = 0, we define L(i) = ∅). This is in case of an arriving class-i request in
period t > 1
ft(i) =

1 ρi ≥
∑
l∈L(i)
[
αwl,t−1w¯i + α
v
l,t−1v¯i
]
0 otherwise.
(6.6)
We refer to the sum of all bid prices of a particular class i ∈ I, ∑l∈L(i) [αwl,t−1w¯i + αvl,t−1v¯i],
as approximated opportunity cost. In order to obtain the decision rules in (6.6), we approximate
Gt(c) and Gt(c+ ei) in (6.3) for all t = T, ..., 1 and c ∈ Ct by
Gt(c) ≈ ψt −
∑
l∈L
αwl,t ∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i + α
v
l,t
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i
 , (6.7)
with ψt as a constant offset in period t.
Oﬄoading cost incurs in the last period only. To approximate the terminal values, we use the
expected values of capacities and capacity requirements, that is
G0(c) ≈ −
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
w¯ici − k¯wl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
v¯ici − k¯vl
+ . (6.8)
Given optimality equations (6.2), we outlined in Section 3.3 that the maximum expected
revenue at time T can be computed by solving the following LP:
(P˜) min
GT (c),...,G1(c)
GT (0)
s.t. Gt(c)−
∑
i∈I
qt,iGt−1(c+ aiei) ≥
∑
i∈I
qt,iρiai ∀c ∈ Ct, 1 ≤ t ≤ T,a ∈ A
Gt(c) ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ Ct, 1 ≤ t ≤ T,
where we define a := (a0, a1, ..., am) with ai as the action depending on the requested class i.
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We further define A = A(0)× ...×A(m) with A(0) = {0}. Even though accepting or rejecting a
request for i = 0 yields the same result, we set A(0) = {0} in order to decrease the problem size.
Further, note that we do not sum over all states in the objective function as done in Section 3.3
since we have an initial state and time-dependent states.
Plugging approximations (6.7) and (6.8) into (P˜) yields
(PAFA) min
ψ,αw,αv
ψT (6.9)
s.t. ψt − ψt−1 −
∑
l∈L
(αwl,t − αwl,t−1) ∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i + (α
v
l,t − αvl,t−1)
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i

+
∑
i∈I
qt,iai
 ∑
l∈L(i)
(w¯iα
w
l,t−1 + v¯iα
v
l,t−1)− ρi
 ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ Ct, 2 ≤ t ≤ T,a ∈ A
(6.10)
ψ1 −
∑
l∈L
αwl,1 ∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i + α
v
l,1
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i
+∑
i′∈I
q1,i′
∑
l∈Lφwl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl
+
≥
∑
i∈I
q1,iρiai ∀c ∈ C1,a ∈ A
(6.11)
ψt, α
w
l,t, α
v
l,t ∈ R ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T, l ∈ L. (6.12)
The above problem still has the same amount of constraints as (P˜) but only T +2L×T variables.
In order to analyze structural properties in more detail and to solve the problem via column
generation, its dual formulation, (DAFA), is presented below.
(DAFA) max
X
∑
1≤t≤T,c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a
∑
i∈I
qt,iρiai −
∑
c∈C1,a∈A
X1,c,a
∑
i′∈I
q1,i′
∑
l∈Lφwl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl
+ (6.13)
s.t.
∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i
=

∑
c∈Ct+1,a∈A
Xt+1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + qt+1,iai)w¯i ∀l ∈ L, 1 ≤ t < T
0 ∀l ∈ L, t = T
(6.14)
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∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i
=

∑
c∈Ct+1,a∈A
Xt+1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + qt+1,iai)v¯i ∀l ∈ L, 1 ≤ t < T
0 ∀l ∈ L, t = T
(6.15)
∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a =

∑
c∈Ct+1,a∈A
Xt+1,c,a ∀1 ≤ t < T
1 t = T
(6.16)
Xt,c,a ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T, c ∈ Ct,a ∈ A. (6.17)
Note that the second part of constraints (6.14) and (6.15) can be eliminated since CT = {0}m.
Further, constraint (6.16) can be replaced by∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a = 1 ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T. (6.18)
Interpreting Xt,c,a as state-action probabilities, constraint (6.14) enforces that the expected
weight booked t time periods before departure equals the expected weight booked t + 1 time
periods before departure plus the weight sold within that time period. Constraint (6.15) en-
forces the same for volume. This dual hence maximizes the expected revenue minus expected
overbooking cost subject to flow balance constraints for weight and volume.
Strong duality ensures that the objective value of (PAFA) equals the objective value of (DAFA).
We will denote this optimal value by zAFA, which gives a tighter bound than the upper bound
problem (DLP).
Theorem 6.2. Any feasible solution to (DAFA) yields a feasible solution to (DLP) having a
greater or equal objective value. Hence GT (0) ≤ zAFA ≤ zDLP .
Proof. The first inequality follows from Proposition 1 in Adelman (2007): One can show that
any feasible solution to (P˜) is an upper bound on the maximum expected revenue determined
by (6.2). Since (PAFA) provides a feasible solution to (P˜), we have zAFA ≥ GT (0). Thus, this
approximate LP determines the lowest upper bound of the form (6.7) on the maximum expected
revenue and the inequality follows.
In order to prove the second inequality, we define yi :=
∑
t>0,c∈Ct,a∈A qt,iaiXt,c,a, for all i ∈ I.
Applying (6.18) to this definition yields
0 ≤ yi =
∑
t>0,c∈Ct,a∈A
qt,iaiXt,c,a =
T∑
t=1
qt,i
∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
aiXt,c,a
≤
T∑
t=1
qt,i
∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a ≤
T∑
t=1
qt,i ∀i ∈ I.
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As a consequence, any feasible solution to (DAFA) gives a feasible solution to (DLP). We will
now show that the objective value of (DLP) is greater than or equal to the objective value of
(DAFA) for any feasible solution.
Considering the definition of yi, the first term of (6.13) becomes
m∑
i=1
yiρi.
Now consider the second term of (6.13) representing overbooking cost. Since both (
∑
i∈I(l)(ci+
ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl )+ and (
∑
i∈I(l)(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl )+ are convex in c and in a, and because
Xt,c,a as well as qt,i can be considered as probability distributions, we can repeatedly apply
Jensen’s inequality to obtain
∑
c∈C1,a∈A
X1,c,a
∑
i′∈I
q1,i′
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl
+
+φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl
+
≥
∑
c∈C1,a∈A
X1,c,a
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + q1,iai)w¯i − k¯wl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + q1,iai)v¯i − k¯vl
+
≥
∑
l∈L
φwl
 ∑
c∈C1,a∈A
X1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + q1,iai)w¯i −
∑
c∈C1,a∈A
X1,c,ak¯
w
l
+
+φvl
 ∑
c∈C1,a∈A
X1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + q1,iai)v¯i −
∑
c∈C1,a∈A
X1,c,ak¯
v
l
+ .
(6.19)
Further, fixing i and summing constraint (6.14) over t yields∑
t,c,a
Xt,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i =
∑
t,c,a
Xt+1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + qt+1,iai)w¯i ∀l ∈ L.
Rearranging terms yields∑
c,a
X1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i =
∑
t,c,a
Xt+1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
qt+1,iaiw¯i ∀l ∈ L.
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By applying the definition of yi, we can write∑
c,a
X1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i =
∑
i∈I(l)
yiw¯i −
∑
c,a
X1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
q1,iaiw¯i ∀l ∈ L.
It follows that ∑
i∈I(l)
yiw¯i =
∑
c,a
X1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + q1,iai)w¯i ∀l ∈ L. (6.20)
Similarly, constraint (6.15) yields∑
i∈I(l)
yiv¯i =
∑
c,a
X1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + q1,iai)v¯i ∀l ∈ L. (6.21)
Using (6.20) and (6.21) gives that the last two lines in (6.19) are equal to
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
yiw¯i − k¯wl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
yiv¯i − k¯vl
+ .
This proves that the objective of (DLP) cannot be lower than the objective value of (DAFA) for
any feasible solution X. Accordingly, every feasible solution of (DAFA) can be transformed to
a feasible solution of (DLP) yielding a greater or equal objective value. As a consequence, the
maximization problem (DAFA) yields a lower upper bound.
Next, we provide an analysis of structural properties of the approximation parameters.
6.3.1 Structural Properties
We motivated our approximation by arguing that
∑
l∈L(i)
[
αwl,t−1w¯i + α
v
l,t−1v¯i
]
should approxi-
mate the opportunity cost of accepting a class-i request in period t. One can show that for an
optimal solution, the approximated opportunity cost of a request is approximately constant in
time.
Theorem 6.3. For an optimal primal solution (αw∗, αv∗, ψ∗) to (PAFA), we have∑
l∈L(i)
[
αw∗l,t w¯i + α
v∗
l,t v¯i
] ≈ ∑
l∈L(i)
[
αw∗l,t−1w¯i + α
v∗
l,t−1v¯i
]
& 0 ∀1 < t ≤ T, i ∈ I.
Proof. First, note that approximated opportunity cost of class i′ ∈ I in period t > 1 can be
written as
∑
l∈L(i′)
[
αw∗l,t w¯i′ + α
v∗
l,t v¯i′
]
. On the other hand, we can plug approximation (6.7) into
the right hand side of (6.2) for Gt(c) and Gt(c + ei′) and write approximated opportunity cost
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of class i′ in period t > 1 as
0 ≤ Gt(c)−Gt(c+ ei′)
≈
∑
j∈I
qt,j max
a∈A(j)
aρj + ψ∗t−1 −∑
l∈L
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + a1{i=j})(αw∗l,t−1w¯i + α
v∗
l,t−1v¯i)

−
∑
j∈I
qt,j max
a∈A(j)
aρj + ψ∗t−1 −∑
l∈L
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + a1{i=j} + 1{i=i′})(αw∗l,t−1w¯i + α
v∗
l,t−1v¯i)

= ψ∗t−1 −
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈I(l)
ci(α
w∗
l,t−1w¯i + α
v∗
l,t−1v¯i) +
∑
j∈I
qt,j max
a∈A(j)
aρj − a ∑
l∈L(j)
(αw∗l,t−1w¯j + α
v∗
l,t−1v¯j)

− ψ∗t−1 +
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈I(l)
ci(α
w∗
l,t−1w¯i + α
v∗
l,t−1v¯i) +
∑
l∈L(i′)
(αw∗l,t−1w¯i′ + α
v∗
l,t−1v¯i′)
−
∑
j∈I
qt,j max
a∈A(j)
aρj − a ∑
l∈L(j)
(αw∗l,t−1w¯j + α
v∗
l,t−1v¯j)

=
∑
l∈L(i′)
(αw∗l,t−1w¯i′ + α
v∗
l,t−1v¯i′).
The inequality holds since Gt(c) is non-increasing in ci for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} (a proof can be
done analogously to the one of Lemma 4.1). It follows that for all 1 < t ≤ T and i′ ∈ I,∑
l∈L(i′)[α
w∗
l,t w¯i′ + α
v∗
l,t v¯i′ ] ≈
∑
l∈L(i′)[α
w∗
l,t−1w¯i′ + α
v∗
l,t−1v¯i′ ].
In the remainder of this work, we assume exact rather than approximate time-independence of
approximated opportunity cost. That is,
∑
l∈L(i)
[
αw∗l,t w¯i + α
v∗
l,t v¯i
]
=
∑
l∈L(i)
[
αw∗l,t−1w¯i + α
v∗
l,t−1v¯i
]
for all i ∈ I and t = T, ..., 2. This assumption yields that there exists an optimal solution featuring
time-independent bid prices.
Theorem 6.4. Assume an optimal solution with time-independent approximated opportunity
cost exists. Then, there also exists an optimal solution (αw∗, αv∗, ψ∗) to (PAFA) with
(i) αw∗l,t = α
w∗
l,t−1,
(ii) αv∗l,t = α
v∗
l,t−1,
(iii) ψ∗t ≥ ψ∗t−1 ≥ 0
for all 1 < t ≤ T and l ∈ L.
Proof. We first prove properties (i) and (ii) by showing that any optimal solution not satisfying
the above structure can be altered to obtain an alternative optimal solution that satisfies those
properties.
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Consider an optimal primal-dual solution X∗, (αw∗, αv∗, ψ∗). Let t′ be the smallest t > 1 with
αw∗l,t 6= αw∗l,t−1 or αv∗l,t 6= αv∗l,t−1. Now consider the alternative solution (αw′, αv′, ψ′) with
αw′l,t =
αw∗l,t ∀t 6= t′, l ∈ Lαw∗l,t−1 t = t′, l ∈ L
αv′l,t =
αv∗l,t ∀t 6= t′, l ∈ Lαv∗l,t−1 t = t′, l ∈ L
ψ′t =

ψ∗t ∀t 6= t′
ψ∗t +
∑
l∈L
[
(αw∗l,t−1 − αw∗l,t )
∑
i∈I(l)
w¯ici + (α
v∗
l,t−1 − αv∗l,t)
∑
i∈I(l)
v¯ici
]
t = t′.
To see that (αw′, αv′, ψ′) is a feasible solution to (PAFA), note that the only constraints in (6.10)
for which we altered any variables are those with t = t′ and t = t′ + 1. Consider t = t′ first. For
any c ∈ Ct′ and a ∈ A, this reads
ψ′t′ − ψ′t′−1 +
∑
l∈L
(αw′l,t′−1 − αw′l,t′) ∑
i∈I(l)
w¯ici + (α
v′
l,t′−1 − αv′l,t′)
∑
i∈I(l)
v¯ici

+
∑
j∈I
qt′,jaj
 ∑
l∈L(j)
(w¯jα
w′
l,t′−1 + v¯jα
v′
l,t′−1)− ρj

=ψ∗t′ − ψ∗t′−1 +
∑
l∈L
(αw∗l,t′−1 − αw∗l,t′) ∑
i∈I(l)
w¯ici + (α
v∗
l,t′−1 − αv∗l,t′)
∑
i∈I(l)
v¯ici

+
∑
j∈I
qt′,jaj
 ∑
l∈L(j)
(w¯jα
w∗
l,t′−1 + v¯jα
v∗
l,t′−1)− ρj
 ≥ 0, (6.22)
where the inequality follows from feasibility of (αw∗, αv∗, ψ∗).
For t = t′ + 1, (6.10) reads for any c ∈ Ct′+1 and a ∈ A
ψ′t′+1 − ψ′t′ +
∑
l∈L
(αw′l,t′ − αw′l,t′+1) ∑
i∈I(l)
w¯ici + (α
v′
l,t′ − αv′l,t′+1)
∑
i∈I(l)
v¯ici

+
∑
j∈I
qt′+1,jaj
 ∑
l∈L(j)
(w¯jα
w′
l,t′ + v¯jα
v′
l,t′)− ρj

=ψ∗t′+1 − ψ∗t′ −
∑
l∈L
(αw∗l,t′−1 − αw∗l,t′) ∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i + (α
v∗
l,t′−1 − αv∗l,t′)
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i

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+
∑
l∈L
(αw∗l,t′−1 − αw∗l,t′+1) ∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i + (α
v∗
l,t′−1 − αv∗l,t′+1)
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i

+
∑
j∈I
qt′+1,jaj
 ∑
l∈L(j)
(w¯jα
w∗
l,t′−1 + v¯jα
v∗
l,t′−1)− ρj

=ψ∗t′+1 − ψ∗t′ −
∑
l∈L
(αw∗l,t′+1 − αw∗l,t′) ∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i + (α
v∗
l,t′+1 − αv∗l,t′)
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i

+
∑
j∈I
qt′+1,jaj
 ∑
l∈L(j)
(w¯jα
w∗
l,t′−1 + v¯jα
v∗
l,t′−1)− ρj

=ψ∗t′+1 − ψ∗t′ −
∑
l∈L
(αw∗l,t′+1 − αw∗l,t′) ∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i + (α
v∗
l,t′+1 − αv∗l,t′)
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i

+
∑
j∈I
qt′+1,jaj
 ∑
l∈L(j)
(w¯jα
w∗
l,t′ + v¯jα
v∗
l,t′)− ρj

+
∑
j∈I
qt′+1,jaj
 ∑
l∈L(j)
(w¯jα
w∗
l,t′−1 + v¯jα
v∗
l,t′−1)−
∑
l∈L(j)
(w¯jα
w∗
l,t′ + v¯jα
v∗
l,t′)

=ψ∗t′+1 − ψ∗t′ −
∑
l∈L
(αw∗l,t′+1 − αw∗l,t′) ∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i + (α
v∗
l,t′+1 − αv∗l,t′)
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i

+
∑
j∈I
qt′+1,jaj
 ∑
l∈L(j)
(w¯jα
w∗
l,t′ + v¯jα
v∗
l,t′)− ρj
 ≥ 0, (6.23)
where the last equality follows from the assumption of time-independent approximated opportu-
nity cost, and the last inequality from the feasibility of (αw∗, αv∗, ψ∗). We hence conclude that
(αw′, αv′, ψ′) is a feasible solution to (PAFA).
To see that it is an optimal solution, we check if complimentary slackness is preserved. To do
this, we need to show that for every c ∈ Ct, a ∈ A, and 1 ≤ t ≤ T with X ′t,c,a > 0, condition
(6.10) is active. Since we showed above that the reduced revenue is the same under (αw′, αv′, ψ′)
as under (αw∗, αv∗, ψ∗), it follows that the dual variables under both solutions are equal, i.e.
X ′t,c,a = X∗t,c,a for all c ∈ Ct and a ∈ A and t = t′, t′ + 1. Again, we only need to check (6.10)
for t = t′ and t = t′ + 1 since nothing was changed in the other constraints.
Consider t = t′ first. From the optimality of (αw∗, αv∗, ψ∗), we know that for c ∈ Ct′ and
a ∈ A with X∗t′,c,a > 0, (6.10) is active for (αw∗, αv∗, ψ∗). As X ′t,c,a = X∗t,c,a, it follows from
(6.22) that (6.10) is also active for the alternative solution. For t = t′+ 1, we can draw the same
conclusion from (6.23).
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Following the same steps repeatedly for larger t’s yields properties (i) and (ii).
To see (iii), choose ci = 0 and ai = 0 for all i ∈ I in constraint (6.10). It follows immediately
that ψ∗t ≥ ψ∗t−1. Doing the same in constraint (6.11) yields ψ∗1 ≥ 0 and thus ψ∗t ≥ 0 for all
1 ≤ t ≤ T . Note that this structure holds for all feasible solutions.
The result of time-independent bid prices is in contrast to the approximate dynamic program-
ming formulation for passenger revenue management suggested in Adelman (2007) where optimal
bid prices vary over time. The reason for this contrast is that we allow for overbooking within
the network formulation.
Due to Theorem 6.4 and the assumption of time-independent approximated opportunity cost,
we will drop the index t hereafter and let αw∗l and α
v∗
l be the optimal, time-independent bid
prices. Intuitively, one might expect αw∗l and α
v∗
l to be positive, just like in the passenger
counterpart in Adelman (2007). This need not be true in our cargo problem, however, as the
following example shows:
Example 6.3. Consider a network that consists of three locations and two legs (see Figure 6.1).
Both legs have the same expected capacity, i.e. k¯w1 = k¯
w
2 = 40 and k¯
v
1 = k¯
v
2 = 20.
A B C 
leg 1 leg 2 
Figure 6.1: Two-leg example: Network
Over a booking horizon of T = 3 periods, requests for three different classes may arrive. The
capacities of the carriers as well as the actual weight and volume of shipments of different classes
equal their expected values. For simplicity take ϑ = 1. The classes are characterized as outlined
in Table 6.1.
Period Class Expected Expected Itinerary Revenue Revenue Probability
weight volume (per unit) (total)
t i w¯i v¯i ϕi ρi qt,i
3 1 20 10 A-C 2.25 45 0.5
2 10 10 A-B 2.5 25 0.3
3 10 10 B-C 2.5 25 0.2
2 1 20 10 A-C 2.25 45 1.0
1 1 20 10 A-C 2.25 45 1.0
Table 6.1: Two-leg example: Classes and data
Classes 2 and 3 require only one leg, and class 1 requires both legs. Further, class 1 requires
the same amount of volume as the other classes but twice the amount of weight. In period 3,
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requests for all classes may arrive. In each period 2 and 1, a request for class 1 arrives with
probability 1. In each period, there may arrive at most one request in total. Further, for the
sake of simplicity, we impose very high oﬄoading cost (take e.g. φ = 5) so that capacity is not
overbooked.
Solving (PAFA) for this example yields α
w∗
1 = −4.5, αw∗2 = 0, αv∗1 = 9, and αv∗2 = 4.5 with
ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ3 = 90. Hence, we know that an upper bound is zAFA = ψ3 = 90.
Using these bid prices, we obtain approximated opportunity cost for class 1 of −4.5 × 20 +
(9 + 4.5)×10 = 45. Since ρ1 = 45, our decision rule accepts a class-1 request. The approximated
opportunity costs for classes 2 and 3 are computed as −4.5× 10 + 9× 10 = 45 and 4.5× 10 = 45.
Since ρ2 = ρ3 = 25, our decision rule rejects requests for both classes.
It is easy to verify that the expected revenue from following this policy is 90 and hence equal to
the upper bound, zAFA. We can conclude that it is optimal. In this example, the optimal policy
cannot be obtained if we restricted the bid prices to non-negative values. To see this, note that
one would need values that satisfy 20(αw1 +α
w
2 ) + 10(α
v
1 +α
v
2) ≤ 45 for class 1, 10αw1 + 10αv1 > 25
for class 2, and 10αw2 + 10α
v
2 > 25 for class 3, which is impossible.
Two things are important to remark here: First, one might argue that static bid prices of
weight and volume capacity can also be obtained by determining the dual variables of (6.4) and
(6.5) from (DLP). By definition, however, those values will be non-negative. In our example,
the dual variables would be λw1 = λ
w
2 = 0, λ
v
1 = 2.5, and λ
v
2 = 2. As argued above, an optimal
policy cannot be obtained with those bid prices. The approximated opportunity cost for class 1
is (2 + 2.5)× 10 = 45 but for classes 2 and 3, approximated opportunity cost is computed as 20
and 25, respectively. Consequently, the low revenue demand from classes 2 and 3 is not rejected.
Second, one might wonder why bid prices are non-negative in passenger revenue management.
In contrast to passenger revenue management, cargo revenue management considers two dimen-
sions and acceptance of multiple units. As a result, the opportunity cost Gt(c) − Gt(c + ei) of
a class i may be lower than the sum of the opportunity costs of two other classes even if these
classes require the same resource and even less total capacity.
Such a situation cannot be observed in classical passenger network revenue management since
all customers require the same amount of capacity on a flight. However, if customer choice
behavior is accounted for, Chaneton & Vulcano (2011) report optimality of negative bid prices
in passenger network revenue management. In this setting, negative bid prices serve to take
advantage of the substitution behavior of customers. That means, if customers choose between
several legs, their demand is moved to the leg that is more profitable for the airline.
Next, we outline how time-independent bid prices are obtained. We apply a column generation
procedure as already outlined in Chapter 4.
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Solution Procedure
Using Theorem 6.4, (PAFA) reduces to
(P˜AFA) min
ψ,αw,αv
ψT
s.t. ψt − ψt−1 +
∑
i′∈I
qt,i′ai′
 ∑
l∈L(i′)
(w¯i′α
w
l + v¯i′α
v
l )− ρi′
 ≥ 0 ∀2 ≤ t ≤ T,a ∈ A
ψ1 −
∑
l∈L
αwl ∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i + α
v
l
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i
−∑
i′∈I
q1,i′
∑
l∈Lρi′ai′ − φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl
+ − φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl
+
≥ 0 ∀c ∈ C1,a ∈ A
αwl , α
v
l ∈ R ∀l ∈ L
ψt ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T.
While (P˜AFA) features only a small number of decision variables (2 × L + T ), the number of
constraints is still very large (especially at t = 1). Thus, an appropriate solution approach is to
solve its dual by column generation (the dual problem, (D˜AFA), is presented in Appendix B).
We consider the pricing subproblem (S) for a given t = T, ..., 2
(S) max
a∈A
ψt−1 − ψt −
∑
i′∈I
qt,i′ai′
 ∑
l∈L(i′)
(w¯i′α
w
l + v¯i′α
v
l )− ρi′

For t = 1, the pricing subproblem is
(S1) max
a∈A,c∈C1
∑
i′∈I
q1,i′ρi′ai′ − ψ1 +
∑
l∈L
αwl ∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i + α
v
l
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i
−∑
i′∈I
q1,i′
∑
l∈Lφwl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl
+
(S1) features a non-linear objective due to the piecewise linear structure of oﬄoading cost.
However, by introducing some auxiliary variables and constraints we obtain a linear objective.
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(S1*) max
a∈A,c∈C1,δw≥0,δv≥0
∑
i′∈I
q1,i′ρi′ai′ − ψ1 +
∑
l∈L
αwl ∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i + α
v
l
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i

−
∑
i′∈I
q1,i′
∑
l∈L
(φwl δ
w
l,i′ + φ
v
l δ
v
l,i′)
s.t. δwl,i′ ≥
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl ∀l ∈ L, i′ ∈ I
δvl,i′ ≥
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl ∀l ∈ L, i′ ∈ I
The column generation procedure is the same as outlined in Section 4.3.
When the time-independent bid prices are used in (6.3), the resulting state- and time-inde-
pendent heuristic decision rule for i ∈ I and t > 1 is
f(i) =

1 ρi ≥
∑
l∈L(i)
[αwl w¯i + α
v
l v¯i]
0 otherwise.
In t = 1, a request is accepted if its revenue is at least as big as the associated increase in
approximated overbooking cost. We refer to the heuristic applying this decision rule as affine
approximation heuristic or AFA hereafter. While this decision rule is easy to implement, the
approximated opportunity cost is time-independent. This implies that a request for a particular
class is either accepted or denied in every decision period, which yields a static acceptance policy.
Furthermore, the policy is inventory-insensitive since the decision rules do not consider current
booking levels.
In the next section, we propose a value function approximation that attempts to overcome the
affine approximation’s shortcoming, which is time- and inventory-insensitive bid prices.
6.3.2 A Piecewise Linear Approximation
A straightforward way to improve the AFA heuristic and its bound zAFA is to allow for a more
general form of the value function approximation. One simple extension that would prevent
excessive overbooking of AFA is to approximate the value of one weight and volume unit differ-
ently depending on the capacity that is booked on a leg. That is, if leg l is not overbooked, we
approximate the value of one weight unit at time t by µwl,t and the value of one unit of volume at
time t by µvl,t. If leg l is overbooked, we approximate the value of one weight unit at time t by µ˜
w
l,t
and the value of one unit of volume at time t by µ˜vl,t. This gives us capacity- and time-dependent
bid prices and corresponds to the following approximation of Gt(c) in (6.2) for all t = T, ..., 1
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and c ∈ Ct:
Gt(c) ≈ψt −
∑
l∈L
µwl,t min
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i, k¯
w
l
+ µvl,t min
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i, k¯
v
l

+µ˜wl,t
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i − k¯wl
+ + µ˜vl,t
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i − k¯vl
+ .
(6.24)
In t = 0, we approximate overbooking cost like we did in the affine-linear case. Approximation
(6.24) is similar to existing piecewise linear approximation schemes, e.g. in Meissner & Strauss
(2012). While these authors divide capacity into equidistant intervals and approximate the value
function in each interval by a different linear function, we use expected capacities as the point
where to switch from one linear function to the other in order to limit computational effort.
Plugging approximation (6.24) into (P˜) yields the linear problem (PPLA).
(PPLA) min
ψ,µw,µv ,µ˜w,µ˜v
ψT
s.t. ψt − ψt−1 −
∑
l∈L
µwl,t min
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i, k¯
w
l
+ µvl,t min
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i, k¯
v
l

−
∑
i′∈I
qt,i′
µwl,t−1 min
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i, k¯wl

+µvl,t−1 min
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i, k¯vl


−
∑
l∈L
µ˜wl,t
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i − k¯wl
+ + µ˜vl,t
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i − k¯vl
+
−
∑
i′∈I
qt,i′
µ˜wl,t−1
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl
+
+µ˜vl,t−1
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl
+−∑
i′∈I
qt,i′ai′ρi′
≥ 0 ∀c ∈ Ct, 1 < t ≤ T,a ∈ A
ψ1 −
∑
l∈L
µwl,1 min
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i, k¯
w
l
+ µvl,1 min
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i, k¯
v
l

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+µ˜wl,1
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i − k¯wl
+ + µ˜vl,1
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i − k¯vl
+
+
∑
i′∈I
q1,i′
∑
l∈L
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl
+
+φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl
+−∑
i′∈I
q1,i′ai′ρi′
≥ 0 ∀c ∈ C1,a ∈ A
ψt, µ
w
l,t, µ
v
l,t, µ˜
w
l,t, µ˜
v
l,t ∈ R ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T, l ∈ L.
The resulting price-directed heuristic accepts a request for class i′ ∈ I at time t > 1 if
ρi′ ≥
∑
l∈L(i′)
µwl,t−1
min
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + 1{i=i′})w¯i, k¯wl
−min
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i, k¯
w
l


+ µvl,t−1
min
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + 1{i=i′})v¯i, k¯vl
−min
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i, k¯
v
l


+ µ˜wl,t−1
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + 1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl
+ −
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i − k¯wl
+
+ µ˜vl,t−1
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + 1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl
+ −
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i − k¯vl
+ .
In t = 1, a request is accepted if its revenue is at least as big as the associated increase in
approximated overbooking cost (like in the affine-linear case). The heuristic that applies these
decision rules is referred to as PLA hereafter. Using this piecewise linear approximation, the
approximation parameters do, in general, vary in time. Hence, the above decision rule is time-
sensitive. The approximation parameters can be determined by solving the dual of (PPLA),
(DPLA) (presented in Appendix B), via column generation. However, many auxiliary variables
and constraints are necessary to transform the non-linear subproblem into a linear one. This
increases computational effort tremendously and only makes this problem solvable for relatively
small problem instances. (Note that in contrast to passenger revenue management, the terminal
condition increases computational effort even further.)
An important property of (PPLA) is that its optimal objective value, zPLA, provides a bound
that is at least as tight as zAFA.
Theorem 6.5. GT (0) ≤ zPLA ≤ zAFA ≤ zDLP .
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Proof. Since (PPLA) provides a feasible solution to (P˜), we have zPLA ≥ GT (0). Thus, this
approximate LP determines the lowest upper bound of the form (6.24) on the maximum expected
revenue.
In order to prove the second inequality, we show that (PAFA) is a special case of (PPLA). This
is simply achieved by setting µwl,t = µ˜
w
l,t = α
w
l,t and µ
v
l,t = µ˜
v
l,t = α
v
l,t for all l ∈ L and 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Then, (PPLA) reduces to (PAFA). Accordingly, any feasible solution of (PAFA) gives a feasible
solution to (PPLA). Thus, an optimal solution to (PPLA) has an objective value which is not
greater than zAFA.
In the next section, we propose a further heuristic that is time- and inventory-sensitive like
PLA. The difference is that this heuristic utilizes the time-independent bid prices from the affine-
linear approximation.
6.4 Dynamic Programming Decomposition
A different approach of value function approximation, which is popular in passenger revenue
management, is to use bid prices in a dynamic programming decomposition (cf. Talluri & van
Ryzin, 2004, Section 3.4). We outline how this approach can be adapted to our cargo setting
below.
The underlying idea of the dynamic programming decomposition heuristic is to decompose
the network MDP into weight and volume subproblems for each leg. The combination of the
one-dimensional value functions is then used to approximate the network value function for all
t = T, ..., 1 and c ∈ Ct as
Gt(c) ≈
∑
l∈L
[
Gwt,l(wl(c)) +G
v
t,l(vl(c))
]
,
where wl(c) :=
∑
i∈I(l) ciw˜i converts the vector of accepted requests into expected weight on leg
l, and vl(c) :=
∑
i∈I(l) civ˜i does the same for volume. In order to preserve integrality of the state
space, we define w˜i := bw¯ic and v˜i := bv¯ic for all i ∈ I.
Denote the revenue from accepting a class-i shipment on leg l by ρwl,i in the weight subproblem
and by ρvl,i in the volume subproblem. Now, consider the single-resource MDP for weight on leg
l. In this subproblem, the maximum expected revenue, which can be obtained after w weight
units have been accepted and t time periods remain until departure, is given by
Gwt,l(w) =
∑
i∈I
qt,i max
a∈Al(i)
{
ρwl,ia+G
w
t−1,l(w + aw˜i)
}
with Gw0,l(w) := −φwl E
[
(w −Kwl )+
]
, and with Al(i) := {0, 1} for i ∈ I and l ∈ L(i).
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The volume problems are formulated likewise to obtain the maximum expected revenue that
can be obtained after v volume units have been accepted on leg l at time t, Gvl,t(v), for all legs l
and decision periods t.
Using this approximation in (6.3) gives the following heuristic decision rule depending on
t = T, ..., 1, c ∈ Ct, and i ∈ I:
ft(c, i) =

1 ρi ≥
∑
l∈L(i)
[
Gwt−1,l(wl(c)) +G
v
t−1,l(vl(c))
−Gwt−1,l(wl(c) + w˜i)−Gvt−1,l(vl(c) + v˜i)
]
0 otherwise.
(6.25)
Depending on how the revenues of the subproblems, ρwl,i and ρ
v
l,i are chosen, different dynamic
programming decomposition heuristics can be analyzed. Furthermore, the following theorem
shows that as long as the class-i revenues are split across dimensions so that the revenues of all
subproblems sum up to their true value ρi for all i ∈ I,
∑
l∈L[G
w
t,l(wl(c)) +G
v
t,l(vl(c))] yields an
upper bound on the maximum expected revenue.
Theorem 6.6. Let ρwl,i and ρ
v
l,i denote the class-i revenue in a leg-l weight and volume subproblem,
respectively. If ∑
l∈L(i)
[
ρwl,i + ρ
v
l,i
]
= ρi ∀i ∈ I,
the sum of the maximum expected revenues of the subproblems provides an upper bound on the
maximum expected revenue determined in (6.2), i.e.∑
l∈L
[
Gwt,l(wl(c)) +G
v
t,l(vl(c))
] ≥ Gt(c) ∀t = T, ..., 0, c ∈ Ct.
Proof. This proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 1 in Amaruchkul et
al. (2007). The proof follows by induction on t. In t = 0, it follows from Jensen’s inequality that
G0(c) = −
∑
l∈L
EW ,V ,Kw,Kv
φwl
∑
i∈I(l)
Wici −Kwl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
Vici −Kvl
+
≤ −
∑
l∈L
φwl E
∑
i∈I(l)
w¯ici −Kwl
++ φvl E
∑
i∈I(l)
v¯ici −Kvl
+
≤ −
∑
l∈L
[
φwl E
[
(wl(c)−Kwl )+
]
+ φvl E
[
(vl(c)−Kvl )+
]]
=
∑
l∈L
[
Gw0,l(wl(c)) +G
v
0,l(vl(c))
]
.
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Now assume that the assertion holds for 0, ..., t. For period t+ 1, we have
Gt+1(c)
=
∑
i∈I
qt+1,i max
a∈A(i)
{aρi +Gt(c+ aei)}
≤
∑
i∈I
qt+1,i max
a∈A(i)
a ∑
l∈L(i)
[
ρwl,i + ρ
v
l,i
]
+
∑
l∈L(i)
[
Gwt,l(wl(c) + aw˜i) +G
v
t,l(vl(c) + av˜i)
]
+
∑
l /∈L(i)
[
Gwt,l(wl(c)) +G
v
t,l(vl(c))
]
≤
∑
i∈I
qt+1,i
 ∑
l∈L(i)
[
max
a∈A(i)
{
aρwl,i +G
w
t,l(wl(c) + aw˜i)
}
+ max
a∈A(i)
{
aρvl,i +G
v
t,l(vl(c) + av˜i)
}]
+
∑
l /∈L(i)
[
Gwt,l(wl(c)) +G
v
t,l(vl(c))
]
=
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈I
qt+1,i
[
max
a∈Al(i)
{
aρwl,i +G
w
t,l(wl(c) + aw˜i)
}
+ max
a∈Al(i)
{
aρvl,i +G
v
t,l(vl(c) + av˜i)
}]
=
∑
l∈L
[
Gwt+1,l(wl(c)) +G
v
t+1,l(vl(c))
]
.
The first inequality follows from the induction assumption, and the second inequality follows
from the fact that a maximum is a subadditive function. The equality in the second last line
holds since the definition of Al(i) allows us to sum over all legs rather than making a difference
between legs that are requested and legs that are not requested.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to establish a connection between these bounds and zAFA in
general. Their performance highly depends on the revenues assigned to the subproblems. Below
we propose a decomposition heuristic that does this assignment by means of the bid prices for
weight and volume on each leg.
Bid-Price Based Heuristic
Amaruchkul et al. (2007) examine three possibilities, how revenue can be distributed over the
weight and volume dimension in a single-leg problem. Two of their heuristics put all the revenue
on one dimension, another and best heuristic achieves a trade-off by splitting it as ρwi = ϕiE[Wi]
and ρvi = ρi − ϕiE[Wi]. (We dropped the index l since they consider a single-leg problem.)
While the authors argue that the latter heuristic is intuitive, it is unclear why such a splitting
would perform well in scenarios where one capacity dimension is tighter than the other. Further,
it is unclear how their ideas should be extended to a network setting.
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This is why we suggest to assign the revenue across dimensions in a way that is proportional
to their bid prices and capacity requirements. For the weight (volume) subproblem of leg l ∈ L,
a request for a class i ∈ I in time period t = T, ..., 1 is viewed as a request to ship a weight of
w˜i (volume of v˜i) if l ∈ L(i). If
∑
l′∈L(i)[α
w
l′ w¯i + α
v
l′ v¯i] > 0 for i ∈ {1, ...,m}, the revenue from
shipping w˜i weight units on leg l is given by
ρwl,i = ρi ×
αwl w¯i∑
l′∈L(i)
[
αwl′ w¯i + α
v
l′ v¯i
] (6.26)
and the revenue from shipping v˜i volume units on leg l is given by
ρvl,i = ρi ×
αvl v¯i∑
l′∈L(i)
[
αwl′ w¯i + α
v
l′ v¯i
] . (6.27)
If the opportunity cost of a class was 0, we take ρiw¯i/
∑
l′∈L(i)(w¯i+ v¯i) and ρiv¯i/
∑
l′∈L(i)(w¯i+ v¯i),
respectively. For i = 0, we define ρwl,i = ρ
v
l,i = 0. Note that we use w¯i and v¯i rather than w˜i
and v˜i when determining revenues since integrality of weight and volume is not necessary at this
point.
The intuition is that if capacity on a leg in one dimension is ample, its bid price will be 0 and
no revenue is ”needed” on this leg. More revenue should be allocated to legs and dimensions
with positive bid prices, where capacity is tight. We refer to the heuristic that applies decision
rule (6.25) with the above outlined revenues per subproblem as DPD (dynamic programming
decomposition) hereafter.
Remember that in the network setting, the bid prices for weight or volume may be negative
on some legs. While this might be desirable in an AFA control policy, as shown in Section 6.3.1,
negative single-leg revenues tend to significantly loosen the upper bound given in Theorem 6.6.
Hence, using (6.26) and (6.27) might not give a very tight upper bound.
This can be explained as follows: For a given class i, let Lw−(i) and Lv−(i) be the set of legs
with negative revenues ρwl,i and ρ
v
l,i, respectively. Now consider a class i 6= 0 for which there is a
leg l ∈ L with ρwl,i < 0 and/or ρvl,i < 0. If we enforce
∑
l∈L(i)[ρ
w
l,i + ρ
v
l,i] = ρi, this implies that the
sum of the bid-prices over the other legs,
∑
l∈L(i)\Lw−(i) ρ
w
l,i +
∑
l∈L(i)\Lv−(i) ρ
v
l,i will exceed the
true revenue ρi. On all weight subproblems with l ∈ Lw−(i) and all volume subproblems with
l ∈ Lv−(i), a class-i request will always be rejected, and a revenue of 0 will be gained from this.
If a class-i request is accepted on the other subproblems, the total revenue it brings will by far
exceed its actual revenue ρi.
Note that this phenomenon cannot happen if we enforce ρwl,i, ρ
v
l,i ≥ 0 for all classes i and all
legs l ∈ L(i). As a consequence, we expect a bound based on revenues as given in (6.26) and
(6.27) not to be tight in the presence of negative bid prices. We therefore suggest to scale bid
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prices to achieve non-negativity when this approach is used to obtain an upper bound and refer
to this upper bound as zDPD.
The following section assesses the quality of our proposed bounds and the performance of the
heuristics by means of numerical experiments.
6.5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, our first intention is to demonstrate the quality of the upper bounds, zDLP ,
zRLP , zPLP , zAFA, zPLA, and zDPD, which we proposed earlier. Further, we assess how well the
suggested heuristics, AFA and DPD, perform. Their performance will be compared to several
other heuristics:
• FCFS: A first-come-first-served policy;
• DLP: A price-directed heuristic with the same decision rule as AFA but with parameters
equal to the dual variables of (DLP), as suggested in Pak & Dekker (2004);
• DPD′: A decomposition heuristic with revenues split in proportion to the bid prices given
by the dual variables of (DLP); this heuristic generates a bound zDPD′ ;
• ACG: A decomposition heuristic for single-leg problems suggested in Amaruchkul et al.
(2007), which splits revenue as ρwi = ϕiE[Wi] and ρvi = ρi −ϕiE[Wi] and does not consider
uncertainty in capacity (cf. Section 4.3 where we called this heuristic HD). It determines
an upper bound zACG (Amaruchkul, Cooper, and Gupta).
Other linear programs, such as (PLP) could, of course, also be used to determine bid-prices in
the price-directed or decomposition heuristics we suggested. In our numerical studies, however,
we found that the differences between different methods to obtain bid prices seem to be small. A
comparison of the heuristics’ achieved revenue to the lowest upper bound will give us information
on the optimality gaps of the heuristics.
We first discuss a single-leg example and provide numerical results for a large-scale network
problem afterwards. All experiments were conducted on an Intel Core2 Quad CPU at 2.83 GHz
and 8 GB RAM. We used Gurobi 5.0 (Gurobi Optimization, 2012) for solving the LPs.
Single-Leg Experiments
To test our heuristics on a single-leg model, we consider an example with 24 shipment categories
as shown in Table 6.2 (taken from Amaruchkul et al., 2007). Shipments of category b = 1, ..., 24
require an uncertain weight Wb and volume Vb at the time of departure. We assume that Wb
and Vb follow a joint normal distribution with E [Wb] = w¯b, E [Vb] = v¯b, coefficient of variation
of CVd = 0.25 for both weight and volume, and coefficient of correlation of 0.8. Each category
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Category b 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Mean weight w¯b (kg) 50 50 50 50 100 100 100 100 200 200 200 250 250 300 400 500 1000 1500 2500 3500 70 70 210 210
Mean volume v¯b 30 29 27 25 59 58 55 52 125 119 100 147 138 179 235 277 598 898 1488 2083 233 17 700 52
(×104 cm3)
Table 6.2: Mean weight and volume of shipment categories
can be requested with a revenue per chargeable weight ϕ ∈ {0.7, 1.0, 1.4}. Viewing a class as a
combination of category and revenue per chargeable weight, 3 × 24 = 72 different classes may
be requested. The expected revenue associated with a request for a category b and revenue per
chargeable weight ϕ is ϕEWb,Vb [Wb, Vb/ϑ] with ϑ = 0.6.
We consider a booking horizon of T = 60 decision periods. In each time period t, either a
shipment with revenue per chargeable weight ϕ or no shipment is requested. The probabilities
for incoming requests with revenue per chargeable weight ϕ are given in Table 6.3. Given a
shipment request, there is a probability of 0.072 for the event that the shipment belongs to
category b = 1, ..., 10. It is 0.04 for categories b = 11, ..., 16; 0.009 for categories b = 17, ..., 20;
and 0.001 for categories b = 21, ..., 24. We assume that the category is independent of the
requested revenue per chargeable weight. As a consequence, the request probability for class
i = (b, ϕ) in time period t, qt,i, equals the probability of observing a revenue per chargeable
weight ϕ in time period t multiplied by the probability of observing a category b request in this
time period. For instance, the probability for an arrival of a class with ϕ = 1.4 and b = 15 at
t = 10 is 0.7× 0.04 = 0.028.
Revenue Periods 1..20 Periods 21..40 Periods 41..60
0.7 0 0.4 0.7
1.0 0.2 0.2 0.2
1.4 0.7 0.4 0
no request 0.1 0 0.1
Table 6.3: Request probabilities for different revenues per chargeable weight
The weight and volume capacities of the freighter, Kw and Kv, are random variables that
follow a joint normal distribution with means k¯w and k¯v, coefficient of variation of CVk = 0.25
for both weight and volume capacity and a coefficient of correlation of 0.8. (We drop the leg
index in this single-leg model to simplify notation.)
The expected total demand in weight and volume is calculated as
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈I qt,iw¯i =: d¯
w and∑T
t=1
∑
i∈I qt,iv¯i =: d¯
v. Using our example data, the expected demand is d¯w = 10740 weight
units and d¯v = 7355 volume units. In the experiments, we vary mean capacities k¯w and k¯v in
order to create scenarios with a shortage of weight and/or volume capacity. The four scenarios
we consider are, (k¯w/d¯w, k¯v/d¯v) ∈ {(1.0, 1.0), (0.5, 0.5), (1.0, 0.5), (0.5, 1.0)}.
Per unit overbooking cost for both weight and volume units is assumed to be 1.2 times the
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expected revenue per unit of available capacity. Accordingly, total weight and volume oﬄoading
cost is φw = 1.2×∑Tt=1∑i∈I qt,iρi/k¯w and φv = 1.2×∑Tt=1∑i∈I qt,iρi/k¯v, respectively.
Upper Bound Quality
We solved DLP to obtain zDLP and used 20,000 samples to estimate zPLP and zRLP . To obtain
zAFA, we solved (P˜AFA) by means of column generation with an optimality tolerance of 1%.
Run times were less than 10 minutes for all problem instances. We solved for zPLA by means
of column generation with the same optimality tolerance. Run times were significantly longer
(between 2-3 hours) for the piecewise linear approximation.
The bid prices obtained by the affine approximation were used to compute the value functions
of each subproblem of DPD, which gave us zDPD. Using different weights, as outlined above, we
further determined zDPD′ and zACG. Table 6.4 displays the computed upper bounds (tightest
bound in bold).
(k¯w/d¯w, k¯v/d¯v) zRLP zPLP zDLP zAFA zPLA zDPD′ zDPD zACG
(1.0,1.0) 11514.32 11972.94 12407.50 12296.80 11904.70 10277.99 10280.15 11214.86
(0.5,0.5) 7299.53 7431.58 7752.52 7687.26 7315.03 5698.50 5700.79 6931.63
(1.0,0.5) 8398.32 8427.68 8722.19 8651.99 8284.90 6612.95 6611.50 11030.13
(0.5,1.0) 7435.12 7437.52 7752.52 7687.70 7314.56 5707.35 5704.46 7116.37
Table 6.4: Upper bounds for the single-leg problem
As shown earlier, we have zPLA ≤ zAFA ≤ zDLP and zPLP ≤ zDLP . In these examples,
zRLP is smaller than zPLP although this need not be true in general. Furthermore, zRLP is
tighter than zPLA in case of unrestricted as well as both weight and volume restricted flights.
The tightest upper bounds, however, are zDPD and zDPD′ which are almost equal and both
significantly lower than zPLA. Both bounds are also tighter than zACG for all tested scenarios.
Further, note that the quality of zACG varies significantly depending on whether weight or volume
is the tighter dimension. This disadvantage of zACG is caused by the priority on weight when
assigning revenues to the subproblems. In case of volume restricted flights, these revenues are
miscalculated since the shortness of volume is not appropriately accounted for. Prioritizing the
capacity dimension that is expected to be the bottleneck is reasonable; however, whether a flight
will be weight or volume restricted can hardly be determined several weeks in advance.
Heuristic Performance
In order to assess the performance of our heuristics, we repeatedly simulated the arrival process.
In each simulation run, we tracked the number of accepted requests of each class for each heuristic
and subtracted oﬄoading cost from total revenue at the end of the booking horizon. In order to
obtain reliable results, we simulated 20,000 booking processes.
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Since the decision rules of FCFS, AFA, and DLP are capacity-independent, we prevent ex-
cessive overbooking by stopping acceptance when the expected capacity is reached. Table 6.5
reports the simulated average net revenues (best performance in bold), which is total revenue
minus oﬄoading cost.
(k¯w/d¯w, k¯v/d¯v) FCFS DLP AFA PLA DPD′ DPD ACG
(1.0,1.0) 8454.13 8882.10 8972.24 8810.37 9433.74 9432.92 9240.15
(0.5,0.5) 2264.57 4895.96 4676.93 4800.95 5144.33 5146.07 4644.28
(1.0,0.5) 3916.01 6216.62 6115.17 6158.16 6343.28 6343.49 4297.30
(0.5,1.0) 3114.46 5432.21 5457.68 5489.67 5607.55 5608.73 5411.23
Table 6.5: Simulated average net revenue in the single-leg problem
DPD and DPD′ feature almost equal revenues, and they outperform all other heuristics for all
capacity-demand ratios. Possible explanations for the fact that both heuristics outperform ACG
are, first, an improved assignment of revenues to subproblems, and second, the consideration
of uncertain capacity. The performance of DPD and DPD′ is also better than the performance
of the price-directed heuristic PLA even though the latter also features a time- and inventory-
sensitive decision rule. In all scenarios, both DPD and DPD′ perform exceptionally well, with
solution gaps between 1.7% and 9.7%.
AFA and DLP would excessively overbook if no external stopping rule was provided. The
artificial booking stop we imposed is the reason why AFA outperforms PLA for (k¯w/d¯w, k¯v/d¯v) =
(1.0, 1.0); it would be worse without. Both bid-price heuristics perform approximately equally
well in the single-leg case since both are based on non-negative static bid prices. Besides our
artificial booking stop, another possible source of inaccuracy is the use of approximated bid prices
in AFA which are obtained through column generation allowing for an optimality tolerance. Our
numerical experiments showed that a small change in bid prices may affect the acceptance policy
of AFA significantly. Note that FCFS performs relatively bad in the above scenarios since low-
value requests tend to arrive before high-value requests in the booking process. That means,
if expected demand is greater than expected capacity, FCFS yields acceptance of unprofitable
requests and does not leave sufficient capacity for accepting more profitable requests.
Network Experiments
To extend our example to a network setting, we consider a hub-and-spoke network comprising
one hub and four spokes as shown in Figure 6.2. We again consider a booking horizon of 60
decision periods. Demand is given by the same 72 classes, with the same expected weight
and volume, same revenues, and same arrival probabilities per time period, as in the single-leg
example. In contrast to the single-leg setting, the network setting requires to additionally specify
the requested legs for each class. We therefore randomly assigned an origin-destination pair to
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each class. The detailed assignment can be found in Appendix C. Again, weight and volume for
a given class follow a joint normal distribution with a correlation of 0.8. To study the impact
of increased variation in weight and volume, we consider both a ”high demand variation” and
a ”low demand variation” scenario. The low demand variation scenario is characterized by a
coefficient of variation equal to CVd = 0.1 for all classes, and it is CVd = 0.4 in the high demand
variation scenario.
Similarly, the weight and volume capacity of a freighter on leg l follows a joint normal distribu-
tion with means k¯wl and k¯
v
l and a coefficient of correlation of 0.8. To vary the degree of capacity
uncertainty, we consider a ”high capacity variation” scenario with a coefficient of variation of
CVk = 0.4 for weight and volume on each leg and a ”low capacity variation” scenario, where this
coefficient of variation is CVk = 0.1.
H 
A 
B 
C 
D 
Figure 6.2: Hub-and-spoke network
Total expected demand on a particular leg in weight, d¯wl , is between 1922 and 3566, and
total expected demand on a particular leg in volume, d¯vl , is between 1112 and 2063. We vary
mean capacities in order to test scenarios with flights that are not restricted, both volume and
weight restricted, only volume restricted, and only weight restricted. More specifically, we use
(k¯wl /d¯
w
l , k¯
v
l /d¯
v
l ) ∈ {(1.0, 1.0), (0.5, 0.5), (1.0, 0.5), (0.5, 1.0)} for all l ∈ L. To limit the number
of scenarios, we only consider extreme cases and use the same capacity-demand ratio on each
leg. Thus, a capacity-demand ratio of 0.5 means that on every leg demand is twice as high as
capacity. Oﬄoading cost is calculated per leg in the same way as in the single-leg experiments.
Upper Bound Quality
Solving for the bid prices as dual variables of (P˜AFA) via column generation with an optimality
tolerance of 1%, each problem instance was solved in less than 30 minutes. (The increased
solution time is a result of the more expensive calculations to determine terminal cost in the
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network setting.) Restricting the solution time to 48 hours, we were not able to solve for zPLA in
this setting. We therefore do not report PLA results in this section. Table 6.6 gives an overview
of the upper bounds zDLP , zRLP , zPLP , zAFA, zDPD′ , and zDPD. We do not report zACG since
the approach of Amaruchkul et al. (2007) covers only single-leg problems. The tightest upper
bound in each scenario is highlighted in bold font.
CVd CVk (k¯
w
l /d¯
w
l , k¯
v
l /d¯
v
l ) zRLP zPLP zDLP zAFA zDPD′ zDPD
0.1 0.1 (1.0,1.0) 10270.04 10442.16 13369.70 13096.40 10420.36 9216.71
(0.5,0.5) 6934.23 7072.59 8594.52 8457.70 5890.76 5808.90
(1.0,0.5) 7132.73 7161.55 8648.54 8568.05 6013.23 6098.43
(0.5,1.0) 7105.64 7149.68 8623.46 8507.07 5967.83 6083.72
0.4 (1.0,1.0) 8813.01 10442.07 13369.70 13046.70 9439.57 7026.91
(0.5,0.5) 5924.81 7069.30 8594.52 8457.62 3929.17 3435.29
(1.0,0.5) 6423.34 7166.02 8648.54 8568.04 4243.35 4049.13
(0.5,1.0) 6408.16 7145.72 8623.46 8507.07 4192.30 4006.96
0.4 0.1 (1.0,1.0) 10652.70 11020.21 14152.80 13854.60 10852.01 9709.01
(0.5,0.5) 7162.12 7470.33 9099.83 8973.35 6202.05 6113.66
(1.0,0.5) 7613.72 7562.35 9150.54 9063.65 6331.07 6435.48
(0.5,1.0) 7580.56 7565.32 9131.74 9008.53 6297.65 6545.49
0.4 (1.0,1.0) 9229.54 11011.19 14152.80 13854.60 9698.76 7444.93
(0.5,0.5) 6219.37 7475.03 9099.83 8973.35 4084.81 3739.76
(1.0,0.5) 6860.47 7564.92 9150.54 9063.65 4460.41 4251.57
(0.5,1.0) 6823.11 7558.53 9131.74 9008.53 4428.79 4221.83
Table 6.6: Upper bounds for the network scenarios
Again we have zAFA ≤ zDLP and zPLP ≤ zDLP as proven earlier. Further, the upper bound
based on the randomized linear program, zRLP , is tighter than zAFA for all scenarios and even
tighter than zDPD′ if capacity is ample. Note that this cannot be guaranteed in general since it
need not even be tighter than zDLP . A further observation is that for low demand variability,
we have zRLP ≤ zPLP . For high demand variability, this is not always the case.
Across all scenarios, the tightest upper bound is given by either zDPD or zDPD′ , where zDPD is
tightest in the majority of scenarios considered. Observe that all upper bounds tend to decrease
if capacity uncertainty increases. The reason for this observation is that overbooked situations
occur more often if capacity uncertainty is high, which decreases total revenue. Observe further
that the upper bounds increase as uncertainty in capacity requirement increases. The reason
for this phenomenon is that the expected revenue of each request increases as the uncertainty
in capacity requirement increases. This relationship is caused by the revenue depending on the
maximum of weight and dimensional weight requirement. As weight and volume requirement are
not perfectly correlated in our example, a higher variation yields a higher maximum of weight
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and dimensional weight causing higher revenues.
Heuristic Policy Performance
To determine the revenue performance of the heuristics, we repeatedly simulated request arrivals
and tracked the number of accepted requests of each class for each heuristic. At the end of the
booking horizon, we generated the random capacities for weight and volume of all flights and
subtracted oﬄoading cost.
In order to obtain reliable results, we ran again 20,000 simulations. Table 6.7 summarizes the
average simulated net revenue for all tested heuristics (best performance in bold). Further, we
report the solution gap, (1 − max(DPD,DPD′)min(zDPD,zDPD′ )), for all scenarios. As we expected, the time- and
CVd CVk (k¯
w
l /d¯
w
l , k¯
v
l /d¯
v
l ) FCFS DLP AFA DPD
′ DPD Gap (in %)
0.1 0.1 (1.0,1.0) 8384.69 8392.73 8537.10 8688.48 8728.49 5.30
(0.5,0.5) 4378.65 4746.81 4855.73 5309.28 5329.22 8.26
(1.0,0.5) 4848.72 4773.65 4737.89 5654.19 5644.61 5.97
(0.5,1.0) 4782.51 4999.00 5014.52 5620.25 5621.97 5.80
0.4 (1.0,1.0) 5416.76 5413.94 5636.22 6254.07 6364.06 9.43
(0.5,0.5) -269.09 1780.78 1861.69 2936.11 2945.38 14.26
(1.0,0.5) 2092.29 3200.44 3158.94 3709.77 3720.58 8.11
(0.5,1.0) 2044.54 3315.53 3308.29 3723.08 3736.55 6.75
0.4 0.1 (1.0,1.0) 8262.05 8203.87 8227.76 8580.46 8610.03 11.32
(0.5,0.5) 3169.96 3972.44 3965.41 4628.77 4685.06 23.37
(1.0,0.5) 4414.66 4669.19 4675.46 5393.97 5356.15 14.80
(0.5,1.0) 4313.90 4520.81 4450.87 5319.98 5269.81 15.52
0.4 (1.0,1.0) 5402.38 5517.91 5512.03 6406.37 6482.04 12.93
(0.5,0.5) -1024.56 1936.22 1595.60 2911.58 2914.57 22.07
(1.0,0.5) 1838.03 3237.42 3140.36 3707.96 3720.39 12.49
(0.5,1.0) 1760.32 3172.07 3155.03 3700.83 3711.32 12.09
Table 6.7: Simulated average net revenue in the network scenarios
inventory-insensitive heuristics AFA, DLP, and FCFS do not achieve a competitive performance.
Observe that AFA tends to outperform DLP for low variation scenarios with CVk = CVd = 0.1.
However, as uncertainty increases, DLP tends to outperform AFA. We conjecture that AFA’s
decision rule is more selective than DLP’s decision rule since it uses negative bid prices (as shown
in Example 6.3). This may be an advantage as long as capacity and capacity requirement are not
very volatile since the bid prices are computed based on expected values. However, as uncertainty
increases, this advantage may vanish.
The heuristics based on decomposition outperform all other heuristics, where DPD achieves
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the highest revenue in most tested scenarios. The solution gap of the best heuristic varies between
5% and 23% across scenarios. Observe that the solution gap is higher for scenarios with high
uncertainty in capacity requirement. Uncertainty in capacity has a smaller effect on the policy
performance and likewise on the solution gap. The reasons why the decomposition heuristics can
handle a high CVk better than a high CVd is that they take into account random capacity in
terminal cost. Random capacity requirement is not accounted for since the state space of both
decomposition heuristics represents the expected rather than random booked capacity. Naturally,
the heuristics perform worse in scenarios with highly variable capacity requirements.
In summary, the decomposition heuristics outperform all other tested heuristics, both on single-
leg and on network problem instances. Further, our experiments reveal that a heuristic using
the time- and inventory-sensitive decision rule of the piecewise linear approximation does not
perform as good as the decomposition heuristics. This highlights the quality of the decomposition
heuristics in combination with static bid prices. All other price-directed heuristics using static bid
prices do not achieve a competitive performance. Further, all proposed linear programs as well
as the affine and the piecewise linear approximation provide an upper bound on the maximum
expected total revenue. However, the sum of the maximum expected revenues of all subproblems
of the decomposition heuristics give the tightest upper bound for most tested instances.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
We have pointed out that, in the airline industry today, profitability issues are omnipresent.
Hence, airlines are struggling to detect sources of cost cutting and revenue improvement. Since
aircraft are capacity-constrained, a potential way to increase revenues is the application of revenue
management techniques. Even though cargo traffic is predicted to increase tremendously, very
little attention has been paid on applying revenue management methods in the air cargo industry.
In the field of cargo capacity control, even less effort has been put on doing research. Thus, we
carried out studies on different kinds of capacity control problems prevailing in air cargo revenue
management. In this chapter, we conclude our work by summarizing the results and insights of
our research. Further, we propose possible extensions of our ideas and suggest future research
directions.
7.1 Research Findings and Insights
After having given an overview of air cargo revenue management, related literature, and the
necessary theoretical concepts, we studied a single-leg capacity control model in Chapter 4. We
showed that the basic decision problem, modeled as a Markov decision process, does not fea-
ture a monotone optimal control policy, owing to the fact that cargo requires multiple capacity
units. Thus, we proposed two further decision models which allow for partially accepting re-
quests. This generalization of the decision model yields an optimal control limit policy, which is
comprehensible for revenue managers.
In case requests are not allowed to be partially accepted, we proposed several heuristics that
provide feasible solutions to the basic capacity control model, which suffers from the curse of
dimensionality for large problems. One of the heuristics is based on decomposition and features
a monotone switching curve policy. Another heuristic approximates the value function by means
of piecewise linear functions and thereby obtains bid prices for weight and volume. Further,
137
7 Conclusions
the maximum objective value of the linear program, which is used to determine the bid prices,
provides an upper bound on the maximum expected revenue of the single-leg capacity control
problem. In numerical experiments, the heuristic based on the piecewise linear approximation
demonstrated the best overall performance. Further, for all tested scenarios, the upper bound
given by the underlying linear program was quite close to the maximum expected revenue. If
shipments with a non-standard capacity requirement were considered, the decomposition heuris-
tic outperformed existing heuristic approaches. However, its performance is very sensitive to the
availability of a particular capacity dimension. If it is not known in advance whether weight or
volume will be short, the decomposition heuristic is not appropriate.
In Chapter 5, we examined the problem of integrated capacity control of passenger seats and
cargo space. In particular, we formulated the single-leg decision problem as a finite-horizon
Markov decision process and analyzed the structure of its optimal decisions. Due to the same
reasons given in the case of cargo capacity control, the optimal decisions do not follow any
monotone structure. Hence, we suggested a further decision model that considers cargo capacity
as one-dimensional and allows for partially accepting cargo requests. This model features an
optimal switching curve policy, which is very intuitive and easy to implement.
The basic model, which considers two cargo dimensions and does not allow partial acceptance,
suffers from the curse of dimensionality when applied to large problems. In order to provide
feasible solutions, we proposed two different heuristics and one upper bound on the maximum
expected revenue. One heuristic decomposes the MDP’s state space into weight, volume, and seat
subproblems. The resulting heuristic policy is a structured policy with acceptance thresholds
that depend on two capacity dimensions. The other heuristic determines bid prices based on
a deterministic linear program as it is used in passenger network revenue management. The
maximum objective value of the linear program provides an upper bound on the maximum
expected revenue. In numerical experiments, the decomposition heuristic performed very well
for all tested scenarios. However, the performance of the heuristic depends on the availability of a
particular capacity dimension as in the pure cargo case. The bid price heuristic and the associated
upper bound demonstrated a good performance if a flight is not heavily capacity-constrained.
We also carried out a study for a network formulation of the cargo capacity control problem.
In our model, overbooking is allowed, and the resulting Markov decision process accounts for
uncertainty in both demand and capacity. We suggested several upper bound problems based on
linear and approximate dynamic programming. When approximating the value function by an
affine function, we showed that the approximation parameters, which we interpret as bid prices
for weight and volume on a leg, are approximately constant in time. A surprising insight is that
bid prices, obtained by this affine approximation, might be negative. We showed that negative
bid prices may result in better control policies than bid prices obtained through a deterministic
linear problem, which was suggested in previous work on cargo revenue management. As the
affine approximation’s decision rule is time- and inventory-insensitive, we proposed decomposition
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heuristics which use static bid prices and offer a time- and inventory-dependent acceptance policy.
Our numerical results show that these heuristics outperformed all other tested heuristics, both
on single-leg and on network problem instances. Further, these heuristics have the potential to
provide very tight bounds, especially in scenarios with low variation in required capacities of
accepted shipments. We also proposed a piecewise linear value function approximation which
explicitly accounts for the state of overbooking on each leg. However, the bid prices of this
heuristic are very difficult to obtain. Furthermore, our experiments revealed that a heuristic using
the time- and inventory-sensitive decision rule of the piecewise linear approximation does not
perform as good as the decomposition heuristics. This highlights the quality of the decomposition
heuristic when combined with static bid prices.
Further, both the linear programs as well as the affine and the piecewise linear approximation
provide an upper bound on the maximum expected revenue. We proved that the partially ran-
domized linear program generates a tighter upper bound than the deterministic linear program.
We also proved that the bound given by the deterministic linear program is looser than the bound
based on the affine approximation. The upper bound from the piecewise linear approximation
is even tighter than the bound obtained by an affine approximation at the expense of increased
computational complexity. Our numerical study showed, however, that the sum of the optimal
expected revenues of all subproblems of the decomposition heuristic provides the tightest upper
bound for almost all tested instances. However, the quality of this bound highly depends on the
way revenues of classes are allocated to legs and cannot be shown to outperform other approaches
in general.
7.2 Future Research Directions
Research on air cargo revenue management is still at an early stage. Therefore, there is a large
number of potential future research directions. Below, we name several of them, according to
the capacity control problems we analyzed.
Single-Leg Cargo Capacity Control
In order to obtain optimal structured control policies in our model, we had to assume partial
acceptance is allowed. If this assumption is dropped, a promising path of future research would
be to study whether certain conditions regarding the arrival process of cargo bookings can be
found that ensure the existence of an optimal switching curve policy. If these conditions are met
in reality, airlines would be more in favor of implementing a cargo revenue management system.
Overbooking, cancellations, and no-shows are not considered in our model. If these are ac-
counted for, a potential future research direction might focus on analyzing optimal decisions.
Further, a study on overbooking levels ensuring the existence of structured optimal decisions
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could be conducted. Furthermore, especially the heuristic based on the piecewise linear approx-
imation would need to be adjusted to a setting with overbooking.
We focused solely on quantity-based decisions. An interesting path of research might be to
apply dynamic pricing techniques to air cargo. Even though this contradicts today’s business
practice, low cost carriers, which already apply dynamic pricing in passenger revenue manage-
ment, may do the same for cargo.
It is common in cargo revenue management that expected revenue is maximized. However,
large freight forwarders have a significant buying power and, if requests are rejected frequently,
might just switch to a different airline. Thus, future work might incorporate the decisions’ long-
term value into the decision model. This topic has already been addressed in passenger revenue
management, but its impact is much greater in the cargo business.
Integrated Capacity Control of Cargo Space and Passenger Seats
All future research directions for the single-leg model apply as well to the integrated model.
Further, particularly interesting might be to extend the integrated capacity control model to a
network of flights. Since, in practice, passenger revenue management is applied at a network
level, an integrated model would probably find a higher acceptance if it is also done at a network
level. This would require more powerful heuristics in order to overcome the increased curse of
dimensionality.
A further promising path of research would be to approximate the value function of the inte-
grated problem (either for a single-leg or a network formulation). Determining the approximation
parameters via simulation or linear programming would give bid prices for weight, volume, and
passenger seats. By means of this information, a price-directed heuristic could be constructed,
which may yield better results than the price-directed heuristic based on the deterministic linear
program that we proposed.
Network Cargo Capacity Control
Our numerical examples showed a superiority of the decomposition heuristic’s bound which we
could not prove analytically. Future work might be aimed at finding revenue allocations for the
decomposition heuristic that can be proven to provide tight bounds and good heuristics.
One of the greatest challenges in our dynamic programming approximations is to efficiently
solve the linearized subproblems in the column generation procedure. Future research might
focus on developing advanced solution techniques for tackling this kind of problem, which arises
due to the penalty cost’s piecewise linear structure. Once this is done, one could also allow for
random capacities within the approximation, which should improve performance.
Another promising path for future research would be to extend the Lagrangian relaxation
techniques, suggested for passenger revenue management, to derive alternative, and possibly
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tighter upper bounds and better heuristics for air cargo network revenue management.
We assumed that the route a shipment travels is uniquely defined by the request. This is true
for small carriers, but it need not hold for large airlines. Thus, future work could address the
challenge of incorporating routing options into the decision problem while still applying revenue
management techniques that are well studied.
We did not account for the availability of container positions in our model. Future research
might analyze how such restrictions can be considered when controlling capacity. A promising
way is to account for them in the terminal cost function. This would require new heuristics for
solving the decision problem.
The network capacity control problem is quite similar to the capacity control problem of cruise
lines. The number of sold cabin categories is usually modeled as the system state and capacity
is given by the number of cabins and lifeboat seats. Thus, future research might study if our
proposed heuristics and bounds would carry over to cruise line revenue management.
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Appendix A
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.2. (i) Fix some s ∈ N0 and a∗ := f(s). Then, we have for all a ∈ A(s) and
a < a∗,
r(a) + h˜(s− a) ≤ r(a∗) + h˜(s− a∗),
and together with concavity of h˜
r(a∗)− r(a) ≥ h˜(s− a)− h˜(s− a∗)
≥ h˜(s+ 1− a)− h˜(s+ 1− a∗).
Since n1(s) ≤ n1(s+ 1), it follows that
r(a) + h˜(s+ 1− a) ≤ r(a∗) + h˜(s+ 1− a∗)
for all a ∈ A(s+ 1) and a < a∗. Thus, we have f(s) ≤ f(s+ 1).
For all a ∈ A(s) and a > a∗, it holds that
r(a) + h˜(s− a) ≤ r(a∗) + h˜(s− a∗),
and together with concavity of r
h˜(s+ 1− (a∗ + 1))− h˜(s+ 1− (a+ 1)) = h˜(s− a∗)− h˜(s− a)
≥ r(a)− r(a∗)
≥ r(a+ 1)− r(a∗ + 1).
143
A Proofs
Since n2(s+ 1) ≤ n2(s) + 1, it follows that
r(a+ 1) + h˜(s+ 1− (a+ 1)) ≤ r(a∗ + 1) + h˜(s+ 1− (a∗ + 1)),
for all a+ 1 ∈ A(s+ 1) and a+ 1 > a∗ + 1. Thus, we have f(s+ 1) ≤ f(s) + 1.
(ii) We prove concavity of h by a case-by-case analysis:
f(s+ 2) = f(s) :
h(s+ 2)− 2h(s+ 1) + h(s) = h˜(s+ 2− a∗)− 2h˜(s+ 1− a∗) + h˜(s− a∗) ≤ 0.
f(s+ 2) = f(s) + 1 :
Let a∗ < n2(s). Due to monotonicity of n2, we have a∗, a∗ + 1 ≤ n2(s + 1). If a∗ = n2(s), it
follows from f(s + 2) = a∗ + 1 ≤ n2(s + 2) and from concavity of n2 that n2(s) < n2(s + 1) ≤
n2(s + 2). Again, we have a
∗, a∗ + 1 ≤ n2(s + 1). Let now a∗ = n1(s) + k for some k ≥ 0. It
follows from the assumption that f(s + 2) = a∗ + 1 = n1(s) + k + 1 ≥ n1(s + 2), and hence
k + 1 ≥ n1(s+ 2)− n1(s). From convexity of n1, it follows that n1(s+ 1)− n1(s) ≤ bk+12 c, and
thus n1(s+ 1) ≤ n1(s) + bk+12 c ≤ n1(s) + k = a∗. Therefore, we have a∗, a∗ + 1 ∈ A(s+ 1), and
it holds that
h(s+ 2)− 2h(s+ 1) + h(s) ≤h˜(s+ 2− a∗ − 1)− h˜(s+ 1− a∗ − 1)
− h˜(s+ 1− a∗) + h˜(s− a∗)
= 0.
f(s+ 2) = f(s) + 2 :
h(s+ 2)− 2h(s+ 1) + h(s) =r(a∗ + 2)− 2r(a∗ + 1) + r(a∗)
+ h˜(s+ 2− a∗ − 2)− 2h˜(s+ 1− a∗ − 1) + h˜(s− a∗)
≤0.
Altogether, we have that h is concave.
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Proof of Lemma 5.2. In order to prove this lemma, we propose an alternative formulation of the
decision model which, however, does not change the value function’s structure. First, we allow
for negative capacities, that means we extend C to C¯ = {...,−1, 0, 1, ...,C} and Cs to C¯s =
{...,−1, 0, 1, ...,Cs}. Second, we define the set of admissible actions as A′(c, cs, i) = {0, ..., γi} for
all i ∈ Iˆ , c ∈ C¯, cs ∈ C¯s. Third, we define the terminal reward function as
V¯0(c, cs, i) = min{c, 0}Φ + min{cs, 0}Φ =: Ψ(c, cs)
for all c ∈ C¯, cs ∈ C¯s, i ∈ Iˆ, and with Φ := maxi∈Iˆ{γiϕi} + 1. Fourth, we define the value
function for min{c, cs} < 0 as
V¯t(c, cs, i) = Ψ(c, cs) = max
a∈A′(c,cs,i)
{aϕi + Q˜t−1V¯t−1(c− a, cs − aσi)} (A.1)
for all t = T, ..., 1 and i ∈ Iˆ. Note that the action maximizing the right hand side in (A.1) is
a = 0, and thus we have V¯t(c, cs, i) = Ψ(c, cs). All other notations and definitions are the same
as in M˜. We denote the maximum expected revenue in state (c, cs, i) at time t = T, ..., 0 as
V¯t(c, cs, i).
Before we prove multimodularity, we first show that V¯t(c, cs, i) = V˜t(c, cs, i) for all c ≥ 0,
cs ≥ 0, i ∈ Iˆ and that negative system states are never occupied. First, consider V¯t(c, cs, i) for
t = T, ..., 1, c ≥ 0, cs ≥ 0, and i ∈ {0, ...,m1}. Then, we have
V¯t(c, cs, i) = max
a∈{0,...,γi}
{
aϕi + Q˜t−1V¯t−1(c− a, cs)
}
. (A.2)
If γi ≤ c, it follows that V¯t(c, cs, i) = V˜t(c, cs, i) since the admissible actions are identical, and
negative system states cannot be reached. Now assume c < a∗ ≤ γi with a∗ as the action
maximizing the right hand side of (A.2). Then, we have
V¯t(c, cs, i) = a
∗ϕi + Q˜t−1V¯t−1(c− a∗, cs) = a∗ϕi + Ψ(c− a∗, cs)
≤ a∗ϕi + (c− a∗)Φ ≤ γiϕi + (c− a∗)Φ ≤ γiϕi −max
i∈Iˆ
{γiϕi} − 1 < 0.
On the other hand, if a∗ ≤ c < γi, we have
V¯t(c, cs, i) = a
∗ϕi + Q˜t−1V¯t−1(c− a∗, cs) ≥ 0.
Accordingly, all actions a with c < a ≤ γi are suboptimal and can thus be neglected. Therefore,
optimal actions are always in the set of admissible actions of M˜ for i ∈ {0, ...,m1}. Further,
since actions satisfying c < a ≤ γi are suboptimal, negative system states are never occupied if
class i ∈ {0, ...,m1} is requested. Now consider V¯t(c, cs, i) for t = T, ..., 1, c ≥ 0, cs ≥ 0, and
145
A Proofs
i ∈ {m1 + 1, ...,m2}. In this case, the optimality equation is
V¯t(c, cs, i) = max
a∈{0,1}
{
aϕi + Q˜t−1V¯t−1(c− a, cs − a)
}
. (A.3)
If γi ≤ c and γi ≤ cs, it follows that V¯t(c, cs, i) = V˜t(c, cs, i) since the admissible actions are
identical, and negative system states cannot be reached. Now assume min{c, cs} < a∗ ≤ γi (i.e.
a∗ = 1) and a∗ maximizes the right hand side of (A.3). Then, we have
V¯t(c, cs, i) = ϕi + Q˜t−1V¯t−1(c− 1, cs − 1)
= ϕi + Ψ(c− 1, cs − 1) ≤ ϕi − Φ = ϕi −max
i∈Iˆ
{ϕi} − 1 < 0.
If a∗ ≤ min{c, cs} < γi (i.e. a∗ = 0) and a∗ maximizes the right hand side of (A.3), we have
V¯t(c, cs, i) = Q˜t−1V¯t−1(c, cs) ≥ 0.
Thus, if min{c, cs} < γi, action a = 1 is suboptimal. Therefore, if i ∈ {m1 + 1, ...,m2}, optimal
actions are always in the set of admissible actions of M˜. This also yields that negative system
states are never occupied.
For t = 0, we have V¯0(c, cs, i) = 0 for all c ≥ 0, cs ≥ 0, and i ∈ Iˆ. Thus, for these values,
V¯0(c, cs, i) = V˜0(c, cs, i). Further, negative systems states are not occupied in the terminal state
for the reasons given above.
In summary, we know that V¯t(c, cs, i) = V˜t(c, cs, i) for t = T, ..., 0, c ≥ 0, cs ≥ 0, and i ∈ Iˆ.
Further, negative system states are not occupied. Thus, if V¯t(c, cs, i) is multimodular in c and
cs, it follows that V˜t(c, cs, i) is also multimodular in c and cs.
We now show that V¯t(c, cs, i) is multimodular in c ∈ C¯ and cs ∈ C¯s. First note that cargo space
and passenger seats are complementary resources since they are required at the same time by
a passenger request. Thus, multimodularity is defined by supermodularity and superconcavity.
The proof follows by induction on t. We first show that V¯0(c, cs, i) = Ψ(c, cs) is multimodular.
For any i ∈ Iˆ, V¯0(c, cs, i) is supermodular in c and cs since
V¯0(c, cs, i)− V¯0(c− 1, cs, i)
= min{c, 0}Φ−min{c− 1, 0}Φ
= min{c, 0}Φ + min{cs + 1, 0}Φ−min{c− 1, 0}Φ−min{cs + 1, 0}Φ
=V¯0(c, cs + 1, i)− V¯0(c− 1, cs + 1, i).
V¯0(c, cs, i) is superconcave in c and cs, which is shown next: For any i ∈ Iˆ, we have
V¯0(c, cs, i)− V¯0(c− 1, cs, i)
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= min{c, 0}Φ−min{c− 1, 0}Φ
≤min{c− 1, 0}Φ−min{c− 2, 0}Φ
= min{c− 1, 0}Φ + min{cs − 1, 0}Φ−min{c− 2, 0}Φ−min{cs − 1, 0}Φ
=V¯0(c− 1, cs − 1, i)− V¯0(c− 2, cs − 1, i),
where the inequality follows from concavity of V¯0(c, cs, i), which is given by its piecewise-linear
structure. We further have
V¯0(c, cs, i)− V¯0(c, cs − 1, i)
= min{cs, 0}Φ−min{cs − 1, 0}Φ
≤min{cs − 1, 0}Φ−min{cs − 2, 0}Φ
= min{c− 1, 0}Φ + min{cs − 1, 0}Φ−min{c− 1, 0}Φ−min{cs − 2, 0}Φ
=V¯0(c− 1, cs − 1, i)− V¯0(c− 1, cs − 2, i).
Therefore, V¯0(c, cs, i) is superconcave and hence multimodular in c and cs for any i ∈ Iˆ.
Now assume V¯t(c, cs, i) is multimodular in c and cs for some t ≥ 0 and i ∈ Iˆ. Since supermodu-
larity and superconcavity are preserved under convex combinations, Q˜tV¯t(c, cs) is multimodular,
too. Consider now the decision period t+ 1.
For i ∈ {0, ...,m1}, c ∈ C¯, and cs ∈ C¯s, we have
V¯t+1(c, cs, i) = max
a∈{0,...,γi}
{aϕi + Q˜tV¯t(c− a, cs)}.
This is of the form
Uj l˜(x, ι) = max
a∈{0,...,nι}
{arι + l(x− aej)}
for j = 1. Since we assume that Q˜tV¯t(c, cs) is multimodular, it follows from Proposition 3.4 that
V¯t+1(c, cs, i) is multimodular in c and cs for all i ∈ {0, ...,m1}.
For i ∈ {m1 + 1, ...,m2}, c ∈ C¯, and cs ∈ C¯s, we have
V¯t+1(c, cs, i) = max
a∈{0,1}
{aϕi + Q˜tV¯t(c− a, cs − a)}.
This is of the form
Ul˜(x, ι) = max
a∈{0,1}
{arι + l(x− a)}.
Here it follows from the induction assumption and from Proposition 3.3 that V¯t+1(c, cs, i) is
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multimodular in c and cs for all i ∈ {m1 + 1, ...,m2}.
In summary, V¯t+1(c, cs, i) is multimodular in c ∈ C¯ and cs ∈ C¯s for all i ∈ Iˆ. Hence, we can
conclude that V˜t+1(c, cs, i) is multimodular in c ∈ C and cs ∈ Cs for i ∈ Iˆ.
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Dual Problems
The dual of (P˜AFA) is (D˜AFA):
max
X
∑
1≤t≤T,c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a
∑
i∈I
qt,iρiai −
∑
c∈C1,a∈A
X1,c,a
∑
i′∈I
q1,i′
∑
l∈Lφwl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl
+
s.t.
∑
c∈C1,a∈A
X1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i
=
∑
1<t≤T,c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
qt,iaiw¯i ∀l ∈ L
∑
c∈C1,a∈A
X1,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i
=
∑
1<t≤T,c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
qt,iaiv¯i ∀l ∈ L
∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a =

∑
c∈Ct+1,a∈A
Xt+1,c,a ∀1 ≤ t < T
1 t = T
Xt,c,a ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T, c ∈ Ct,a ∈ A.
149
B Dual Problems
The dual of (PPLA) is (DPLA):
max
X
∑
1≤t≤T,c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a
∑
i∈I
qt,iρiai −
∑
c∈C1,a∈A
X1,c,a
∑
i′∈I
q1,i′
∑
l∈Lφwl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl
+ + φvl
∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl
+
s.t.
∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a min
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i, k¯
w
l

=

∑
c∈Ct+1,a∈A
Xt+1,c,a
∑
i′∈I
qt+1,i′ min
{ ∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i, k¯wl
}
∀l ∈ L, 1 ≤ t < T
0 ∀l ∈ L, t = T
∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a min
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i, k¯
v
l

=

∑
c∈Ct+1,a∈A
Xt+1,c,a
∑
i′∈I
qt+1,i′ min
{ ∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i, k¯vl
}
∀l ∈ L, 1 ≤ t < T
0 ∀l ∈ L, t = T
∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
ciw¯i − k¯wl
+
=

∑
c∈Ct+1,a∈A
Xt+1,c,a
∑
i′∈I
qt+1,i′
( ∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})w¯i − k¯wl
)+
∀l ∈ L, 1 ≤ t < T
0 ∀l ∈ L, t = T
∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a
∑
i∈I(l)
civ¯i − k¯vl
+
=

∑
c∈Ct+1,a∈A
Xt+1,c,a
∑
i′∈I
qt+1,i′
( ∑
i∈I(l)
(ci + ai′1{i=i′})v¯i − k¯vl
)+
∀l ∈ L, 1 ≤ t < T
0 ∀l ∈ L, t = T
∑
c∈Ct,a∈A
Xt,c,a =

∑
c∈Ct+1,a∈A
Xt+1,c,a ∀1 ≤ t < T
1 t = T
Xt,c,a ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T, c ∈ Ct,a ∈ A.
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Request Classes in Network
Experiments
Class Mean Weight Mean Volume Itinerary Per-unit revenue
1 50 30 A-H 1.4
2 50 29 B-A 1.4
3 50 27 C-A 1.4
4 50 25 A-B 1.4
5 100 59 C-H 1.4
6 100 58 B-C 1.4
7 100 55 A-C 1.4
8 100 52 C-D 1.4
9 200 125 C-A 1.4
10 200 119 B-C 1.4
11 200 100 B-A 1.4
12 250 147 H-D 1.4
13 250 138 A-H 1.4
14 300 179 D-C 1.4
15 400 235 H-D 1.4
16 500 277 A-C 1.4
17 1000 598 B-A 1.4
18 1500 898 H-D 1.4
19 2500 1488 A-B 1.4
20 3500 2083 D-A 1.4
21 70 233 B-C 1.4
22 70 17 C-A 1.4
23 210 700 A-B 1.4
24 210 52 D-C 1.4
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25 50 30 C-D 0.7
26 50 29 A-C 0.7
27 50 27 C-H 0.7
28 50 25 C-B 0.7
29 100 59 A-H 0.7
30 100 58 H-D 0.7
31 100 55 A-B 0.7
32 100 52 B-C 0.7
33 200 125 C-B 0.7
34 200 119 A-D 0.7
35 200 100 C-B 0.7
36 250 147 B-A 0.7
37 250 138 A-B 0.7
38 300 179 C-H 0.7
39 400 235 D-A 0.7
40 500 277 A-H 0.7
41 1000 598 A-B 0.7
42 1500 898 C-D 0.7
43 2500 1488 D-C 0.7
44 3500 2083 B-C 0.7
45 70 233 B-C 0.7
46 70 17 D-A 0.7
47 210 700 H-D 0.7
48 210 52 A-C 0.7
49 50 30 C-H 1
50 50 29 A-D 1
51 50 27 C-B 1
52 50 25 A-B 1
53 100 59 H-D 1
54 100 58 B-A 1
55 100 55 B-C 1
56 100 52 C-H 1
57 200 125 A-H 1
58 200 119 D-A 1
59 200 100 D-C 1
60 250 147 B-C 1
61 250 138 C-D 1
62 300 179 A-C 1
63 400 235 H-D 1
64 500 277 C-H 1
65 1000 598 A-B 1
66 1500 898 D-A 1
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67 2500 1488 B-A 1
68 3500 2083 C-H 1
69 70 233 C-D 1
70 70 17 A-H 1
71 210 700 A-D 1
72 210 52 D-C 1
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